Commw. v. Watson, SJC-08029

Citation430 Mass. 725,723 N.E.2d 501
Decision Date05 October 1999
Docket NumberNo. SJC-08029,SJC-08029
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
Parties(Mass. 2000) COMMONWEALTH vs. MICHAEL L. WATSON (and three companion cases <A HREF="#fr1-1" name="fn1-1">1 ). . Argued:

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Steven M. Lundbohm & Francis J. Hurley for Michael J. Watson.

Alan D. Tuttman for Thomas J. Smith.

Christopher Pohl, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Marshall, C.J., Abrams, Lynch, Greaney, & Ireland, JJ.

LYNCH, J.

The two defendants, Michael L. Watson and Thomas J. Smith, were convicted, in separate jury-waived trials, of trafficking in marijuana and conspiracy to violate the controlled substances laws.[2] The execution of sentences of one year each was stayed pending their appeals from the denial of their motions to suppress evidence seized from two suitcases in Watson's vehicle. We transferred the cases here on our own motion, and we now affirm.

The defendants argue that the motion judge erred in denying their motions to suppress under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights for several reasons:[3] (1) there was no reasonable suspicion to justify a stop (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [1968]) of the defendants and seizure of their property, (2) even if there was reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop, detention of the defendants and their property was excessive, (3) because the detention was excessive, the State police lacked probable cause to seize either the defendants or their property, (4) there was a warrantless search of the property, and (5) the warrant itself was invalid. The defendants further assert that art. 14 should offer more protection than the Fourth Amendment during a Terry stop.[4]

1. Facts[5] Troopers Mark E. Archer and Carol Harding were trained and experienced in narcotics investigations and had received specialized training in hotel drug interdiction. As part of the specialized training, the troopers learned that individuals involved in illegal drug activities used hotels near airports, and that there were several indicators of their activity including arriving from certain States known as sources of high drug activity, paying cash for a room, having an indeterminate length of stay with no advance reservations, using public or cellular telephones, and carrying "hard-sided" luggage.[6] Trooper Archer met with the managers of hotels located near Logan Airport and enlisted their cooperation in narcotics investigations.

On March 10, 1995, Trooper Archer drove to the Ramada Inn on Route 1A in Revere, north of Logan Airport.[7] He checked the guest registration forms and found John Graneto who had arrived from Encinadas, California, which is near San Diego and approximately thirty miles from the Mexican border. Graneto had paid cash for his room and checked into Room 221 at 1:30 A.M. Trooper Archer obtained a photocopy of Graneto's driver's license (providing a photograph of Graneto) and decided to set up a surveillance. He requested that Troopers Harding and Michael Valair, and Sergeant Michael Melia join him. Shortly after 8 A.M. Troopers Archer and Harding were in the hotel lobby and Valair and Melia waited in their vehicles in the hotel parking lot.

At approximately 11 A.M., Archer observed an individual resembling Graneto get off the elevator in the lobby, enter the hotel's restaurant, and order a meal. At approximately 11:40 A.M., Graneto left the restaurant and returned to the second floor. Then at noon, Graneto came back into the lobby, gave the front desk clerk cash, and returned to the second floor. Archer learned from the front desk clerk that Graneto had paid for another day at the hotel.[8] Archer also learned that Graneto had placed two calls to San Diego, California, shortly after his arrival at the hotel.

At approximately 1 P.M., Archer and Harding observed three men enter the hotel lobby through the rear doors. Two were the defendants and the third was later identified as Mark Curran. The three individuals walked over to a bank of telephones and Curran placed a call from a hotel house telephone. The three individuals then took the elevator to the second floor. Trooper Archer took the stairway and arrived to see the three individuals enter Graneto's room.

Archer returned to the lobby and reported what he had seen to Trooper Harding. Shortly thereafter, Watson and Smith emerged from the elevator in the lobby, each pulling a large, seemingly heavy, suitcase. One suitcase was black nylon and the other was blue and hard-sided. Watson and Smith went through the rear doors of the hotel into the parking lot. At about the same time, Graneto came to the hotel lobby with Curran, checked out, called for a taxi, and left the hotel.[9]

By radio, Archer told Valair, Melia, and Harding, who had gone into the parking lot, that the defendants were leaving by the rear doors. Harding observed the defendants struggle to lift the suitcases into the rear of a red Eagle Talon hatchback-style vehicle. The defendants then left the parking lot and drove onto Route 1A, with the four troopers following in separate, unmarked cruisers.

