Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood

• Decision Date: 10 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–948.,10–948.
• Citation: 181 L.Ed.2d 586,565 U.S. 95,132 S.Ct. 665
• Parties: COMPUCREDIT CORPORATION, et al., Petitioners v. Wanda GREENWOOD et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

565 U.S. 95

132 S.Ct. 665

181 L.Ed.2d 586

COMPUCREDIT CORPORATION, et al., Petitioners

v.Wanda GREENWOOD et al.

No. 10–948.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Oct. 11, 2011.

Decided Jan. 10, 2012.

Michael W. McConnell, for Petitioners.

Scott L. Nelson, Washington, DC, for Respondents.

Deanne E. Maynard, Brian R. Matsui, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Washington, D.C., Susan L. Germaise, McGuireWoods LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Sri Srinivasan, Anton Metlitsky, Joanna Nairn, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C., David L. Hartsell, McGuireWoods LLP, Chicago, IL, for Petitioners.

W. Lloyd Copeland, Steven A. Martino, Taylor Martino, P.C., Mobile, AL, Scott L. Nelson, Counsel of Record, Allison M. Zieve, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC, Jay Smith, Adrian John Barnes, Gilbert & Sackman, A Law Corp., Los Angeles, CA, Gregory Hawley, U.W. Clemon, White Arnold & Dowd, P.C., Birmingham, AL, Richard R. Rosenthal, Richard R. Rosenthal, P.C., Birmingham, AL, Kasie M. Braswell, The Braswell Firm, LLC, Daphne, AL, for Respondents.

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider whether the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), 15 U.S.C. § 1679 et seq., precludes enforcement of an arbitration agreement in a lawsuit alleging violations of that Act.

I

Respondents are individuals who applied for and received an Aspire Visa credit card marketed by petitioner CompuCreditCorporation and issued by Columbus Bank and Trust, now a division of petitioner Synovus Bank. In their applications they agreed to be bound by a provision which read: "Any claim, dispute or controversy (whether in contract, tort, or otherwise) at any time arising from or relating to your Account, any transferred balances or this Agreement (collectively, 'Claims'), upon the election of you or us, will be resolved by binding arbitration...." App. 62.

In 2008, respondents filed a class-action complaint against CompuCredit and Columbus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging, as relevant here, violations of the CROA. The claims largely involved the defendants' allegedly misleading representation that the credit card could be used to rebuild poor credit and their assessment of multiple fees upon opening of the accounts, which greatly reduced the advertised credit limit.

The District Court denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration of the claims, concluding that " Congress intended claims under the CROA to be non-arbitrable." 617 F.Supp.2d 980, 988 (2009). A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, Judge Tashima dissenting. 615 F.3d 1204 (2010). We granted certiorari, 563 U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2874, 179 L.Ed.2d 1187 (2011).

II

The background law governing the issue before us is the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq ., enacted in 1925 as a response to judicial hostility to arbitration. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011). As relevant here, the FAA provides:

"A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.

This provision establishes "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). See also, e.g., Concepcion, supra, at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 1745; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). It requires courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate according to their terms. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985). That is the case even when the claims at issue are federal statutory claims, unless the FAA's mandate has been "overridden by a contrary congressional command." Shearson/ American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987). See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). Respondents contend that the CROA contains such a command.

That statute regulates the practices of credit repair organizations, defined as certain entities that offer services for the purpose of "(i) improving any consumer's credit record, credit history, or credit rating; or (ii) providing advice or assistance to any consumer with regard to any activity or service described in clause (i)."¹ 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3). In its principal substantive provisions, the CROA prohibits certain practices, § 1679b, establishes certain requirements for contracts with consumers, § 1679d, and gives consumers a right to cancel, § 1679e. Enforcement is achieved through the Act's provision of a private cause of action for violation, § 1679g, as well as through federal and state administrative enforcement, § 1679h.

III

Like the District Court and the Ninth Circuit, respondents focus on the CROA's disclosure and nonwaiver provisions. The former, which is reproduced in full in the Appendix, infra, sets forth a statement that the credit repair organization must provide to the consumer before any contract is executed. § 1679c(a). One sentence of that required statement reads, " 'You have a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the Credit Repair Organization Act.' " The Act's nonwaiver provision states, "Any waiver by any consumer of any protection provided by or any right of the consumer under this subchapter—(1) shall be treated as void; and (2) may not be enforced by any Federal or State court or any other person." § 1679f(a).

The Ninth Circuit adopted the following line of reasoning, urged upon us by respondents here: The disclosure provision gives consumers the "right to sue," which "clearly involves the right to bring an action in a court of law." 615 F.3d, at 1208. Because the nonwaiver provision prohibits the waiver of "any right of the consumer under this subchapter," the arbitration agreement—which waived the right to bring an action in a court of law—cannot be enforced. Id., at 1214.

The flaw in this argument is its premise: that the disclosure provision provides consumers with a right to bring an action in a court of law. It does not. Rather, it imposes an obligation on credit repair organizations to supply consumers with a specific statement set forth (in quotation marks) in the statute. The only consumer right it creates is the right to receive the statement, which is meant to describe the consumer protections that the law elsewhere provides. The statement informs consumers, for instance, that they can dispute the accuracy of information in their credit file and that " '[t]he credit bureau must then reinvestigate and modify or remove inaccurate or incomplete information.' " 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a). That description is derived from § 1681i(a), which sets out in great detail the procedures to be followed by a credit bureau in the event of challenges to the accuracy of its information. Similarly, the required statement informs consumers that they may " 'cancel your contract with any credit repair organization for any reason within 3 business days from the date you signed it' "—the right created and set forth in more detail in § 1679e. And the "right to sue" language describes the consumer's right to enforce the credit repair organization's "liab[ility]" for "fail[ure] to comply with any provision of this subchapter" provided for in § 1679g(a).² Thus, contrary to the dissent's assertion, our interpretation does not "[r]educ[e] the required disclosure to insignificance," post, at 678. The disclosure provision informs consumers of their right to enforce liability for any failure to conform to the statute—information they might otherwise not possess. It is the dissent's interpretation that effectively reduces a portion of the CROA to a nullity. Interpreting the "right to sue" language in § 1679c(a) to "create" a right to sue in court not only renders it strikingly out of place in a section that is otherwise devoted to giving the consumer notice of rights created elsewhere; it also renders the creation of the "right to sue" elsewhere superfluous.

Respondents suggest that the CROA's civil-liability provision, § 1679g (set forth in full in the Appendix, infra ), demonstrates that the Act provides consumers with a "right" to bring an action in court. They cite the provision's repeated use of the terms "action," "class action," and "court"—terms that they say call to mind a judicial proceeding. These references cannot do the heavy lifting that respondents assign them. It is utterly commonplace for statutes that create civil causes of action to describe the details of those causes of action, including the relief available, in the context of a court suit. If the mere formulation of the cause of action in this standard fashion were sufficient to establish the "contrary congressional command" overriding the FAA, McMahon,supra, at 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, valid arbitration agreements covering federal causes of action would be rare indeed. But that is not the law. In Gilmer we enforced an arbitration agreement with respect to a cause of action created by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) which read, in part: "Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1). In McMahon we enforced an arbitration agreement with respect to a cause of action created by a provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) which read, in part: "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this...