Compton v. Pletch

• Decision Date: 29 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 12A02-9003-CV-177,12A02-9003-CV-177
• Citation: 561 N.E.2d 803
• Parties: James Brian COMPTON, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Mary R. PLETCH, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 803

561 N.E.2d 803

James Brian COMPTON, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Mary R. PLETCH, Appellee (Defendant).

No. 12A02-9003-CV-177.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Second District.

Oct. 29, 1990.

Peter L. Obremskey, Bridget L. Rogers, Parr, Richey, Obremskey & Morton, Lebanon, James D. Moore, Ryan, Hartzell, Moore & Cook, Frankfort, for appellant.

Michael E. Douglas, Frankfort, for appellee.

BUCHANAN, Judge.

CASE SUMMARY

Appellant-plaintiff James Brian Compton (Compton) appeals a jury verdict finding him forty percent at fault for an auto accident, claiming the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a sudden emergency instruction.

We reverse and remand for new trial.

FACTS

The facts of this case are not in dispute. On December 8, 1987, Compton was driving his 1982 Mercury Lynx east on State Road 28, a four-lane highway just outside of Frankfort, Indiana. State Road 28 in that area is a four-lane highway. Because several cars were pulling onto State Road 28 from factories which had just closed for the day, Compton was traveling in the left lane. Approaching the intersection of the highway with County Road 200 West, Compton observed Mary R. Pletch (Pletch) driving a 1978 Ford pickup truck north on C.R. 200 near a stop sign at the intersection Compton, who was traveling approximately 50 miles an hour, saw Pletch drive into the intersection when he was only about 200 feet away. Compton applied his brakes but could not stop because the road was wet with mist and melting snow. He then switched to the right lane believing Pletch was going to continue through the intersection and that he could pass behind her. Realizing too late that Pletch had not continued through the intersection and was blocking the right lane, Compton discovered he could not switch back to the left lane because of another car or swerve off the road to the right because of a deep ditch. Compton's car struck the driver's side of Pletch's truck. As a result of the collision, Compton incurred medical expenses and other costs, which he subsequently tried to recover in this negligence action against Pletch.

of that road with S.R. 28. Pletch stopped at the stop sign, and then not seeing Compton's approaching vehicle, proceeded into the intersection. Suddenly seeing Compton's car, Pletch stopped her truck in the intersection with the front end blocking the right lane of traffic.

Following a jury trial, Compton was found to be forty percent at fault for the accident. Finding that the total damage Compton suffered was $26,000, the jury awarded Compton a verdict against Pletch of $15,600. Compton appeals.

ISSUES

Compton raises just one issue for our consideration:

Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine?

DECISION

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS--Compton sees the facts as supporting the giving of a sudden emergency instruction even though Indiana has adopted the Comparative Fault Act. Pletch counters that the facts do not warrant the giving of the requested instruction, and that the sudden emergency doctrine does not apply to situations involving comparative fault.

CONCLUSION--The trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to the sudden emergency doctrine.

This is one of other cases which will undoubtedly follow concerning the applicability of certain entrenched common law doctrines limiting the effect of contributory negligence. Is the sudden emergency doctrine one that survives the adoption by Indiana of comparative fault? ¹ If it does, then the instruction requested in this case should have been given if it otherwise qualified.

In reviewing a trial court's refusal to give tendered instructions, a three part inquiry is used: (1) whether the tendered instruction is a correct statement of the law, (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the instruction, and (3) whether the substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions given by the court. Dahlberg v. Ogle (1978), 268 Ind. 30, 373 N.E.2d 159. Even if this inquiry is answered in the affirmative, reversal will not result unless the failure to give the instruction substantially and adversely affected the rights of the complaining party so as to quite likely have affected the result. Sullivan v. Fairmont Homes, Inc. (1989), Ind.App., 543 N.E.2d 1130, trans. denied.

A. Sudden Emergency Instruction Correctly States the Law

Following the presentation of evidence, Compton tendered the following instruction:

"When a person is confronted with a sudden emergency not of his own making without sufficient time to determine with certainty the best course to pursue, he is not held to the same accuracy of judgment as would be required of him if he had time for deliberation. Accordingly, if he exercises such care as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise when confronted with a similar emergency, he is not liable for an injury which results from his conduct, even though another course of conduct would have been more judicious or safer or might even have avoided the collision and injury.

