Compania Maritima v. United States

Citation145 F. Supp. 935,136 Ct. Cl. 697
Decision Date07 November 1956
Docket NumberNo. 50165.,50165.
PartiesCOMPANIA MARITIMA v. The UNITED STATES.
CourtCourt of Federal Claims

John P. Lipscomb, Jr., Washington, D. C., Frederic P. Lee, Washington, D. C., Allison J. Gibbs, Manila, P. I., and Alfred M. Osgood, Washington, D. C., on the briefs, for plaintiff.

Kendall M. Barnes, Washington, D. C., with whom was George Cochran Doub, Asst. Atty. Gen., Melford O. Cleveland, Wilton, Ala., on the brief, for defendant.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and LITTLETON, WHITAKER, MADDEN and LARAMORE, Judges.

LARAMORE, Judge.

The plaintiff is a Philippine corporation which seeks to recover just compensation for two vessels requisitioned from it by the defendant shortly after the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan. At all times material to this case all of the plaintiff's officers and stockholders resided in the Philippine Islands and a majority of the stockholders were Filipino citizens.

Prior to the outbreak of war the plaintiff had operated a fleet of vessels in the vicinity of the Philippine Islands. On December 21, 1941 (Philippine time), approximately two weeks after the commencement of hostilities, the defendant acting through officers of the United States Navy requisitioned from plaintiff the vessels Monadnock and Sarangani which were anchored near Manila.

On December 24, 1941, the United States forces began evacuating Manila for Bataan and Corregidor Island, and on December 25 or 26, 1941, Manila was declared an open city.

The Japanese forces occupied Manila on January 2, 1942, and on May 7, 1942, all United States and Filipino forces in the Philippines were finally surrendered to the Japanese.

Neither of the two vessels were ever returned to the plaintiff by the defendant and on June 22, 1946, plaintiff filed claims for compensation with the claims office of the United States Navy in Manila. The Navy Contract Settlement Commission determined a value for both vessels and payment was tendered to plaintiff by the Department of the Navy on March 24, 1947. Plaintiff rejected the payment and filed suit in this court on May 25, 1951.

The Government asserts that plaintiff's claim is barred by the 6-year statute of limitations applicable to suits in this court. It takes the position that in Marcos v. United States, 102 F.Supp. 547, 106 F.Supp. 172, 122 Ct.Cl. 641, in which this court held that the war between the United States and Japan suspended the statute as to persons residing in the Philippine Islands, the court erred in selecting September 2, 1945, as the date upon which the suspension was lifted. It urges the court to adopt the date of April 16, 1945, because mail service between Manila and the United States was then resumed and from that date the plaintiff could have communicated with attorneys in the United States and with the Court of Claims.

In the alternative defendant urges that even if the court adheres to its former position that September 2, 1945, is the date on which the court was reopened to plaintiff, we should hold that plaintiff was under a legal disability which was removed on that date and that plaintiff had thereafter only three years in which to file its petition.

In this posture of the case it becomes necessary for the court to review and reconsider the decision in the Marcos case, supra.

The Marcos case was handed down by this court on February 5, 1952. The issues presented in that case are identical, insofar as the statute of limitations is concerned, with the issues involved in the case presently before the court.

The plaintiff in the Marcos case filed his petition on August 14, 1951, alleging that the defendant, acting through the United States Army, had requisitioned a number of cattle from his ranch on the Island of Mindanao in the Philippines during the period from December 9, 1941, to January 28, 1942. The defendant moved, pursuant to rule 16(b), Rules of Court of Claims, 28 U.S.C.A., to dismiss plaintiff's petition on the ground that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) § 2501, 62 Stat. 976, which reads in part as follows:

"Every claim of which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed, or the claim is referred by the Senate or House of Representatives, or by the head of an executive department within six years after such claim first accrues.
* * * * *
"A petition on the claim of a person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be filed within three years after the disability ceases."

