Commw. v. David St. Peter

• Decision Date: 02 February 2000
• Docket Number: P-1629
• Citation: 48 Mass. App. Ct. 517,722 N.E.2d 1002
• Parties: (Mass.App.Ct. 2000) COMMONWEALTH vs. DAVID ST. PETER. No.: 96-
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

722 N.E.2d 1002 (Mass.App.Ct. 2000)

COMMONWEALTH vs. DAVID ST. PETER.

No.: 96-P-1629

MASSACHUSETTS COURT OF APPEALS

Argued June 8, 1999.

February 2, 2000

Barnstable County.

Present: Kass, Porada, & Gelinas, JJ.

Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Waiver of constitutional rights, Assistance of

counsel. Practice, Criminal, Admissions and confessions, Waiver, Voluntariness of statement,

Assistance of counsel, Instructions to jury. Waiver. Intoxication. Evidence, Photograph,

Inflammatory evidence, Judicial discretion.

Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on October 26, 1993.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Gerald F. O'Neill, Jr., J., and the cases were

tried before him.

Daniel J. Johnedis for the defendant.

J. Thomas Kirkman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

GELINAS, J.

The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of manslaughter, G.

L. c. 265, 13, and assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, 13A, following the death of his girlfriend.

He appeals, claiming error in (1) the denial of his motion to suppress four statements made to the

police while he was in custody; (2) the admission in evidence of certain photographs taken at and

after an autopsy performed on the victim; and (3) certain of the judge's instructions to the jury.

We affirm the convictions.

We summarize the evidence presented at trial, reserving certain details for our discussion of the

claimed errors.

During the late evening hours of August 22, 1993, and the early morning hours of August 23,

1993, the defendant consumed a considerable amount of alcohol and painkilling medication, in

preparation for, and in amelioration of, the pain attendant on self-extraction of his diseased tooth.

He extracted the tooth in the early morning of August 23, suffering pain, bleeding, and swelling.

The resulting effects of the alcohol, medication, and extraction caused him to miss his work

assignment on the 6 A.M. sailing of the Captain Bob, his brother's charter fishing boat. By early

afternoon, feeling somewhat better but not yet ready to work, the defendant persuaded his brother

to permit him to join the afternoon sailing to relax and recuperate. He boarded the boat along

with twenty paying passengers and the victim. He and the victim repaired to a small

compartment below deck in the forward area of the boat. During the next few hours, as the boat

moved from one fishing spot to another, several passengers and one of the crew heard the

defendant and the victim arguing violently (the quarrel was about the victim's having spent the

prior night at a bar drinking). They also saw the defendant strike the victim more than once. The

victim stayed on the deck momentarily and then returned to the forward compartment. More

arguing and thuds were heard. These stopped after a time, and, following a period of quiet, the

defendant came on deck, reporting to his brother that the victim had suffered a heart attack. He

stated that, despite his efforts to revive her with water and CPR, she was dead. The boat returned

to port, where members of the police and fire department were waiting. After removal of the

body, the police talked with the passengers and crew, including the defendant. The defendant

volunteered that the victim, upon returning to the compartment, had slipped on the

companionway ladder, fallen into the compartment, and become unconscious. His efforts at

revival proving futile, he had then reported the incident to his brother. The police did not

question the defendant at this time. About an hour after the boat docked, the police determined

that there was an outstanding three year old warrant for the defendant's arrest on a complaint for

driving while under the influence (DUI). The police arrested the defendant on the warrant, and he

was transported to the Barnstable police station, where he was booked. At the arrest and again at

booking, he was advised of his rights, including the warnings prescribed in Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

1. The motion to suppress. By a motion to suppress, and later by objection at trial, the defendant

sought to keep from the jury four statements that he gave while in police custody. He complains

that (a) the judge failed to consider whether the waiver of his rights afforded by Miranda v.

Arizona, supra, was knowing and voluntary; (b) the statements themselves, as well as the

waivers, were not voluntary due to his low level of intelligence, his emotional state, and his

consumption of alcohol; and (c) the attorney appointed to represent him on the unrelated DUI

charge, who was present in the building, was not notified prior to his being questioned by police

at the Barnstable court house.

