Conard v. Goolsby, EC 72-98-K.

• Decision Date: 10 October 1972
• Docket Number: No. EC 72-98-K.,EC 72-98-K.
• Citation: 350 F. Supp. 713
• Parties: W. James CONARD et al. v. James E. GOOLSBY et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

350 F. Supp. 713

W. James CONARD et al. v. James E. GOOLSBY et al.

No. EC 72-98-K.

United States District Court, N. D. Mississippi, E. D.

October 10, 1972.

Fred L. Banks, Jr., Jackson, Miss., for plaintiffs.

Shields Sims, Columbus, Miss., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KEADY, Chief Judge.

This class action, based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was instituted by three male public school teachers of the black race and all others similarly situated against the superintendent and Board of Trustees of the Columbus Municipal Separate School District, Columbus, Mississippi. Federal court juridiction is founded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4).

By their complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants, acting under color of state law, had promulgated a policy of denying employment to teachers who refuse to conform with certain personal appearance regulations contained in a locally adopted and published "code of conduct". Plaintiffs urge that the code, and defendants' actions thereunder, impose arbitrary, capricious, burdensome and humiliating restrictions relating to moustaches, sideburns, beards, and hair of teachers as a condition of initial or continued employment in the Columbus public schools; that such grooming restrictions are racially discriminatory as to black males, who, as a matter of custom, tradition and racial identity, are more prone to wear moustaches, beards and longer sideburns than are whites; and that defendants' refusal to continue to employ plaintiffs solely because of their noncompliance with arbitrary and discriminatory grooming regulations violates plaintiffs' constitutional rights to privacy, due process and equal protection under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

On September 22, 1972, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The evidence adduced disclosed that on July 31, 1972, the School Board adopted a code of conduct effective for the 1972-73 school year, part II of which delineated personal appearance regulations for both boy and girl students. Although the personal appearance section of the code was specifically directed to students, at the hearing defendants insisted that the Board had contemplated the applicability of the code to students and teachers alike,¹ and that certain language in part IV of the code entitled "Discipline Policy" had been inserted to insure that teachers would be equally subject to the grooming restrictions in part II during the 1972-73 academic year.²

The pertinent portions of part II of the code, which specifically relate to boy students, contained sections governing beards, mustaches, and sideburns, as follows:

"(b) Boys:

1. Beards are prohibited.

2. A moustache may be worn provided it is neatly trimmed, does not extend below the bottom of the top lip and does not extend beyond the corners of the mouth.

* * * * * *

4. Sideburns may be worn to a length not below the bottom of the ear lobe, must be neatly trimmed, and cannot be bushy."

Each of the named plaintiffs has taught in the Columbus schools for the past six years. W. James Conard, 29 years, is a mathematics and algebra teacher in S. D. Lee High School, and currently wears a moustache slightly extending below the corners of the mouth, a small beard or goatee, and sideburns which do not extend below the bottom of the ear lobe. Ezra Baker, 28 years, and a civics teacher in Lee High School, has a moustache slightly extending below the corners of the mouth, a faint growth of hair below the bottom lip, and sideburns protruding just below the bottom of the ear lobe. F. A. Yates, 28 years, also a mathematics teacher in Lee High School, wears his moustache extending beyond the corners of the mouth and sideburns below the ear lobe, but has no beard or facial hair below the lower lip. Plaintiffs have worn these facial hair styles for years, although Conard and Baker in recent months reduced the length of their sideburns in an unsuccessful effort to comply with the students' dress code. On the witness stand, each man expressed feelings of chagrin, embarrassment and humiliation in making the requisite alterations to their appearance and, therefore, refused to conform to the specific restrictions placed on boy students by the code. Without question, each of the plaintiffs would be in good standing as a teacher in the Columbus school system had he strictly complied with the provisions of (b) 1, 2 and 4 above.

