Compton v. State, No. 95-57
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
| Writing for the Court | Before GOLDEN; GOLDEN |
| Citation | 931 P.2d 936 |
| Parties | Raymond A. COMPTON, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Docket Number | No. 95-57 |
| Decision Date | 07 January 1997 |
Page 936
v.
The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
Page 937
Michael N. "Nick" Deegan, Gillette, for appellant.
William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Page 938
Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR * and LEHMAN, JJ.
GOLDEN, Justice.
Appellant Raymond A. Compton appeals his conviction for attempted first-degree sexual assault following a jury trial on grounds the jury was improperly instructed and he contends his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the jury instructions given.
We affirm.
Compton identifies the following issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on the law of attempt, the elements of the crime attempted and the elements of attempt as charged.
2. Whether or not the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on "specific intent".
3. Whether or not the trial court committed plain error in failing to define "substantial step" for the jury.
4. Whether or not the trial court committed plain error in instructing the jury that it could find the defendant guilty if the presumption of innocence was "overcome by the evidence" rather than instructing the jury that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" on each element was required to overcome the presumption.
5. Whether or not the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on attempted sexual assault in the fourth degree as a lesser included offense of attempted sexual assault in the first degree.
6. Whether or not defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the instructional errors and omissions recited in # 1 through # 5 above.
The State rephrases the issues as:
I. Whether the district court properly instructed the jury with respect to the charge of attempted first degree sexual assault?
II. Whether the district court properly instructed the jury on the state's burden of proof and the standard of proof applicable to criminal cases?
III. Whether the district court's failure to sua sponte offer a lesser included offense instruction on attempted fourth degree sexual assault amounted to plain error?
IV. Whether appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the instructional errors and omissions alleged in appellant's first five enumerated appellate arguments?
Around 3:00 a.m., Saturday, March 19, 1994, the victim was awakened by a partially undressed assailant attempting to penetrate her with his partially erect penis. Unsuccessful, the intruder left the house. The victim recognized him as Compton and reported the attack to sheriff's deputies, who arrested Compton at his house. Compton was overheard telling his girlfriend that the arrest concerned the "[the victim's last name] lady" and, as he was transported to jail, he volunteered that the victim was "coming on to him." Compton stood trial for burglary and attempted first degree sexual assault. His defense was consent, contending that the victim had invited him to her home and initiated the sexual activity. The district court rejected the proposed jury instructions submitted by the State and Compton and proposed its own jury instructions. The defense did not object to the court's jury instructions. A jury acquitted him on the burglary charge but convicted him of attempted first degree sexual assault. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
No objections were lodged against the jury instructions at trial and plain error analysis applies. Miller v. State, 904 P.2d
Page 939
344, 347 (Wyo.1995). To demonstrate plain error, Compton must show that the record clearly shows an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a substantial right. Id. at 348.Jury Instructions on the Crime of Attempt
The jury convicted Compton of one count of attempted first degree sexual assault. The crime of first degree sexual assault is defined in the statute as:
(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree if:
* * *
(iii) The victim is physically helpless, and the actor knows or reasonably should know that the victim is physically helpless and that the victim has not consented....
WYO.STAT. § 6-2-302(a)(iii) (1988).
The crime of attempt is described in the statutes as:
(a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if:
(i) With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step towards commission of the crime. A "substantial step" is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to complete the commission of the crime....
WYO.STAT. § 6-1-301(a)(i) (1988).
The jury instructions given by the court on the charge of attempted first degree sexual assault in this case were:
Instruction No. 5
The necessary elements of the crime of attempted sexual assault in the first degree are:
1. The acts occurred within the County of Crook in the State of Wyoming on or about March 19, 1994; and
2. Raymond Compton attempted to inflict sexual intrusion on [the victim]; and
3. With the intent to commit sexual intrusion on [the victim], Raymond Compton, did an act which was a substantial step towards the infliction of sexual intrusion on her; and
4. At the time [the victim] was physically helpless and Raymond Compton knew, or should reasonably have known, that she was physically helpless and had not consented....
* * * *
Instruction No. 6
"Sexual penetration" means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus or anal intercourse with or without emission.
Instruction No. 7
"Physically helpless" means unconscious, asleep or otherwise physically unable to communicate unwillingness to act.
Instruction No. 8
The defendant contends that [the victim] consented to sexual contact. The defense of consent involves two separate elements:
1. [The victim] voluntarily consented to sexual contact by word or conduct; and
2. [The victim] had the present ability to consent or the defendant could not reasonably have known that she lacked the present ability to consent.
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the victim] did not consent to intercourse with the defendant.
Compton contends that it was error to combine the elements of the first degree sexual assault and attempt into one jury instruction instead of separately setting out the elements of the two crimes in two different instructions and he contends that it was error for part three of Instruction No. 5 to state "with the intent to inflict sexual intrusion," claiming it should have stated "with the specific intent to commit first degree...
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Giles v. State, No. 02-63.
...about the applicable law so that the jury may apply that law to its own findings with respect to the material facts. Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939 (Wyo. 1997); Brown v. State, 817 P.2d 429, 439 (Wyo.1991). A jury instruction must leave no doubt as to under what circumstances the crime......
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Whitney v. State, No. 03-34.
...shows an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a substantial right." Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939 [¶ 76] The record clearly reflects what occurred at trial regarding the photograph's admission into evidence. Officer Brackin testified tha......
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Sam v. State, S-16-0168.
...of attempt as defined by the general attempt statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301, is a crime of specific intent. See Compton v. State , 931 P.2d 936, 940 (Wyo. 1997) (crime of attempted first-degree sexual assault is a specific intent crime). In Reilly v. State , 2002 WY 156, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 12......
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Harlow v. State, No. 04-101.
...its import in relation to the factual circumstances.'" Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo.1997)); see also Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wyo.2000). We see nothing about the word "escape" or its usage in this statute that sugge......
-
Giles v. State, No. 02-63.
...about the applicable law so that the jury may apply that law to its own findings with respect to the material facts. Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939 (Wyo. 1997); Brown v. State, 817 P.2d 429, 439 (Wyo.1991). A jury instruction must leave no doubt as to under what circumstances the crime......
-
Whitney v. State, No. 03-34.
...shows an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a substantial right." Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939 [¶ 76] The record clearly reflects what occurred at trial regarding the photograph's admission into evidence. Officer Brackin testified tha......
-
Sam v. State, S-16-0168.
...of attempt as defined by the general attempt statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301, is a crime of specific intent. See Compton v. State , 931 P.2d 936, 940 (Wyo. 1997) (crime of attempted first-degree sexual assault is a specific intent crime). In Reilly v. State , 2002 WY 156, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 12......
-
Harlow v. State, No. 04-101.
...its import in relation to the factual circumstances.'" Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo.1997)); see also Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wyo.2000). We see nothing about the word "escape" or its usage in this statute that sugge......