CONCERNED CITIZENS AROUND MURPHY v. Murphy Oil USA

Decision Date04 February 2010
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 08-4986.
PartiesCONCERNED CITIZENS AROUND MURPHY v. MURPHY OIL USA, INC.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

Adam Babich, Andrew Seidel, Casey Scott, Corinne Van Dalen, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, New Orleans, LA, Jill Marie Witkowski, Jill M. Witkowski, Attorney at Law, San Diego, CA, for Concerned Citizens Around Murphy.

Kerry J. Miller, Joseph Nicholas Mole, Kyle Andrew Spaulding, Paul C. Thibodeaux, Frilot L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Murphy Oil USA, Inc.

ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH S. VANCE, District Judge.

Before the Court are plaintiff Concerned Citizens Around Murphy (CCAM)'s First Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability and Standing (see R. Doc. 30), and defendant Murphy Oil USA, Inc. (Murphy)'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Standing (see R. Doc. 41). CCAM's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Murphy's motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

CCAM, a Louisiana non-profit organization, brought this action on behalf of its members under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). CCAM alleges that Murphy repeatedly violated hourly and yearly emission limitations set by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ), and also that Murphy failed to properly maintain certain pollution control devices. CCAM alleges that these violations endanger the health and impair the quality of life of its members who live or own property near Murphy's Meraux refinery in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana. CCAM requests a declaration that Murphy has committed these violations, a permanent injunction requiring Murphy to comply with applicable permits and the Clean Air Act, civil penalties and attorney's fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604.

CCAM now moves for partial summary judgment on liability and standing. Murphy also moves for partial summary judgment on standing. The Court heard oral argument on the parties' motions on December 9, 2009 and ordered supplemental briefing. For the following reasons, CCAM's motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Murphy's motion is DENIED.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any material fact exists, the Court considers "all of the evidence in the record but refrains from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir.2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated assertions. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. A court ultimately must be satisfied that "a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Delta, 530 F.3d at 399.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party "must come forward with evidence which would `entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.'" Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263-64 (5th Cir.1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the motion by either countering with sufficient evidence of its own, or "showing that the moving party's evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party." Id. at 1265.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; Isquith for and on Behalf of Isquith v. Middle South Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 198 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926, 109 S.Ct. 310, 102 L.Ed.2d 329 (1988).

III. DISCUSSION

Congress created the Clean Air Act "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, et seq., is a comprehensive program for controlling and improving the nation's air quality. Under the Act, the Environmental Protection Agency identifies air pollutants that endanger the public health or welfare, determines what concentrations of those pollutants are safe, and promulgates those determinations as national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), national emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPs), and new source performance standards (NSPS). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409, 7411, 7412. Each state must ensure that its ambient air meets the appropriate NAAQS, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), and must develop a state implementation plan to achieve the standards established by the EPA, see 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a). The Act requires state implementation plans to include "enforceable emission limitations and other control measures, means, or techniques..., as well as schedules and timetables for compliance" to meet the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A). The Act also permits states to set additional or higher emission standards in its plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 7416. Louisiana's plan requires permits for discharges of various air pollutants. La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 30:2055. The Secretary of the LDEQ issues permits in accordance with federal and state law and LDEQ regulations. La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 30:2054. The LDEQ has issued three relevant permits setting emission limitations for Murphy's Meraux refinery.1

The Clean Air Act includes a citizen suit provision that allows citizens to request injunctive relief and civil penalties, payable to the United States Treasury, for the violation of any "emission standard or limitation" under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). CCAM sues Murphy under this citizen suit provision for violating the emission limitations set by its LDEQ Permits.

A. Standing

Both CCAM and Murphy move for summary judgment on the issue of whether CCAM has standing to bring this action under the Clean Air Act. The Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision authorizes "any person" to "commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person ... who is alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated) or to be in violation of (A) an emissions standard or limitation under this chapter. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). Congress defined the term "person" to include corporations, partnerships and associations. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e). It is clear that nonprofit corporations may invoke the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision. See, e.g., Texans United for a Safe Econ. Educ. Fund v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 207 F.3d 789, 792 (5th Cir.2000); St. Bernard Citizens for Environ. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Refining, L.L.C., 354 F.Supp.2d 697, 700 (E.D.La.2005). CCAM alleges that Murphy has repeatedly violated its LDEQ emission limitations. Accordingly, if CCAM has standing to bring this action under Article III of the Constitution, it also has statutory standing under the Clean Air Act. See Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir.2000); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat. Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 16, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981).

Thus, the Court must determine whether CCAM has constitutional standing to bring this citizen suit. The standing issue is a threshold matter. Texans United, 207 F.3d at 792. The requirement that a party have standing flows from the Article III requirement that there be a "case or controversy." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Standing analysis focuses on whether "a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). To prevail on a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff may not rest on mere allegations to support standing, but it instead must produce affidavits or other evidence to prove that standing exists. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n. 31, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979).

In this suit, CCAM seeks to represent the interests of its members. An organization like CCAM has standing to bring a suit on behalf of its members if: (1) its members would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests its seeks to protect are germane to its purpose as an association; and (3) neither the claim it asserts, nor the relief it requests, requires the participation of individual members. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); Texans United, 207 F.3d at 792. The parties dispute all three of these requirements. The Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact that CCAM satisfies all three requirements under Fifth Circuit law.

1. CCAM's individual members would have standing to sue in their own right.

To prevail on its motion for summary judgment on standing, CCAM must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact that: (1) its members have suffered an actual or threatened injury; (2) the injury is "fairly traceable" to the...

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