Compensation of Harris, Matter of

• Decision Date: 24 August 1981
• Docket Number: CO-OP,No. 80-2710,80-2710
• Citation: 53 Or.App. 618,632 P.2d 1299
• Parties: In the Matter of the COMPENSATION OF Earl L. HARRIS, Claimant. Earl L. HARRIS, Petitioner, v. FARMERS'CREAMERY, Respondent. WCB; CA A20206.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

Page 1299

632 P.2d 1299

53 Or.App. 618

In the Matter of the COMPENSATION OF Earl L. HARRIS, Claimant Earl L. HARRIS, Petitioner, v. FARMERS' CO-OP CREAMERY, Respondent.

WCB No. 80-2710; CA A20206.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted June 15, 1981.

Decided Aug. 24, 1981.

Michael B. Dye, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner.

Katherine H. O'Neil, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Elizabeth K. Reeve, and Schwabe, Williamson, Wyatt, Moore & Roberts, Portland.

Before GILLETTE, P.J., and ROBERTS and YOUNG, JJ.

ROBERTS, Judge.

The issue in this workers' compensation case is whether claimant's heart attack, which occurred while he was driving a company car during his employment as a route supervisor for a milk distribution company, was job-related. The referee found that it was. The Workers' Compensation Board (Board) reversed. On de novo review, ORS 656.298(6), we find that the preponderance of the evidence supports legal and medical causation and we reverse.

The incident at issue occurred on December 28, 1979, after claimant had driven from McMinnville to Milwaukie to deliver a 30-pound crate of whipping cream. On his return trip, he suffered pains deep in his chest and began to sweat so heavily that water dripped from his hair and his clothing was soaked. He stopped in Sherwood, telephoned his office and asked them to send someone to get him. When no one showed up, he began to drive again, but pulled off the road again near Newberg. He was picked up and taken to the Newberg Hospital by his immediate supervisor. He was diagnosed as having suffered an acute myocardial infarction. The treating physician's report states that there was no previous history of exertional chest pain or "definite heart disease." ¹ Claimant was transferred to St. Vincent's Hospital in Portland for further care by a cardiologist, Dr. Sutherland. On his initial examination of claimant, Dr. Sutherland confirmed that he had suffered an acute myocardial infarction, with coronary artery disease. Claimant was treated at St. Vincent's for eleven days and discharged. Subsequently, he suffered a recurrence of symptoms and was hospitalized in McMinnville for nine days. He was readmitted to St. Vincent's on February 11 1980, for angiography. At that time, Dr. Sutherland diagnosed coronary artery disease with a recent myocardial infarction. A coronary bypass operation was performed. The final diagnosis by Dr. Sutherland was coronary artery disease, with recent myocardial infarction, angina pectoris and congestive heart failure. In a letter to employer's insurer on March 6, 1980, Dr. Sutherland stated: "From what I know at the present time I do not believe that Mr. Harris' work was the etiology of his coronary artery disease or myocardial infarction." Based on this letter, the insurer denied the claim.

To recover compensation for an on-the-job heart attack, claimant must show, first, that he exerted himself in carrying out his job and, second, that the exertion was a material contributing factor in producing the heart attack. The first is a question of legal causation; the second determines the issue of medical causation. Coday v. Willamette Tug & Barge Co., 250 Or. 39, 440 P.2d 224 (1968). The proof is the same whether the exertion is physical or emotional, see Clayton v. Compensation Department, 253 Or. 397, 454 P.2d 628 (1969), and claimant must prove both legal and medical causation by a preponderance of the evidence. Carter v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 52 Or.App. 215, 627 P.2d 1300 (1981). In cases where the claim is based on physical exertion, a showing of unusual exertion is not required. The usual exertion of a claimant's regular job is sufficient to establish legal causation. Coday v. Willamette Tug & Barge Co., supra; Carter v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., supra; Riutta v. Mayflower Farms, Inc., 19 Or.App. 278, 527 P.2d 424 (1974); Anderson v. SAIF, 5 Or.App. 580, 485 P.2d 1236 (1975). Legal causation in cases of emotional stress can likewise be established by a showing of chronic emotional stress or an episode of acute stress. Schwehn v. SAIF, 17 Or.App. 50, 520 P.2d 467 (1974).

Both the referee and the Board agreed that claimant had established legal causation. The record clearly shows claimant was, in the days immediately preceding his heart attack, subject to physical stress, as well as substantial emotional stress. Claimant testified that, while his normal duties were basically management and sales, during holiday seasons ² his job responsibility changed to include product loading and deliveries. He said that on December 24 he had worked a 15 and one-half or 16 hour day, hauling dairy products to drivers and to stores. He testified he was "extremely tired," "exhausted" at the end of the day and looking forward to Christmas Day and rest. On Christmas, however, he was called out on an emergency to deliver milk to a store in Salem and worked about half a day. This precipitated a family quarrel, which he testified created tension in the home all evening. Claimant returned to work the next morning at about 6:30 a. m. and worked 14 or 15 hours. On that day he delivered milk to various stores and picked up empty cases. He testified that he went to work tired and went home tired.

The next day, December 27, claimant went to work at 4 a. m. and drove a tractor and 35-foot trailer of products from McMinnville to Eugene. Upon his return to McMinnville he was called in by his immediate supervisor and told he had to discipline a driver about whom the firm had received complaints. ³ Claimant testified disciplining employes caused him "a lot of anxiety." He then had to hand load a truck and deliver products to Lincoln City and Newport. He loaded and unloaded 50 to 60 30-pound cases of milk and returned home at 10 p. m., after completing an 18-hour day. He was, he said, "exhausted." He spent a restless night and when he woke up he said he "felt like I'd worked all night." He was bothered and upset about the upcoming confrontation with the driver. He went to work at 6:30 the morning of December 28 "uptight," "upset" and "nervous." That morning, when he had to deliver the 30-pound crate of whipping cream to Milwaukie, claimant testified "I was exhausted, and it was just felt like almost more than I could handle." It was on claimant's return from Milwaukie to McMinnville, where he was to meet with the errant driver, that he suffered the heart attack.

The facts thus amply demonstrate that claimant was suffering from a high degree of emotional stress: he was subject to "a lot of anxiety" over the disciplining of the driver, whom he himself had hired from another employer and whom he had previously felt to be an exceptional worker; his work hours were the cause of confrontations with his wife and tensions at home; and he was also affected by the additional stress of his holiday work schedule. The holiday schedule increased the physical stress to which claimant was subject as well. During the four days preceding his heart attack, claimant, whose normal duties did not include loading of trucks, did a significant amount of loading. It appears that such work was not comparable to his normal physical exertion, though it may have been his normal "holiday" schedule. In any event, as we have noted, normal job stress, whether physical or emotional, is sufficient to establish legal causation.

The question remaining is whether claimant established medical causation. This, of course, is a matter which must be established by medical experts. Dr. Sutherland, the treating physician, said that to his knowledge claimant's work was not a causative factor, but Dr. Sutherland's knowledge was based only on the St. Vincent's medical reports and a written statement of an interview conducted with claimant by a claims investigator for the insurer. There were reports from two other physicians in evidence....