The proof at the hearing showed that, prior to their suspension, plaintiffs had been verbally warned by their principal and by the superintendent that they were not in compliance with the grooming standards of the code. The new restrictions had been explained at faculty meetings prior to opening of the school term, and all male teachers in the system, except the three plaintiffs, brought themselves into compliance. On September 7, Superintendent Goolsby notified plaintiffs by certified mail that they had been suspended from their duties as teachers for their refusal to comply with part II of the code, subparagraphs 2(b), 1, 2 and 4. The Superintendent advised plaintiffs that they would be afforded a hearing before the School Board on September 18; and if, prior to that date, plaintiffs fully complied with the grooming regulations, they would be reinstated. Plaintiffs chose not to appear at the Board hearing, and through their counsel notified Superintendent Goolsby that, although their facial hair styles were "slightly out of compliance" with the code, they nevertheless were "properly groomed in accordance with standards generally prevailing in the community." Asserting that the code was an illegal invasion of their right of privacy, plaintiffs' attorney threatened litigation unless the Board exercised leniency in applying the code restrictions. The Board thus had no occasion at its September 18 meeting to interpret the applicability of the code to teachers, and, upon failure of plaintiffs to appear, summarily discharged them from teaching contracts because of their failure to abide by the Board's regulations.³

Despite the testimony of the superintendent and several school trustees that the 1972-73 grooming regulations, particularly 2(b) 1, 2 and 4, had been adopted with the intent that they apply to male teachers, this court noted an apparent ambiguity in the language of the code, and that it might reasonably be construed as requiring good grooming of teachers, without conforming to the specific restrictions set for boy students. Additionally, assuming the Board's intent that specific grooming regulations should apply to teachers as well as students, the court expressed its concern that the Board had not had the opportunity to conduct a factual hearing with plaintiffs to determine whether plaintiffs were indeed in violation of the Board's own interpretation of the code's standards. Therefore, this court reserved ruling on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction pending final administrative hearing and decision by the Board. The court also reserved ruling on defendants' motion for summary judgment which had been filed on the day of the evidentiary hearing.

The Board scheduled another hearing for October 9, at which plaintiffs were present and presented evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board unanimously concluded that specific code provisions, 2(b) 1, 2 and 4, were applicable to male teachers and plaintiffs were not in compliance therewith. Consequently, the prior decision to suspend and terminate plaintiffs as classroom teachers was upheld.

The parties have agreed that they have no additional proof to present, and the court may consider the record made at the initial evidentiary hearing as one for final hearing on the merits. Thus, the court now addresses itself to all issues in the case, including those raised by defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs seek reinstatement, award of back pay, damages, as well as attorney fees and costs for bringing this action.

Plaintiffs' most serious contention is that the Board's personal appearance regulations, when made applicable to teachers, are an arbitrary denial of substantive due process and also violate the Equal Protection Clause under either the traditional standard of review, in that they constitute a classification having no rational relation to any legitimate governmental objective of a school board in the operation of public schools, or the stringent review, since the restrictions amount to racial classifications inherently suspect which burden blacks more heavily than whites and do not serve a compelling state interest. Defendants argue that there is no constitutional right in anyone to teach in public schools, that the School Board has power and authority to adopt regulations to maintain discipline and good order in its schools, that the promulgation of grooming regulations applicable to teachers and students alike is a legitimate exercise of that power, and the personal appearance regulations under attack have been administered in a racially nondiscriminatory manner and uniformly applied to both white and black teachers.

In support of their position, defendants cite the recent en banc decision of the Fifth Circuit in Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5 Cir. 1972), contending that it clearly dictates the rule to be followed in the present case. That is, within a public high school setting, there is no constitutionally protected right to wear one's hair (presumably including one's moustache, sideburns, or beard) in a length, manner or style which suits the wearer; thus, it is argued that plaintiffs' complaint should be summarily dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Alternatively, defendants maintain that even assuming plaintiffs have a constitutional right to wear hair,...