Compton v. McCaffree

• Decision Date: 21 February 1906
• Citation: 220 Ill. 137,77 N.E. 129
• Parties: COMPTON et al. v. McCAFFREE et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

220 Ill. 137

77 N.E. 129

COMPTON et al.

v.McCAFFREE et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 21, 1906.

Appeal from Circuit Court, McDonough County; G. W. Thompson, Judge.

Suit by William A. Compton and others against Nancy J. McCaffree and others for partition. From a decree refusing to confirm a sale of the property over objection, complainants appeal. Affirmed.

Ira J. O'Harra, for appellants.

Charles W. Flack, for appellees.

HAND, J.

This was a bill in chancery, filed in the circuit court of McDonough county, for the partition of a 116-acre farm, situated in said county, between the heirs at law of Samuel Hushaw, deceased, who died seised in fee simple of said real estate. Two of the complainants were minors. The commissioners reported the farm could not be divided, and appraised it at $11,600. A decree of sale was entered, and the farm was sold to William A. Compton, for himself and the other three appellants, by the master, for $9,375. The defendants filed exceptions to the confirmation of the report of sale, and asked that the sale be set aside and the premises resold, and deposited $1,000 in cash with the clerk of the court as earnest money, and gave a bond in the sum of $12,000, conditioned that they, or some of them, would bid the sum of $11,600 for said farm and comply with the terms of the sale if the premises should be ordered resold. The defendants also deposited with the clerk, for the use of the appellants, the sum of $50 as their solicitor's fees, and $201.56 as interest upon the amount of their bid from the date of its deposit with the master to the date of the order directing a resale of the premises. Thereupon the court refused to confirm the report of sale, set aside the sale, and ordered the premises resold, and an appeal has been prosecuted to this court.

While the evidence is conflicting as to the value of the farm, it fairly sustains the contention of the appellees that the premises sold for $2,225 less than they were worth. It also appears that the defendants were all nonresidents of the state of Illinois, their residence being at Emporia, in the state of Kansas; that they were not represented in the partition suit by a resident solicitor, but were represented by a firm of lawyers residing in the city of Emporia; that their solicitors wrote the solicitor representing the complainants to obtain information of the date and terms of the master's sale of said premises, but they were not informed by him of the date and terms of said sale, and the defendants did not learn of the date of the sale until five days after the sale had taken place. It also appears that Compton and the three other appellants entered into a combination to buy the premises at the master's sale upon speculation, that the sale took place on Saturday, and that they did not comply with the terms of the sale by paying the amount of their bid to the master until on the following Monday, and not until after three of the parties in the combination had sold out, at a considerable advance over the amount of their bid, to the fourth, who appears to have been the only person in the combination who really desired to buy the farm and who furnished the money deposited with the master on Monday.

In the late case of Kiebel v. Leick, 216 Ill. 474, on page 475, 75 N. E. 187, it was said: ‘It is the policy of the law to give permanency and stability to judicial sales, and to give to the purchaser the benefit of his bid, but there are cases in which such sale will be set aside, even in the absence of fraud.’ And in Sowards v. Pritchett, 37 Ill. 517, on page 524: ‘It is a cherished object of courts to give stability to judicial sales, and at the same time, as far as possible, protect and guard the rights of the owner. In all such cases the chancellor is necessarily vested with a large discretion, and he must so exercise it as will promote justice and protect the rights of parties. And in the exercise of that discretion this court will not interfere, if it seems to have been soundly exercised. We will only reverse when we can see, from all the circumstances, that wrong or injustice has been done.’ And, again, in Kiebel v. Leick, 216 Ill. 476,75 N. E. 188: ‘On an application to vacate a judicial sale the court should also take into consideration the fact, if shown, that the parties interested are under disabilities. ...