Conaway v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 20 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:13-cv-3260-T-36JSS |
| Parties | RONALD L. CONAWAY, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Ronald L. Conaway, a state of Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. 1). He challenges his convictions entered by the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Polk County, Florida, in 2007. Respondent filed a response (Dkt. 11), which raises no challenge to the petition's timeliness. Conaway filed a reply (Dkt. 15). Upon review, the petition must be denied.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A jury convicted Conaway of robbery with a firearm, false imprisonment with a firearm, and three counts of aggravated assault with a firearm. (Dkt. 12, Ex. 3, Verdict Form.) He was sentenced to life imprisonment for robbery with a firearm, fifteen years in prison for false imprisonment with a firearm, and five years in prison for each count of aggravated assault with a firearm. (Dkt. 12, Ex. 3, Judgment and Sentence.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed his convictions and sentences. (Dkt. 12, Ex. 7.)
Conaway filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Dkt. 12, Ex. 9.) The court summarily denied some claims and granted an evidentiary hearing on one claim. (Dkt. 12, Exs. 10, 13.) Following the evidentiary hearing, the state court entered a final order denying Conaway's postconviction motion. (Dkt. 12, Ex. 14.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the order of denial. (Dkt. 12, Ex. 21.)
FACTS1
Ulysses "Jim" Valladares worked as the manager at the apartment complex where he lived. He handled evictions and collected rent. On the evening of November 6, 2006, he was sitting on the porch outside his apartment with his friend Darrell Marvicsin when Conaway joined them. Valladares' daughters Sara and Seleste planned to arrive to celebrate his birthday that night.
After his daughters arrived with their children and Valladares said goodbye to Marvicsin and Conaway, Conaway pulled out a gun and said no one was leaving. Conaway made statements indicating he was upset about his job and the eviction of his friend from the apartment complex. He also made comments about getting even and "pay back." He waved the gun around and pointed it at the others. Sara, Seleste, and their children got into a car. Still holding the gun, Conaway stood near the car. He eventually agreed to let them leave but told them that if they called police, he would shoot Valladares, Marvicsin, and any police officer that arrived. Sara and Seleste left with their children.
At some point, Conaway fired two shots from the gun. Apparently responding to a police call from an unknown person reporting the gunshots, Sergeant Christopher Gilbertarrived at the apartment. Worried about Conaway's earlier statement that he would shoot any officers who arrived, Valladares denied hearing any gunshots. Gilbert left the scene.
When Sara and Seleste returned to check on Valladares, Conaway again pointed the gun at them, and kicked Seleste's car. The two women left. According to Valladares, Conaway went inside Valladares' apartment with Valladares and Marvicsin. Conaway said he needed money and, because Conaway was armed, Valladares provided him with $41 from his wallet. Conaway also took a bag containing about $800 in rent money Valladares had collected. Valladares described his belief that he could not leave the apartment and that he was held there against his will because Conaway was armed. Conaway remained in the apartment for hours, leaving at some point the next morning. When Conaway opened the door to the apartment, Valladares pushed him out and locked the door behind him. Marvicsin later left the apartment.
Upon his arrest, Conaway told Detective Kenneth Powers that "Darrell" brought the gun to Valladares' apartment and that Valladares discharged the gun. Conaway stated that he held the gun but denied discharging it or threatening anyone with it. At trial, Conaway called Dr. Henry Dee. Dr. Dee testified to his conclusion that Conaway was insane at the time of the offenses.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d), which sets forth a highly deferential standard for federal courtreview of a state court adjudication, states:
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied-the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there wasan error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Cone, 535 U.S. at 693. In other words, "AEDPA prevents defendants-and federal courts-from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) () (citations omitted).
The state appellate court affirmed Conaway's convictions and sentences and the denial of his postconviction motion in per curiam decisions without written opinions. These decisions warrant deference under Section 2254(d)(1) because "the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due." Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99("When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.").
Review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the state court:
We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that "resulted in" a decision that was contrary to, or "involved" an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state court.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181-82. Conaway bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state court factual...
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