The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 411, as amended, 50 U.S. C.A.Appendix, § 1 et seq., was also in effect at all times pertinent to the plaintiff's claim in the Marcos case. Section 2 of this act defined the word "enemy" as:

"(a) Any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals, of any nationality, resident within the territory (including that occupied by the military and naval forces) of any nation with which the United States is at war * * *."

Section 3(a) of the act made it unlawful for any person in the United States to trade with an enemy of the United States. The words "to trade" were defined in section 2 as meaning:

"(c) Enter into, carry on, complete, or perform any contract, agreement, or obligation.
* * * * *
"(e) To have any form of business or commercial communication or intercourse with."

In its original opinion the court concluded that the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan on December 8, 1941, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix note preceding section 1, by implication suspended the statute of limitations, and that the suspension was lifted on September 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1733, giving the plaintiff six full years after that date in which to file his petition. Since, under this view, the filing of the plaintiff's petition was timely, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied.

Judge Whitaker dissented on the ground that since the plaintiff was under a disability to sue, he should have had the same length of time to file his petition after the disability was removed as others under a disability are given by the statute, i. e., three years.

The defendant moved for a rehearing and on July 15, 1952, the court reaffirmed its previous holding 102 F.Supp. 547, 106 F.Supp. 172 at page 122 Ct.Cl. at page 650. In its second opinion, the court held that war is not a legal disability within the meaning of section 2501 of title 28 and that therefore the 3-year period was not applicable.

Judge Whitaker dissented on the ground that the plaintiff was prevented from suing by the Trading with the Enemy Act, supra, and that he was therefore under a legal disability and should have had only three years in which to bring suit after the war.

After an extensive review of the authorities and a careful reconsideration of the court's opinion in the Marcos case, we are of the opinion that the court was in error in certain respects and we expressly overrule the Marcos case insofar as it conflicts with the views expressed herein.

In the Marcos case the court relied primarily upon Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 18 L.Ed. 939, to sustain its position that the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan suspended this court's statute of limitations as to persons residing in the Philippine Islands. A careful examination of the Hanger case and the other authorities reveals that they do not support this holding.

It is a well-established rule of international law that war will suspend statutes of limitations as between citizens of belligerents. 137 A.L.R. 1455. The courts have applied this rule even though the specific statute involved contained no provision for such suspension. The reason for the rule is that during war international law makes all of the citizens of one belligerent enemies of the Government and the citizens of the other belligerent, forbids all intercourse between citizens of the belligerents, and closes the courts of one belligerent to citizens of the other. Since these principles of international law make it impossible for the citizens of one belligerent to sue in the courts of the other, statutes of limitations are suspended as to such citizens during war.

These principles of international law were applied by the Supreme Court in a number of cases decided subsequent to the Civil War. In those cases the Court held that certain statutes of limitations were suspended during the Civil War as between citizens of the United States and citizens of the Confederacy. A careful analysis of these decisions reveals that they were predicated upon the fact that under international law citizens of the United States were enemies of citizens of the Confederacy and the courts of each belligerent were closed to citizens of the other.

In the leading case of Hanger v. Abbott, supra, a resident of New Hampshire brought suit against a resident of Arkansas in assumpsit. The right to bring suit had matured in October 1859, but suit was not brought until April 1865. Arkansas had a 3-year statute of limitations patterned after the English statute of limitations of 1623 which excepted minors, femes covert, non compos mentis, etc., but which made no mention of war. The problem before the court was whether or not the statute continued to run during the Civil War, thus barring the plaintiff's suit. The opinion of the Court contained a lengthy historical discussion which explained why the statute of 1623 and its American antecedents did not include war in the list of exceptions. The Court concluded that the statute was suspended during the Civil War even though it contained no provision for such suspension. The following language appears in the Court's opinion in 6 Wall. at page 539, 18 L.Ed. 939:

"Total inability on the part of an enemy creditor to sustain any contract in the tribunals of the other belligerent exists during war, but the restoration of peace removes the disability, and opens the
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