Community Realty Management, Inc. for Wrightstown Arms Apartments v. Harris

• Decision Date: 20 July 1998
• Citation: 714 A.2d 282,155 N.J. 212
• Parties: COMMUNITY REALTY MANAGEMENT, INC., FOR WRIGHTSTOWN ARMS APARTMENTS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Nedra HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 212

155 N.J. 212

714 A.2d 282

COMMUNITY REALTY MANAGEMENT, INC., FOR WRIGHTSTOWN ARMS APARTMENTS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Nedra HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Jan. 5, 1998.

Decided July 20, 1998.

Larry D. DeCosta, Supervising Attorney, Camden Regional Legal Services, Inc., for appellant.

Robert P. Weishoff, Mount Holly, for plaintiff-respondent (Mr. Weishoff, attorney; Michael S. Rothmel, of counsel and on the brief).

Melville D. Miller, Jr., Edison, for amicus curiae, Legal Services of New Jersey, Inc. (Mr. Miller President, attorney; Mr. Miller and Joseph Harris David, on the brief).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

COLEMAN, J.

This appeal involves summary proceedings to dispossess a tenant for non-payment of rent. The appeal focuses on the adequacy of procedures to protect pro se tenants. Two significant issues raised are whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to vacate a consent judgment for possession pursuant to Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 639 A.2d 286 (1994), and whether Burlington County's summary dispossess procedures adequately protect pro se tenants.

The trial court refused to vacate the judgment for possession and the Appellate Division affirmed in an unreported decision. We granted certification, 151 N.J. 74, 697 A.2d 546 (1997), and now reverse.

I

Defendant Nedra Harris resides in Wrightstown Arms Apartments, a Section 8 housing development constructed under the National Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437, to provide low-income housing. As the owner, Community Realty Management, Inc. (Community) receives federal subsidies enabling it to provide housing at reduced rents, but obligating it to comply with federal housing regulations.

Harris rents an apartment at Wrightstown Arms where she resides with her two minor children. She entered into a lease with Community for a term commencing April 19, 1993 and terminating March 31, 1994. Although Harris and Community did not execute a new lease at the expiration of the one year term, the original lease provided that "after the initial term ends, the Agreement will continue for successive terms of one month each unless automatically terminated as permitted by paragraph 23 of this Agreement." Thus, Harris remained in the apartment as a month-to-month tenant under the same terms of the original lease.

When Harris failed to pay her monthly rent of $133 on June 1, 1995, Community served Harris with a Notice to Quit. The Notice stated that Harris's tenancy was terminated effective June 22, 1995, and advised her that Community would seek eviction proceedings if she remained in the premises after June 22. On June 20, 1995, Community received a letter from Harris stating that she would be unable to pay her rent until Friday, June 23, 1995. On June 22, 1995, Community nonetheless filed a complaint for summary dispossess for non-payment of rent based on N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1a. The complaint alleged $236.50 in back rent, representing $133 for June rent, $31 in prior late charges, $30 in late charges for non-payment of June rent, $17.50 in damages, and $25 in contract costs. The complaint also requested $125 in attorney's fees and $18 in court costs for a total of $379.50.

On July 14, 1995, the return date of the summary dispossess proceeding, Harris appeared in court without the assistance of an attorney. The trial court gave the following general instructions to litigants prior to the docket call:

I should explain to you, ladies and gentlemen, that the procedure will be I will call the list and then we will take a recess so that the cases where both parties are present there will be an opportunity for the folks to speak with one another and then we'll recall the list to see which matters actually have to be tried and then try them.

After I finish calling the list I will explain the principles in a general way that apply to the landlord and tenant law....

Following the docket call, the court gave further instructions regarding non-payment cases:

In the case of nonpayment of rent the legislature has said that the tenant must pay the rent on time and in full, and if the tenant doesn't the landlord's entitled to a judgment for possession.

It's important for you to realize that we're all adults here, and we realize when rent is not paid usually it's because a person has run into a difficult situation.... So, there's no moral criticism or we're not saying people are bad persons, but on the other hand, I have no choice but to enter a judgment for possession.

