COMPETITOR LIAISON BUREAU INC. v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT Co.
| Decision Date | 08 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:08-cv-2165-Orl-28GJK |
| Parties | COMPETITOR LIAISON BUREAU, INC., NASCAR, INC., Plaintiffs, v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
This is an insurance subrogation case based on a products liability claim against Defendant Cessna Aircraft Company ("Cessna").1 It arises from a tragic incident that occurred on July 10, 2007 when a 310R model aircraft ("the Aircraft") manufactured by Cessna, owned by Plaintiff Competitor Liaison Bureau, Inc. ("CLB"), and operated by Plaintiff NASCAR, Inc. ("NASCAR"), sustained an in-flight electrical fire and crashed into a neighborhood in Sanford, Florida causing death, personal injury, and property damage to persons and property on the ground.2 (Joint Pretrial Statement ("JPS"), Doc. 109, at 1). Plaintiffs settled3 with those who asserted the underlying wrongful death, personal injury and property damage claims resulting from the accident. (Compl. ¶¶ 11-14; Lexington Compl.¶¶ 11-14; Westchester Compl. ¶¶ 11-14). Plaintiffs now seek to recoup that money from Cessna. Plaintiffs argue that the Aircraft was unreasonably dangerous when it was manufactured because Cessna used PVC-insulated wire in the cockpit of the Aircraft and Cessna knew or should have known that the wire was not flame resistant and would create dangerous quantities of toxic fumes and smoke when ignited. (JPS ¶ 3(a)). Cessna denies that the PCV-insulated wire is defective, but it argues that even if it were, Cessna is entitled to summary judgment based on the statute of repose.4 As discussed below, Cessna's motion for summary judgment must be granted.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When faced with a "properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the nonmoving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere allegations." Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). However, the failure to respond and create a factual dispute by the nonmoving party "does not automatically authorize the entry of summary judgment for the moving party." Dixie Stevedores, Inc. v. Marinic Maritime, Ltd., 778 F.2d 670, 673 (11th Cir. 1985). "Rule 56 requires the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact." Id.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). "[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249. Some degree of factual dispute is expected, but to successfully counter a motion for summary judgment the factual dispute must be material and genuine. That is, the factual evidence must "affect the outcome of the suit" and must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248.
There are two statutes of repose at issue in this case: Florida's statute of repose for products liability claims ("the FSR"), section 95.031(2)(b)-(d), Florida Statutes, and the federal statute of repose contained in the General Aviation Revitalization Act ("GARA"), 49 U.S.C. § 40101, Note. The FSR provides: Under no circumstances may a claimant commence an action for products liability, including a wrongful death action or any other claim arising from personal injury or property damage caused by a product, to recover for harm allegedly caused by a product with an expected useful life of 10 years or less, if the harm was caused by exposure to or use of the product more than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product.
§ 95.031(2)(b), Fla. Stat. The FSR additionally provides that "[a]ll products . . . are conclusively presumed to have an expected useful life of 10 years or less" except for a few enumerated exceptions. Id. One of the exceptions is for "[a]ircraft used in commercial or contract carrying of passengers or freight." Id. § 95.031(2)(b)(1). For such aircraft, "no action for products liability may be brought more than 20 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessor who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product." Id. § 95.031(2)(b)(3). The other exception is if "the manufacturer specifically warranted, through express representation or labeling, that [the product has] an expected useful life exceeding 10 years" in which case "the product has an expected useful life commensurate with the time period indicated by the warranty or label." Id. § 95.031(2)(b)(2). Furthermore, the FSR provides that regardless of whether the twenty-year or the twelve-year statute of repose applies, "[t]he [applicable] repose period . . . is tolled for any period during which the manufacturer through its officers, directors, partners, or managing agents had actual knowledge that the product was defective in the manner alleged by the claimant and took affirmative steps to conceal the defect." Id. § 95.031(d).
GARA, on the other hand, provides an eighteen-year statute of repose, 49 U.S.C. § 40101, Note § 3, for any "civil action for damages for death or injury to persons or damage to property arising out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft . . . brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft," Id. § 2(a). The GARA statute of repose does not apply "if the person for whose injury or death the claim is being made was not aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident." Id. § 2(b).
It is undisputed that the statute of repose began to run on November 22, 1978 when Jackson Development Corporation, which was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing aircraft, purchased the Aircraft. (Jackson Aff., Doc. 53, ¶¶ 6-7). This suit was filed in state court on November 25, 2008-approximately thirty years after the statute of repose began to run. (Notice of Removal, Doc. 1, ¶ 1). Therefore, this action is barred under both the FSR and GARA unless an exception applies. The FSR and GARA, however, contain different exceptions, so the Court must first determine which statute of repose applies and then analyze the exceptions contained within that statute. As discussed below, the FSR is the controlling statute of repose and none of its exceptions apply to this case.
GARA expressly preempts "any State law to the extent that such law permits a civil action [for damages for death or injury to persons or damage to property arising out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft] to be brought after the [eighteen-year] limitation period." 49 U.S.C. § 40101, Note § 2(d). Therefore, if Florida's twelve-year statute of repose applies to this matter, it is not preempted by GARA, but if Florida's twenty-year statute of repose applies, it is preempted by GARA. See Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824, 830 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (); Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, The General Aviation Revitalization Act: How Rational Civil Justice Reform Revitalized an Industry, 67 J. Air L. & Com. 1269, 1285-86 (2002) (); cf. Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cnty., Fla. v. Lake Aircraft, 992 F.2d 291, 294 (11th Cir. 1993) ().
The twenty-year repose period only applies to "[a]ircraft used in commercial or contract carrying of passengers or freight." § 95.031(2)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. Plaintiffs argue that the Aircraft falls into this category because it was used in furtherance of NASCAR's business, which is a "commercial" enterprise. However, to accept such a construction would be to take the word "commercial" out of context and rewrite the statute as applying the twenty-year repose period to any aircraft used in commerce, rather than aircraft used in "commercial . . . carrying of passengers or freight." In the FSR, "commercial" modifies "carrying of passengers or freight" and is juxtaposed to "contract carrying of passengers or freight." Therefore, it is illustrative to examine the definition of "carrier" and "contract carrier."
"A 'carrier' is an individual or organization (such as . . . an airline) that contracts to transport passengers or goods for a fee. Black's Law Dictionary 242 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). A "contract carrier" is also termed a "private carrier" and is defined as "[a]ny carrier that is not a common carrier by law." Id. In other words, a contract carrier is one that "is not bound to accept business from the general public" as opposed to a "common carrier" which is a "commercial enterprise that holds itself out to the public as offering to transport freight or passengers for a fee. . . [and] is generally required by law to transport freight or passengers . . . without refusal, if the approved fare or charge is paid." Id. (emphasis added); see also Suazo By and Through Suazo v. Del Busto, 587 So. 2d 480, 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 199...
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