Compton v. Countrywide Fin. Corp.

• Decision Date: 13 July 2011
• Docket Number: CIV. NO. 11-00198 SOM-BMK
• Parties: WATOSHINA LYNN COMPTON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, JOHN AND MARY DOES 1-10, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

WATOSHINA LYNN COMPTON, Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.,
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION,
BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP,
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE,
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
JOHN AND MARY DOES 1-10, Defendants.

CIV. NO. 11-00198 SOM-BMK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

Dated: July 13, 2011

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

On March 28, 2011, Plaintiff Watoshina Lynn Compton filed her Complaint in this matter. Compton alleges that Countrywide Financial Corporation ("CFC"), Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. ("Countrywide"), Bank of America Corporation ("BOA"), BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP ("BAC"), U.S. Bank National Association as trustee, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems ("MERS"), and U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank") violated federal and state statutes during the servicing and modification of a residential mortgage loan.

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Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d). The Complaint does not state a claim against Defendants, and it is dismissed.

II. BACKGROUND.

On May 18, 2006, Compton executed a mortgage and note in favor of Countrywide for $920,000. See Compl. ¶ 59, ECF No. 1. On May 1, 2009, Compton stopped making payments on the loan after her business revenues fell. See id. ¶ 62. Compton allegedly spoke with BAC on numerous occasions about obtaining a loan modification. See id. ¶¶ 63-91. On August 29, 2009, Compton allegedly received a modification approval notice from BAC that explained that Compton "needed to sign and return the enclosed documents" to accept the modification. Compl. ¶ 70. Between September 2009 to October 2009, BAC allegedly failed to modify Compton's loan on three occasions, citing deficiencies in the notary acknowledgment in Compton's submissions. Id. ¶¶ 71-74. Compton alleges that, between November 2009 and February 2011, BAC systematically and routinely frustrated her attempts to modify her loan. Id. ¶¶ 78-91. She alleges, among other things, that BAC made false statements to her about the status of her modification, closed her file without justification, required her to resubmit documents numerous times, and counseled her to remain delinquent on mortgage payments. See id. ¶¶ 190-194.

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On August 5, 2010, MERS, acting as nominee for Countrywide, recorded an assignment of mortgage to U.S. Bank. See id. ¶ 92. On August 23, 2010, U.S. Bank recorded a Notice of Mortgagee's Intention to Foreclose Under Power of Sale. See id. ¶ 93.

On March 28, 2011, Compton filed a Complaint asserting the following five claims: (1) declaratory relief; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) unfair and deceptive acts and practices; and (5) injunctive relief. See Compl. ¶¶ 95-216. Compton also seeks punitive and treble damages, along with attorney's fees and costs. See Compl. at p. 86.

Compton's counsel has brought these very claims on behalf of other clients in other actions, and had those claims dismissed. See, e.g., Phillips v. Bank of America, N.A., Civ. No. 10-00551 JMS-KSC, 2011 WL 2160583 (D. Haw. June 1, 2011); Velasco v. Security Nat. Mortg. Co., Civ. No. 10-00239 DAE-KSC, 2011 WL 2117008 (D. Haw. May 24, 2011); Radford v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Civ. No. 10-00767 SOM-KSC, 2011 WL 1833020 (D. Haw. May 13, 2011). This court has warned counsel to prepare his Complaints more carefully. See Goya v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Civ. No. 11-00048 SOM/KSC, 2011 WL 2559830 (D. Haw. June 27, 2011) (warning counsel not to keep filing rejected boilerplate complaints).

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Compton's counsel appears to disagree with Defendants' assertion that Compton's Complaint is "nearly identical to the other lawsuits by her lawyer." Mot. at 1. Compton's counsel characterizes this statement as "simply demonstrating] the systemic and ongoing nature of Defendants' unfair and deceptive business practices." However, Compton's Complaint is indeed very similar to other complaints filed by this lawyer. See, e.g., Norris v. Countrywide Financial Corp., Civ. No. 11-00156 LEK-KSC. What is systematic and ongoing is counsel's refusal to heed the court's multiple warnings. See Duarte v. Bank of America, Civil No. 10-00372 JMS-BMK, 2011 WL 1399127 (D. Haw. Apr. 12, 2011); Caraang v. PNC Mortg., Civ. No. 10-00594 LEK-BMK, 2011 WL 1326959 (D. Haw. Apr. 5, 2011).

III. ANALYSIS.

Defendants seek dismissal of the Complaint, arguing that it fails to sufficiently allege a claim. To survive this challenge, Plaintiff's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true, even if doubtful in fact. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ("the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation").

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While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

A. Counts I and V (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief).

Defendants contend that Count I (Declaratory Relief) and Count V (Injunctive Relief) fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted because the claims are remedies, not independent causes of action. Mot. at 6-9, 24-25, ECF No. 12. The court agrees that these counts fail to state claims.

Count I seeks relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.¹ See Compl. ¶ 95. Count I alleges that

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"[a]n actual controversy exists with respect to whether or not U.S. Bank has the legal authority to foreclose on the Subject Property." Compl. ¶ 96. Compton "requests declaratory judgment to determine that U.S. Bank, in fact, does not have the legal authority to foreclose on the Subject Property." Id. Compton bases her claim for declaratory relief on allegations that MERS could not have validly assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank, Countrywide did not effectively transfer Compton's note, and U.S. Bank does not hold title to the mortgage. Id.

As pled, Compton's declaratory relief claim is not cognizable as an independent cause of action. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996) ("A declaratory judgment offers a means by which rights and obligations may be adjudicated in cases 'brought by any interested party' involving an actual controversy that has not reached a stage at which either party may seek a coercive remedy and in cases where a party who could sue for coercive relief has not yet done so."); Hoilien v. Bank of America, Civ. No. 10-00712 JMS/BMK, 2011 WL 976699, at *4 (D. Haw. Mar. 17, 2011) ("Plaintiff's declaratory relief claim is not cognizable as an independent cause of action under the Declaratory Relief Act"). That is, because Compton's claim is based on allegations

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regarding Defendants' past wrongs, a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act is improper and essentially duplicates the other causes of action. See, e.g., Ballard v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 2010 WL 5114952, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2010) ("A claim for declaratory relief 'rises or falls with [the] other claims.'" (alteration in original)); Ruiz v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2009 WL 2390824, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2009) (dismissing claim for declaratory judgment when foreclosure had already occurred and the plaintiff was seeking "to redress past wrongs"); Mangindin v. Washington Mut. Bank, 637 F. Supp. 2d 700, 707 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("A claim for declaratory relief is unnecessary where an adequate remedy exists under some other cause of action."); Edejer v. DHI Mortg. Co., 2009 WL 1684714, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2009) ("Plaintiff's declaratory relief cause of action fails because she seeks to redress past wrongs rather than a declaration as to future rights.").

Count V seeks injunctive relief for the "irreparable harm" that will occur from foreclosure. See Compl. ¶ 214. The court follows the well-settled rule that a claim for "injunctive relief" standing alone is not a cause of action. See, e.g., Henke v. Arco Midcon, L.L.C., 750 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059-60 (E.D. Mo. 2010) ("Injunctive relief, however, is a remedy, not an independent cause of action."); Jensen v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ("A request

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for injunctive relief by itself does not state a cause of action" (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Plan Pros, Inc. v. Zych, 2009 WL 928867, at *2 (D. Neb. Mar. 31, 2009) ("no independent cause of action for injunction exists"); Motley v. Homecomings Fin., LLC, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1014 (D. Minn. 2008) (same). Injunctive...