Community State Bank v. Martin

Citation144 Wash. 483,258 P. 498
Decision Date29 July 1927
Docket Number20281.
PartiesCOMMUNITY STATE BANK v. MARTIN et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Yakima County; A. W. Hawkins, Judge.

Action by the Community State Bank against Jacob Martin and wife and others. Judgment dismissing plaintiff's action, except as against defendants Martin, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Grady &amp Velikanje, of Yakima, for appellant.

Richards Gilbert & Conklin, of Yakima, for respondents.

MAIN, J.

As to the defendants Jacob Martin and wife this action was brought to foreclose a chattel mortgage. As to the other defendants damages were sought because they had purchased certain property claimed to have been covered by the mortgage and had failed to account to the plaintiff for the purchase price. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the defendants other than Martin and wife challenged the sufficiency thereof and moved for a dismissal. This motion was granted. Judgment was entered against Martin and wife for the sum of $772.44 together with interest thereon, which was the balance due upon the note secured by the mortgage, and the plaintiff appeals from the judgment of dismissal. Only the respondent Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, a corporation, appears in this court.

On January 13, 1923, Jacob Martin gave a chattel mortgage to the appellant which specifically covered certain horses, farm machinery, etc. The mortgage then provided:

'Also the following described crops now growing and to be grown and harvested in the season of 1923 upon the following described real estate in Yakima county, state of Washington which is now leased by the party of the first part, to wit: The southwest quarter of the southeast quarter and the northeast quarter of the southwest quarter of section 5 and the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of section 5, all in township 9 north, range 22 east, Willamette meridian, containing 87 acres more or less.'

At this time Martin had no lease for the land for the year 1923, but on March 9, 1923, the respondent leased to him the property described in the chattel mortgage together with other property for that year. During the season covered by the mortgage Martin raised beets, potatoes, hay, and straw, and, as stated, the purchasers thereof of which the respondent was one did not account to the appellant for the purchase price.

The first question is whether the description of the crops to be grown during the season of 1923 was sufficient. The rule is in such cases that the mortgage must point out the subject-matter covered thereby so that the purchasers thereof may be able to identify the property intended to be covered together with such inquiry as the instrument suggests. In Stickney v. Dunaway & Lambert, 169 Ala. 464, 53 So. 770, it is said:

'In order to impute to a purchaser of a mortgaged chattel notice that such chattel is subject to the lien of the mortgage, it is not essential that the chattel bought should answer, with entire exactness, to the whole description written in the recorded instrument. As between mortgagees and purchasers, the rule, as stated by Judge Freeman in Barrett v. Fisch (Iowa) 14 Am. St. Rep. at page 242, is: 'The mortgage * * * must point out the subject-matter of it, so that such persons (purchasers) by it, together with such inquiries as the instrument suggests, may be able to identify the property intended to be covered.''

The cases of Mott v. Johnson, 112 Wash. 18, 191 P. 844, Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Small, 131 Wash. 197, 229 P. 531, Collerd v. Tully, 77 N. J. Eq. 439, 77 A. 1079, and Williamson v. Payne, 103 Va. 551, 49 S.E. 660, are to the same effect regarding the statement of the rule. The description of the property as contained in the mortgage is sufficient, if it directs an inquiring mind to evidence where the precise thing mortgaged may be ascertained. In Ormsby v. Nolan, 69 Iowa, 130, 28 N.W. 569, it is said:

'The description of the property as contained in the mortgage must direct the mind to evidence whereby the precise thing conveyed, may be ascertained, and if thereby absolute certainty may be attained, the instrument is valid; otherwise it is void as to third parties for uncertainty.'

There are innumerable cases upon the question of the sufficiency of the description of property in chattel mortgages, some, of course, holding the description sufficient, and others to the contrary. Each case must be determined largely from its particular facts. In other words, the question is, Do the particular facts of a given case bring it within the rule stated about which there is little, if any, controversy? In the present case the mortgage specifies the year and describes accurately the land on which the crops were to be produced. It purports to cover crops grown during that year upon the land described. It was sufficient to suggest an inquiry as to the crops and by such inquiry, if pursued, the crops covered by the mortgage could have been ascertained with certainty. It is true that in the printed portion of the mortgage the words 'following described' are used and the crops to be produced are not particularly described as this language would indicate. It does not appear to us, however, that these words should be given the effect of destroying the sufficiency of the description which otherwise would satisfy the governing rule in such cases. It is our view that the mortgage was not invalid because of the insufficiency of the description.