As he was leaving the hotel parking lot, Archer radioed the Revere State police barracks, asking for marked cruisers to be available to pull over Watson's vehicle if need be. Watson and Smith's vehicle slowed and accelerated along Route 1A, made an abrupt right turn onto the ramp for Route 145, with the troopers following. Archer asked the troopers in marked cruisers to stop Watson and Smith after they made a U-turn on Route 145.[10] Trooper Hubert made the stop.[11]

Trooper Hubert asked Watson, the driver, to produce his license and registration, and Trooper Valair asked him to step to the rear of the vehicle. He asked Watson about the suitcases in the back of the vehicle and Watson replied that they belonged to Smith. Smith was then ordered out of the vehicle. Smith denied ownership of the suitcases.

At that point, Trooper Valair conferred with Trooper Archer and Sergeant Melia, and they decided to seize the suitcases. Watson and Smith were told that they could accompany the suitcases to the State police barracks, but they did not have to do so. The troopers, followed by Watson and Smith, set out at about 1:45 P.M. and drove to the Revere barracks arriving at approximately 2 P.M. Watson and Smith stayed in the lobby awaiting the arrival of a drug detection dog while the suitcases were taken to the office area.

In the meantime, Trooper Valair gave both Watson and Smith their Miranda warnings. The defendants were interviewed separately and each volunteered statements about their activities of the day.[12] Questioning ended when each defendant requested an attorney.

Trooper Rideout arrived with a drug detection dog at approximately 3 P.M. The suitcases were placed in different rooms and the dog reacted positively to both suitcases. Watson and Smith were then arrested. Trooper Harding prepared an affidavit and obtained a warrant and searched the suitcases, which contained marijuana.[13]

2. Validity of Terry stop. In evaluating the propriety of a Terry stop, we inquire whether the initiation of the stop was proper in the circumstances and whether the scope was justified by the circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 405 (1974).

a. Validity of stop. An officer has the right to "make a threshold inquiry where suspicious conduct gives the officer reason to suspect that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime." Id. Reasonable suspicion cannot be based on a hunch or on good faith, but the inferences can follow in light of the officer's experience. See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 426 Mass. 703, 710-711 (1998) (even though officer did not see what was exchanged, officer's training, education, and knowledge supported reasonable suspicion of drug deal); Commonwealth v. Silva, supra at 406. Officers may stop automobiles to conduct a threshold inquiry. Id. at 405. Seemingly innocent activities taken together can give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying a threshold inquiry. See Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 420 Mass. 542, 549 (1995), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and cases cited. See Terry v. Ohio, supra at 22 (series of innocent acts, "taken together warranted further investigation"); Commonwealth v. Williams, 422 Mass. 111, 116 (1996), citing Commonwealth v. Fraser, 410 Mass. 541, 545 (1991), and Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 384 Mass. 762, 764 (1981).

In this case, as the motion judge found, the State police officers had more than enough information to establish a reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Watson's vehicle to conduct a threshold inquiry. The troopers knew that Graneto's actions satisfied some of the indicators for a drug dealer. They saw the defendants come in to the hotel with no luggage, enter Graneto's room for a short period of time, and emerge with two heavy suitcases, which they loaded into a vehicle at about the same time that Graneto checked out of the hotel. After the defendants left the hotel parking lot, they drove erratically and evasively, in a manner that the officers could infer was intended to detect whether they were being followed, adding to the suspicion the officers already harbored.

The defendants argue that there was not enough information to establish reasonable suspicion because the factors used to draw the drug courier profile of Graneto were too general.[14] This argument is not applicable to the present case because the focus of the officers' suspicions leading to the stop was on the defendants, not Graneto. The fact that the defendants were interacting with someone who was under surveillance as a possible drug courier, coupled with the fact that they arrived at a hotel without luggage and emerged shortly thereafter from Graneto's room with two heavy suitcases, which they placed in a vehicle not connected with Graneto, and then...

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