Concepcion v. United States

• Decision Date: 27 June 2022
• Docket Number: 20-1650
• Parties: Carlos CONCEPCION, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

142 S.Ct. 2389

213 L.Ed.2d 731

Carlos CONCEPCION, Petitioner

v.UNITED STATES

No. 20-1650

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued January 19, 2022

Decided June 27, 2022

Charles L. McCloud, Washington, DC, for petitioner

Matthew Guarnieri, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

J. Martin Richey, First Assistant Federal Public Defender, Boston, MA, Lisa S. Blatt, Charles L. McCloud, Counsel of Record, Benjamin N. Hazelwood, Alex C. Ussia, Danielle J. Sochaczevski, Aaron Z. Roper, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Kenneth A. Polite, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Joel S. Johnson, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

There is a longstanding tradition in American law, dating back to the dawn of the Republic, that a judge at sentencing considers the whole person before him or her "as an individual." Koon v. United States , 518 U.S. 81, 113, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). In line with this history, federal courts today generally "exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used" to craft appropriate sentences.

Williams v. New York , 337 U.S. 241, 246, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). When a defendant appears for sentencing, the sentencing court considers the defendant on that day, not on the date of his offense or the date of his conviction. Pepper v. United States , 562 U.S. 476, 492, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011). Similarly, when a defendant's sentence is set aside on appeal, the district court at resentencing can (and in many cases, must) consider the defendant's conduct and changes in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines since the original sentencing. Ibid.

Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018 against that backdrop. The First Step Act authorizes district courts to reduce the prison sentences of defendants convicted of certain offenses involving crack cocaine. The Act allows a district court to impose a reduced sentence "as if " the revised penalties for crack cocaine enacted in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the offense was committed. The question in this case is whether a district court adjudicating a motion under the First Step Act may consider other intervening changes of law (such as changes to the Sentencing Guidelines) or changes of fact (such as behavior in prison) in adjudicating a First Step Act motion.

The Court holds that they may. It is only when Congress or the Constitution limits the scope of information that a district court may consider in deciding whether, and to what extent, to modify a sentence, that a district court's discretion to consider information is restrained. Nothing in the First Step Act contains such a limitation. Because district courts are always obligated to consider nonfrivolous arguments presented by the parties, the First Step Act requires district courts to consider intervening changes when parties raise them. By its terms, however, the First Step Act does not compel courts to exercise their discretion to reduce any sentence based on those arguments.

The District Court in this case declined to consider petitioner Carlos Concepcion's arguments that intervening changes of law and fact supported his motion, erroneously believing that it did not have the discretion to do so, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court now reverses.

I

A

In 2007, Concepcion pleaded guilty to one count of distributing five or more grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006 ed.). Concepcion admitted that he sold 13.8 grams of crack cocaine, and he was sentenced in 2009 to 19 years (228 months) in prison. Two features of his sentencing are relevant here. First, Concepcion was sentenced under a scheme that created a 100-to-1 disparity between crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine offenders. At the time Concepcion was sentenced, an offense involving five or more grams of crack cocaine resulted in a statutory sentencing range of 5 to 40 years’ imprisonment; it required 100 times as much powder cocaine to trigger the same penalties. Second, when Concepcion was initially sentenced, he qualified as a "career offender." The career offender provision, together with other enhancements, increased Concepcion's Guidelines range from 57 to 71 months to 262 to 327 months.

Both of these features of Concepcion's sentencing have since been altered. Just one year after Concepcion was sentenced, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to correct the harsh disparities between crack and powder cocaine sentencing. Section 2 of that Act increased the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger the 5-to-40-year sentencing range from 5 grams to 28 grams. § 2(a)(2), 124 Stat. 2372. The Sentencing Commission then retroactively amended the Sentencing Guidelines to lower the Guidelines range for crack-cocaine offenses, but that amendment did not benefit all prisoners serving sentences handed down during the 100-to-1 regime. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual App. C, Amdt. 750 (Supp. Nov. 2011) (USSG). Concepcion was not eligible for retroactive relief under that 2011 Sentencing Commission's amendment because he was sentenced under the career offender enhancement, but he became eligible to have his sentence reduced in 2018, when Congress passed the First Step Act. The First Step Act authorized district courts to "impose a reduced sentence" for qualifying movants "as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act ... were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed." Pub. L. 115–391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5222.

B

Concepcion filed a pro se motion under the First Step Act in 2019. He argued that he was serving a sentence for a "covered offense" because § 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act "modified" the statutory penalties for his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Concepcion contended that retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act lowered his Guidelines range from 262 to 327 months to 188 to 235 months. The Government conceded Concepcion's eligibility for relief and his calculation of the Guidelines but opposed the motion, emphasizing that Concepcion's original sentence of 228 months fell within the new Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months. While recognizing Concepcion's participation in various programs in prison, the Government detailed "troubling behaviors such as ‘[f]ighting (12/19/2017); Interfering with Staff (11/15/2012); and Possession of a Weapon’ " in Concepcion's prison records that, in the Government's view, counseled against a sentence reduction. Electronic Case Filing in No. 1:07–cr–10197 (Mass.) (ECF), Doc. 78, pp. 4–5, n. 4.

In his reply brief, represented by counsel, Concepcion made two primary arguments in support of a reduced sentence. First, he argued that he would no longer be considered a career offender under the amended Guidelines, because one of his prior convictions had been vacated and his remaining convictions would no longer be considered crimes of violence that trigger the enhancement.¹ Without the career offender enhancement, Concepcion argued that his revised Guidelines range should be 57 to 71 months. Second, Concepcion pointed to postsentencing evidence of rehabilitation. Concepcion highlighted his successfully completed drug and vocational programming, as well as his stable reentry plan. He also submitted a letter from a Bureau of Prisons chaplain who attested to Concepcion's spiritual growth while incarcerated.

The District Court denied Concepcion's motion. It adopted the Government's argument that if the Court "considered only the changes in law that the Fair Sentencing Act enacted, [Concepcion's] sentence would be the same." App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a. The court declined to consider that Concepcion would no longer qualify as a career offender on the ground that the First Step Act "does not authorize such relief." Id., at 72a. In doing so, the District Court adopted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, which understood the First Step Act to require a district court to " ‘plac[e] itself in the time frame of the original sentencing, altering the relevant legal landscape only by the changes mandated by the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act.’ " Id., at 74a (quoting United States v. Hegwood , 934 F.3d 414, 418 (C.A.5 2019) ). The District Court did not address Concepcion's evidence of rehabilitation or the Government's countervailing evidence of Concepcion's disciplinary record.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided opinion. The court interpreted the First Step Act as requiring a "two-step inquiry." 991 F.3d 279, 289 (C.A.1 2021). At the first step of that inquiry, a district court decides whether a movant should be resentenced at all, considering only the changes wrought by the Fair Sentencing Act. Ibid. If the district court answers in the affirmative at the first step, it may then, in its discretion, consider new factual or legal developments in determining how to resentence the movant. Id., at 289–290. Judge Barron dissented, rejecting the panel's bifurcated approach. In his view, the First Step Act requires only one step of analysis, at which district courts have "substantial discretion" to consider evidence of rehabilitation and Guidelines changes. Id., at 293, 309–310.

The Court of Appeals opinion added to the disagreement among the Circuits as to whether a district court deciding a First Step Act motion must, may, or may not consider intervening changes of law or fact.² This Court granted certiorari to resolve this disagreement. 594 U. S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 54, 210 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2021).

II

"From the beginning of the Republic, federal judges were entrusted with wide sentencing discretion." K. Stith & J. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 9 (1998) (Stith & Cabranes). Federal courts...