The next question is whether the mortgage is invalid because at the time it was executed the mortgagor had no interest in the land on which the crops were to be grown, the mortgage having been executed prior to the time of the making of the lease. In this state the right to mortgage crops before they shall have been sown or planted is authorized, provided that the making of such a mortgage for more than one year in advance of the seeding or planting is forbidden. Rem. Comp. Stat. § 3779. That statute does not cover the question presented. It only recognizes and authorizes the right to mortgage crops sown within the limits specified. Upon the precise question there are not many adjudicated cases so far as we are informed. In Hogan v. Atlantic Elevator Co., 66 Minn. 344, 69 N.W. 1, it was held that a chattel mortgage of property not then owned, but to be thereafter acquired, was valid. It was there said:

'The further point is made that there was no evidence that at the time the mortgage was executed the mortgagor was in possession of, or had any interest in, the land on which this grain was raised, and hence that the grain had not even a potential existence, and was incapable of being the subject of a mortgage. This is fully disposed of by the case of Ludlum v. Rothschild, 41 Minn. 218, 43 N.W. 137, in which this court went entirely beyond the doctrine of 'potential existence,' and adopted the rule in equity, holding that where parties, by their contract, in clear terms express an intention to create a mortgage lien upon personal property, not then owned, but to be subsequently acquired, by the mortgagor, whether then in being or not, the mortgage attaches as a lien on the property as soon as the mortgagor acquires it.'

In Ludlum v. Rothschild, 41 Minn. 218, 43 N.W. 137, the same court said:

'We are of opinion that, except in cases prohibited by statute (see [Gen.] Laws 1887, c. 176), whenever the parties by their contract in clear terms express an intention to create a positive lien upon personal property not then owned, but to be subsequently acquired, by the mortgagor, whether then in esse or not, the mortgage attaches as a lien on the property as soon as the mortgagor acquires it, as against the mortgagor and all claiming under him, either by voluntary transfer or with notice, precisely as if the property had been in being and belonged to the mortgagor when the mortgage was executed.'

In Richardson v. Washington, 88 Tex. 339, 31 S.W. 614, the Supreme Court of Texas supports the same doctrine. It was there said:

'It is well established that a mortgage of the personal and real property of a railway to be hereafter acquired, that a mortgage of crops to be raised during a series of years to secure rents, that a mortgage of the earnings of a ship on future voyages to
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5 cases
  • Mackall-Paine Veneer Co. v. Vancouver Plywood Co.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 7 Mayo 1934
    ... ... being duly authorized to do business in this state, operated ... a large business in Vancouver, Wash., in the ... case in this respect is controlled by the case of Bank of ... California v. Clear Lake Lumber Co., 146 Wash. 543, 264 ... In ... Community State Bank v. Martin, 144 Wash. 483, 258 ... P. 498, 500, we quoted ... ...
  • Fisher v. Thumlert
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 8 Marzo 1938
    ... ... laws of the state of Washington, that the contract by which ... he purchased the ... the property is legally sufficient. Community State Bank ... v. Martin, 144 Wash. 483, 258 P. 498 ... ...
  • Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. v. Fruit Production Co.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 9 Diciembre 1935
    ... ... Third Nat'1 Bank v. Kniffen, 143 Wash. 434, 255 ... P. 378; Farmers' State Bank v. ick, 143 Wash ... 614, 255 P. [184 Wash. 573] 915; Community State Bank v ... Martin, 144 Wash. 483, 258 P. 498 ... ...
  • Simons v. Lee James Finance Co.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 5 Mayo 1960
    ...by the terms of which title to the chattels remained in respondents until the full purchase price was paid. In Community State Bank v. Martin, 1927, 144 Wash. 483, 258 P. 498, 501, this court quoted with approval the case of United States v. New Orleans & O. Railroad, 12 Wall. 362, 79 U.S. ......
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