Communications Workers of America, Local 5714 v. Reeb

• Decision Date: 15 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-8707-CV-270,49A02-8707-CV-270
• Citation: 520 N.E.2d 111
• Parties: 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3019, 122 Lab.Cas. P 56,912 COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 5714 and Communications Workers of America, Local 5800, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Marilyn F. REEB and Sylvia T. Megnis, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 111

520 N.E.2d 111

128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3019, 122 Lab.Cas. P 56,912

COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 5714 and Communications Workers of America, Local 5800 Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Marilyn F. REEB and Sylvia T. Megnis, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 49A02-8707-CV-270.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

First District.

March 15, 1988.

John F. Schmitt, Judith T. Kirtland, Lewis, Bowman, St. Clair & Wagner, Indianapolis, James B. Coppess, Communications Workers of America, Legal Dept., Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Susan M. Mann, and Allen N. Smith, Jr., Moore, Smith & Bryant, Indianapolis, for defendants-appellees.

RATLIFF, Chief Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal involves the consolidation of two (2) cases brought by the Communications Workers of America, Locals 5714 and 5800 to enforce and collect fines imposed under the Union's constitution. Both cases were heard and decided by the Marion County Municipal Court. Local 5714 appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Marilyn F. Reeb. Local 5800 appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of Sylvia T. Megnis. In both cases the trial court ruled that the Union's claims violated the public policy of this state as codified in Indiana Code section 22-6-2-1 et seq. We reverse both decisions and remand for a trial on the merits of Local 5714's claim against Reeb and order judgment in favor of Local 5800 on the claim against Megnis.

FACTS

On August 7, 1983, the Communications Workers of America Union, including Locals 5714 and 5800, commenced a nationwide strike against the Bell Telephone Systems, including the Indiana Bell Telephone Company. Marilyn Reeb and Sylvia Megnis allegedly crossed union picket lines and worked during the strike. Locals 5714 and 5800 pursuant to union rules charged Reeb

and Megnis with violations of the Union's constitution, Article XIX, section 1, which provides that members of the union may be fined for working during an authorized strike. Both Reeb and Megnis were given notice of their respective charge and hearing thereon. After the hearings before a union committee, both were found guilty of violating the Union's constitution and fined accordingly. The Locals demanded payment from Reeb and Megnis. Neither Reeb nor Megnis paid their respective fines.

APPEAL BY LOCAL 5714

Local 5714 filed suit against Reeb, to collect the fine levied for crossing the picket line in violation of the Union's constitution. Thereafter, Reeb filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the Union's strike and fine for working behind picket lines violated Indiana's Public Utility Anti-Strike Act, Ind.Code Sec. 22-6-2-1 et seq. Local 5714 responded and argued that the strike was protected under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 141 et seq. (hereinafter LMRA) which pre-empted the Indiana Act. The Union also filed a motion for summary judgment and filed exhibits and affidavits to establish Reeb's status as a full member of the Union. Reeb filed a memorandum in opposition and an affidavit alleging non-membership. The trial court granted Reeb's motion for summary judgment and denied Local 5714's motion on the ground that the fines grew out of an illegal strike. The court stated:

"It is clear from reading the statutes I.C. 22-6-2-1 et seq. that it is against the public policy of this state as expressed by the Indiana Legislature for employees of public utilities to strike. Therefore, this Court cannot enforce plaintiff's claim which is in clear violation of these statutes. Furthermore, to enforce plaintiff's claim would be to encourage the parties in the future to commit a Class B misdemeanor."

Record at 66. Local 5714 appeals from this ruling.

APPEAL BY LOCAL 5800

Local 5800 filed suit to collect the fine levied against Megnis for crossing the picket line in violation of the Union's constitution. Although the original charges made before the union committee suggested Megnis worked for six (6) days in violation of the Union's constitution, the fine imposed and sought in court by the Union was for only two (2) days (i.e., the days Megnis worked behind the picket lines prior to her August 15, 1983, resignation from Union membership). Although both parties filed motions for summary judgment, the trial court did not rule on the motions, and the case proceeded to trial. After Local 5800 presented evidence the trial court entered judgment in favor of Megnis. The trial court determined that the Union's claim violated the public policy of the state as provided in Indiana Code Sec. 22-6-2-1. Local 5800 appeals this determination and judgment.