In this case, if you should find from the evidence the Plaintiff, James B. Compton, was confronted with a sudden emergency and that he then pursued a course of action that an ordinarily prudent person would have pursued when confronted with the same or similar emergency, but the collision nevertheless occurred, then the Plaintiff is not negligent."

Record at 22.

Pletch concedes that this is a correct statement of law in the abstract, but not as applied to cases under the Indiana Comparative Fault Act. Appellee's Brief at 12. In support of this position, Pletch cites Roggow v. Mineral Processing Corp. (S.D.Ind.1988), 698 F.Supp. 1441, in which a federal district court examined Indiana's Comparative Fault Act and determined that under the Act, the doctrine of last clear chance is no longer available to excuse the negligence of a party. In Roggow, the district court put words into the mouth of our supreme court:

"If given the opportunity, the Indiana Supreme Court would hold that any of the ameliorative common law doctrines designed to lessen the harsh results of contributory negligence no longer are applicable under the statutory scheme of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act."

Id. at 1445.

On appeal, the 7th Circuit observed that the conclusion of the district court that the doctrine of last clear chance is obliterated by a comparative fault system reflected a majority position. Roggow v. Mineral Processing Corp. (7th Circuit 1990), 894 F.2d 246; See also W. Prosser & R. Keaton, The Law of Torts, Section 67 at 477 n. 82 (5th ed. 1984 and Supp.1988). However, the 7th Circuit concluded it need not reach that issue because the issuance of the last clear chance instruction was not applicable to the factual circumstances of the case. Roggow v. Mineral Processing Corp. (7th Cir.1990), 894 F.2d 246.

While the parties discuss at some length the last clear chance doctrine as being analogous to the sudden emergency doctrine, we do not find the analogy helpful. The last clear chance doctrine presupposes that the actions of both parties were, to some degree, the cause of an accident and excuses the contributory negligence of one because the other party had an opportunity to avoid the accident but failed to do so. Bates v. Boughton (1972), 151 Ind.App. 139, 278 N.E.2d 316. Thus, a party who otherwise would be completely barred from recovering because of his contributory negligence, is able to recover for the negligent action of the other party. Such a doctrine is closely related to the very essence of contributory negligence.

The sudden emergency doctrine, on the other hand, has no such relationship. It relates to the standard of care required of the driver of a motor vehicle when confronted with a sudden emergency. Tuttle v. Reid (1966), 247 Ind. 375, 216 N.E.2d 34. The sudden emergency doctrine, unlike the last clear chance doctrine, does not act to excuse fault, but rather defines the conduct to be expected of a prudent person in an emergency situation.

With these comments in mind we need to decide whether the sudden emergency instruction remains a correct statement of the law after Indiana's enactment of comparative fault. Indiana's Comparative Fault Act defines "fault" as:

"any act or omission that is negligent, willful, wanton or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others.... The term also includes unreasonable assumption of risk ... incurred risk, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages."

IC 34-4-33-2(a) (1988) (emphasis supplied).

This language would seem to contemplate retention of existing negligence concepts. A person who is "negligent" will be considered to be at "fault" and may be held liable for damages resulting from such negligence. Likewise, a person who "unreasonabl [y] fail[s] to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages" may also be determined to be at "fault" under the Comparative Fault Act and held liable for damages.

The sudden emergency instruction informs the jury of the converse--how it is to allocate fault and apportion damages when the conduct of the person in question is that of an "ordinarily prudent person" when faced with an emergency situation. If the conduct of the person conforms to that standard, then the sudden emergency instruction informs the jury that the person is to be considered "not negligent" even though another course of action might have prevented the accident.

So it seems the sudden emergency instruction would remain a correct statement of the law. If Compton acted as an "ordinarily prudent person" then he was not "negligent" under the Act and his failure to avoid the accident was not "unreasonable." Should that be the case, Compton was not at "fault" as that term is defined under the Act.

Thus, we conclude that the sudden emergency doctrine is compatible not only with the definition of "fault," but with the overall objective of the Act in...