The court also informed the tenants that

Some folks may be in a position where certain agencies may be able to provide assistance, and through the Department of Consumer Affairs ... there are representatives from both the Welfare Board and emergency services who can talk to people who may feel ... that they may be qualified for some assistance.

Thereafter, the court recessed. During the recess, Harris informed Community's attorney, Robert Weishoff, that she was unable to pay the back-due monies. Weishoff, in turn, informed the court clerk who entered a judgment for possession. Harris told the clerk she would make the full payment within eleven days. Eleven days later, on July 25, Harris paid the $379.50 demanded in the complaint as well as July rent of $133 plus $109 in late charges, totaling $621.50. She then signed a consent agreement staying the issuance of a warrant for removal until December 31, 1995. The agreement was a hardship stay pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.6.

On November 3, 1995, Community sent Harris a letter stating: "On July 25, 1995 through the Burlington County Superior Court of New Jersey a consent order was entered staying the order of removal until December 31, 1995. This letter is a reminder that per that order on December 31, 1995 you are to vacate the premises." When Harris failed to vacate the apartment by December 31, 1995, Community obtained a warrant for her removal on January 3, 1996, with an execution date of January 12, 1996. Represented by counsel for the first time, Harris filed an order to show cause, seeking to vacate the judgment for possession.

The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 12, 1996. At the hearing, Harris testified that she spoke with Weishoff at the summary dispossess proceedings while the court was in recess. Although Weishoff did not remember speaking with Harris, he stated in an unsworn statement that he always follows the same procedure. First, he calls the tenants who are present to counsel's table. Then, he informs them that if they pay the money they owe by 4:30 p.m., their cases will be dismissed. He also informs the tenants that if they do not have the money they owe, they can attempt to negotiate a deal with the landlord and memorialize their agreement in writing. In particular, he stated that he advises tenants to utilize the form consent order promulgated by the Burlington County Court, a copy of which has not been provided to us.

Weishoff also stated that he tells tenants that if they are unable to pay and are not able to negotiate an agreement with the landlord, they will have eleven days to post the rent before a lockout. In response to the trial court's requested explanation of the meaning of a lockout, Weishoff explained that a lockout occurs when a judgment for possession has been entered and a landlord petitions the court for a warrant of removal. The Special Civil Part then gives the warrant to a constable who serves it on the tenant. Seventy-two hours later, the constable is directed to lock out the tenant.

Weishoff also stated that he informs tenants that they may be eligible to receive funds from public agencies. He stated that he explains the terms of a hardship stay to tenants, including that all back monies must be paid, all future rent must be paid on the first calendar day of the month, the landlord's property may not be destroyed, and the tenant may not disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood. Finally, Weishoff stated that he calls each tenant over to counsel's table individually and informs the tenant of the amount he or she owes, including late charges. He then asks the tenant if he or she has the money at that time. If the tenant says no, he tells the tenant that the landlord will take a judgment for possession that day.

Describing her recollection of the conversation with Weishoff, Harris stated, "I told him I didn't have all the money right then and there. He said I have eleven days to get it--to get it together so I left." Harris stated that she gave her name to the court clerk indicating that she would make payment within eleven days. Thereafter, the court clerk noted a judgment for possession by writing "7-14-95-J" on the court list.

Harris also explained that on July 25, 1995, eleven days after the judgment for possession was entered by the clerk, she went to the clerk's office to remit payment. It is undisputed that while Harris was there, the clerk called Weishoff's office to determine the amount due. Weishoff's paralegal informed the clerk that Harris owed $621.50 as of that day, representing an additional $242 that included Harris's July rent of $133 plus $109 late fees for June and July. Harris paid the $621.50 and received a receipt. The receipt given by the court clerk informed Harris to go to Weishoff's office to sign a consent agreement staying the warrant of removal.

Harris went to Weishoff's office and met with a paralegal, Denise Yanzuk, who regularly prepares hardship stays. Yanzuk prepared Harris's consent order to stay the warrant of removal. At trial, Yanzuk testified that when a tenant comes into the office she normally shows the order to the tenant and goes "through paragraph by paragraph and, basically, read[s] it to them or explain[s] each paragraph." Additionally, Yanzuk, explained that when a tenant asks about what happens at the end of a hardship stay, she responds that "the...