ISSUES

Consolidated, three (3) issues are presented for review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by holding that the Union's claims for fines were prohibited by Indiana Code section 22-6-2-1 et seq.?

2. Whether Local 5714's claim for fines against Reeb is enforceable by a motion for summary judgment?

3. Whether Local 5800's claim for fines against Megnis is enforceable as a matter of law?

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Issue One

The Union argues that the trial court erred by relying on Indiana's Public Utility Anti-Strike Act, Ind.Code Sec. 22-6-2-1 et seq. to hold that the claims for fines were unenforceable as violative of public policy. The Union argues that the Indiana statute is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq. because the Indiana statute conflicts with the federal act. Thus, the Union argues that the trial court erroneously relied upon a statute that is void and unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of the United States constitution, Article VI, clause 2. The Union is correct. Therefore, the trial court's rulings rejecting the Union's claims for fines are reversed.

A state statute that encompasses and regulates the same area as a federal statute may be pre-empted and found unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Golden State Transit v. City of Los Angeles (1986), 475 U.S. 608, 613, 106 S.Ct. 1395, 1398, 89 L.Ed.2d 616, 623; Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Int'l Union, Local 54 (1984), 468 U.S. 491, 500-01, 104 S.Ct. 3179, 3185, 82 L.Ed.2d 373, 382-83; Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees of America, Div. 988 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (1951), 374 U.S. 74, 82, 83 S.Ct. 1657, 1662, 10 L.Ed.2d 763, 768 (Bus Employees II); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (1951), 340 U.S. 383, 399, 71 S.Ct. 359, 368, 95 L.Ed. 364, 378 (Bus Employees I ). In Golden State Transit, the United States Supreme Court outlined the principles of pre-emption as applied to the NLRA as follows:

"Last Term, in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985), we again noted: 'The Court has articulated two distinct NLRA pre-emption principles.' Id., at , 105 S.Ct., at 2394. See, also, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 498-499, 103 S.Ct. 3172, 3176-3177, 77 L.Ed.2d 798 (1983). The first, the so-called Garmon pre-emption, see San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), prohibits States from regulating 'activity that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits.' Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. , , 106 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 89 L.Ed.2d 223, (1986). The Garmon rule is intended to preclude state interference with the Labor Board's interpretation and active enforcement of the 'integrated scheme of regulation' established by the NLRA. Id., at , 106 S.Ct., at 1062. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S., at [748-49] and n. 26, 105 S.Ct., at 2394 and n. 26 (1985).

"This case, however, concerns the second pre-emption principle, the so-called Machinists pre-emption. See Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976). This precludes state and municipal regulation 'concerning conduct that Congress intended to be unregulated.' Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S., at , 105 S.Ct., at 2394. Although the labor-management relationship is structured by the NLRA, certain areas intentionally have been left ' "to be controlled by the free play of economic forces." ' Machinists, 427 U.S., at 140, 96 S.Ct., at 2553, quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144, 92 S.Ct. 373, 377, 30 L.Ed.2d 328 (1971). The Court recognized in Machinists that ' "Congress has been rather specific when it has come to outlaw particular economic weapons," ' 427 U.S., at 143, 96 S.Ct., at 2555, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 498, 80 S.Ct. 419, 421, 4 L.Ed.2d 454 (1960), and that Congress' decision to prohibit certain forms of economic pressure while leaving others unregulated represents an intentional balance ' "between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective interests." ' Machinists, 427 U.S., at 146, 96 S.Ct., at 2556, quoting Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258-259, 84 S.Ct. 1253, 1257-1258, 12 L.Ed.2d 280 (1964). States are therefore prohibited from imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons of self-help, such as strikes or lockouts, see 427 U.S., at 147, 96 S.Ct., at 2556, unless such restrictions presumably were contemplated by Congress. 'Whether self-help economic activities are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding pre-emption is the same: whether "the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effective implementation of the Act's processes." ' Id., at 147-148, 96 S.Ct., at 2557, quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380, 89 S.Ct. 1109, 1116, 22 L.Ed.2d 344 (1969)."

Golden State Transit, 475 U.S. at 613-15, 106 S.Ct. at 1398-99, 89 L.Ed.2d at 623-24. Under the foregoing...