The judge's findings reflect his consideration of the defendant's age, education, intelligence and

emotional stability, his experience in the criminal justice system, his physical and mental

condition, his lack of sobriety, and the details of the interrogation, including the conduct of the

police. These appropriate "relevant factors" apply with respect to the voluntariness of the

Miranda waivers and the statements. See Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413

(1986); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 673 (1995).

a. The Miranda warnings. The defendant contends that the judge failed to consider and rule on

whether his waiver of Miranda rights was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. As to the first

statement, when the officer at booking was completing his reading of the Miranda warnings, the

defendant, unsolicited, said, "That's a bad one. I might have just killed someone." Although the

defendant was in custody, no one had asked him a question; his statement was entirely

spontaneous. "Miranda warnings are only necessary where one is the subject of 'custody and

official interrogation'" (emphasis supplied). Commonwealth v. Larkin, 429 Mass. 426, 432

(1999), quoting from Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990). Here, there was no

interrogation, and thus the standards set by Miranda were not violated.

With regard to the remaining statements, the Commonwealth's burden is to show, beyond a

reasonable doubt and in light of all the circumstances, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary

waiver. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 425 Mass. 361, 366 (1997). A judge's failure to make

findings regarding waivers of Miranda rights is not fatal where the judge's conclusion is "clearly

evident from the record." Commonwealth v. Parham, 390 Mass. 833, 837-838 (1984), quoting

from Commonwealth v. Brady, 380 Mass. 44, 52 (1980). The judge's findings here explicitly

address the voluntariness of the statements and include the facts that Miranda warnings had been

given, that the defendant indicated that he understood those rights, and that he waived those

rights. It is, therefore, "clearly evident from the record" that the judge determined that the

waivers were valid. Commonwealth v. Parham, supra.

Moreover, although "[t]he voluntariness of . . . waiver[s] on the basis of Miranda and the

voluntariness of . . . statements on due process grounds are separate and distinct issues,"

Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra at 673, in the circumstances of this case, where the Miranda

warnings immediately preceded the statements and the judge made findings regarding the

voluntariness of the statements, we view those findings as relevant to the waivers. See

Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra. On review of the record and the judge's findings, as set forth

below, we conclude that the waivers were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, supra.

b. Voluntariness. The defendant argues that, because he was under the influence of drugs and

alcohol and was of limited intelligence, his waivers and any statements he made could not have

been made voluntarily. We give "substantial deference to the judge's ultimate conclusions and we

will not reject a judge's subsidiary findings if they are warranted by the evidence,"

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 425 Mass. at 364, quoting from Commonwealth v. Mandile, supra

at 412; we accept his resolution of conflicting testimony, Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass.

140, 144, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982), and "we conduct an independent review to

ascertain whether the judge properly applied the law." Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, supra. Here,

there was testimony from police officers, some of whom had known the defendant over a long

period of time,¹ concerning the defendant's condition. They described him at the relevant times

as coherent, lucid, although somewhat nervous and in discomfort from the tooth extraction,

walking and speaking normally, and understanding and answering questions in a rational manner.

The first police questioning, after Miranda warnings, took place some four hours after the

defendant's arrest and at least five hours after he had ingested alcohol, and the second, also after

Miranda warnings and resulting in two statements, came the next day. The defendant was

evaluated by a clinical psychologist who testified at the suppression hearing as to the defendant's

IQ (84, at the low end of the normal range), his long-standing alcoholism, leading to a

heightened tolerance of alcohol over time, and his experience with law enforcement which would

have aided him in understanding Miranda warnings even though he had consumed a substantial

amount of alcohol. There is no suggestion in the record, and no claim made by the defendant, of

undue, aggressive interrogation or trickery on the part of the police.

"A defendant's intoxication is one factor that bears on . . . voluntariness . . . Commonwealth v.

Prater, 420 Mass. 569 (1995), but the fact that a defendant has consumed drugs and alcohol

before his arrest does not necessarily mandate a finding that the defendant's confession was

involuntary. Commonwealth v. Mello, ...