Conant v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 30 September 1868
• Citation: 48 Ill. 410,1868 WL 5132
• Parties: ELIHU C. CONANT et al.v.ALBERT GRIFFIN, Adm'r, etc., of WILLIAM BARBER, dec'd.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

48 Ill. 410

1868 WL 5132 (Ill.)

ELIHU C. CONANT et al.

v.ALBERT GRIFFIN, Adm'r, etc., of WILLIAM BARBER, dec'd.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1868.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Lee county; the Hon. W. W. HEATON, Judge, presiding.

The facts in this case are fully stated in the opinion.

Messrs. EDSALL & CRABTREE, for the appellants.

Messrs. BARGE & HEATON, for the appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action of trespass, in the Lee Circuit Court, brought by Albert Griffin, administrator on the estate of William Barber, deceased, against Elihu C. Conant and William A. Conant, for an assault upon deceased with a pistol, resulting in his death. The action was brought under the act of 1853, on the allegation that deceased left a widow and infant son, his next of kin, to whom the damages, if any were recovered, could be distributed.

The plea was the general issue, with a notice of justification.

A jury found for the plaintiff, and assessed the damages at five thousand dollars. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and a judgment rendered on the verdict.

To reverse this judgment, the defendants have appealed to this court.

Several points are made by the appellants as grounds of reversal, the first of which is, that the court received evidence to show the wealth of the defendants, on the claim of the plaintiff and by concession of the court, that he had a right to recover punitive or exemplary damages. On this question, this court is fully committed by the decision in the cases of The City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349, and Rock Island Railroad Co. v. Morris, 26 ib. 400, and Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Shannon, 43 ib. 338.

In the first named case, the object and purposes of this statute were fully considered, and it was there held that the damages to be recovered, in an action under it, could only be for the pecuniary loss, not for the bereavement.

In the next case it was said, the statute makes the pecuniary loss of the widow and next of kin the sole measure of damages. The satisfaction of that loss, is, therefore, the sole purpose for which an action can be instituted, there being nothing to be allowed for the bereavement, nothing for solatium; the damages must be limited to an indemnity for the pecuniary loss.

In the last case, it was said, such next of kin as have suffered pecuniary injury from death, may recover pecuniary compensation under the statute, which requires the jury to give such damages as they may deem a fair and just compensation.

It is apparent, from these rulings, that the condition of th?? defendants, as to wealth, could not be taken into consideration by the jury in arriving at the measure of compensation for the pecuniary loss, for, was their wealth small or great, it did not, in any manner, increase or diminish the pecuniary loss sustained by the parties complaining. This action is the creature of the statute, and must be governed entirely by its provisions, and as they only provide for compensation for the pecuniary loss, the evidence should be confined exclusively to that. The damages should be compensatory, or approximate thereto, but not vindictive or exemplary.

The court erred in admitting this testimony, and in this connection it erred in giving the first instruction to the jury. By it the jury were informed, in substance, if the widow and child had sustained any pecuniary loss by the death, then they might assess the damages to five thousand dollars, the amount claimed in the declaration. The amount of pecuniary loss must be ascertained by proof, as in Shannon's case, and the verdict must not exceed the loss proved. By the instruction, the jury were told, if there was any pecuniary loss, they might assess the damages to the amount claimed in the declaration.

Another point made by appellants is, that the court erred in excluding evidence to show that Ann Barber was not the widow, and that Frank Barber was not the legitimate son and heir of the deceased.

In Morris' case, supra, the declaration was held bad, because of the want of an averment that the person killed...