Concerned Citizens of Cohocton Valley, Inc. v. New York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation

Decision Date02 September 1997
Docket NumberNos. 96-7373,96-9474,s. 96-7373
Citation127 F.3d 201
Parties28 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,039 CONCERNED CITIZENS OF COHOCTON VALLEY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, Michael Zagata, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation; Jeffrey J. Sama, Deputy Permit Administrator of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Defendants-Appellees, J. Makowski Associates, Inc., Defendant-Appellant. AVOCA NATURAL GAS STORAGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONCERNED CITIZENS OF COHOCTON VALLEY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Mark A. Chertok, Sive, Paget & Riesel, New York City (Frederick M. Lowther, Lee A. Alexander, Stefan M. Krantz, Yoav K. Gery, Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, Washington, DC, on the brief), for appellants.

Alan J. Knauf, Rochester, NY, Kathleen Liston Morrison, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albany, NY (Mark A. Urbanski, Knauf & Craig, Rochester, NY; Dennis C. Vacco, N.Y. State Atty. Gen., Peter H. Schiff, Dep. Solicitor Gen., Lisa M. Burianek, Timothy Hoffman, Asst. Attys. Gen., Albany, NY, on the brief), for appellees.

Before: NEWMAN and KEARSE, Circuit Judges. *

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated appeals raise two somewhat esoteric issues of appellate and district court jurisdiction. The first issue is whether and in what circumstances a party may appeal a decision that granted it all the relief it sought, but did so on grounds other than those urged by the prevailing party, leaving in place a subsidiary ruling of the trial court that the appellant apprehends will have an adverse collateral estoppel effect. The second issue is whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a suit seeking both a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent the enforcement of state regulatory provisions when the plaintiff has not named any state official or agency as a defendant and the interests of the state regulatory authorities are not adverse to those of the plaintiff.

The first issue arises on an appeal by J. Makowski Associates, Inc. ("JMAI") from the March 21, 1996, judgment of the District Court for the Western District of New York (David G. Larimer, Chief Judge) dismissing a suit by Concerned Citizens of Cohocton Valley, Inc. ("CCCV") against state and local environmental regulatory officials and JMAI. The second issue arises on an appeal by Avoca Natural Gas Storage ("Avoca") from the October 8, 1996, judgment of the same Court, dismissing Avoca's suit against CCCV. On JMAI's appeal, we conclude that JMAI's apprehension of an adverse preclusive effect is unwarranted and that it may not appeal, and we therefore dismiss the appeal. On Avoca's appeal, we conclude that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking in the absence of adversity between the plaintiff and the state regulatory authorities whose enforcement activities the plaintiff seeks to prevent, and we therefore affirm.

Background

The Avoca Natural Gas Project ("Avoca project") is a proposed plan for the construction, development, and operation of an interstate natural gas storage facility in Avoca, New York. In December 1993, JMAI, the project developer, applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") for certificates of public convenience and necessity, which would constitute federal approval of the project. See Natural Gas Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1994).

After performing the environmental reviews required by the Natural Gas Act and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994), FERC approved the project and granted the certificates. In November 1994, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") published an agency determination (i) that the Natural Gas Act preempted the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"), and (ii) that FERC's approval of the Avoca project preempted enforcement of SEQRA, including SEQRA's requirement of a more intensive evaluation of the potential environmental effects of the Avoca project than required by NEPA. As a result of these determinations, DEC issued construction permits to JMAI, and the Town of Avoca Planning Board thereafter adopted a resolution to grant a special permit for JMAI to begin work on the project.

In May 1995, CCCV, a not-for-profit corporation consisting of residents of the Town of Avoca and surrounding areas, brought an action in the District Court against JMAI, DEC, DEC officials, and other state and local officials and agencies. The complaint alleged that DEC's issuance of the construction permits violated SEQRA and other state laws, and that the local agencies and officials violated state and local laws by approving or ratifying the DEC permits. Contending that the environmental reviews conducted under NEPA and the Natural Gas Act cannot substitute for the intensive evaluations required under SEQRA, CCCV sought to have the DEC permits declared null and void, and to enjoin Avoca's construction of the facility.

An introductory paragraph of CCCV's complaint stated that CCCV had selected a federal forum "because the primary (but not only) issue in the case is whether [the FERC] approvals ... preempt the requirement under state law that defendants comply with SEQRA."

Focusing on the issue of preemption, JMAI moved for dismissal or summary judgment. In a similar motion, the state defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment. Chief Judge Larimer treated the motions as requesting summary judgment, and dismissed CCCV's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Concerned Citizens of Cohocton Valley, Inc. v. Town of Avoca Planning Board, 919 F.Supp. 643 (W.D.N.Y.1996). He ruled that plaintiff had alleged only state law claims, that the plaintiff's anticipation of defendants' preemption defense did not support federal jurisdiction, and that the doctrine of complete preemption did not apply to the Natural Gas Act to create federal jurisdiction over claims pleaded as arising under state law. Id. at 647-50.

In May 1996, after the dismissal of CCCV's complaint, and after CCCV had filed a new complaint in state court, 1 JMAI transferred the FERC certificates as well as the DEC and local permits to Avoca. Avoca then filed its own complaint in the District Court, seeking (i) a declaration that the Natural Gas Act preempts SEQRA, and (ii) an injunction barring CCCV from attempting to enforce the requirements of state law. CCCV was the only defendant named in Avoca's complaint.

Chief Judge Larimer dismissed Avoca's suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Avoca Natural Gas Storage v. Concerned Citizens of Cohocton Valley, Inc., 939 F.Supp. 223 (W.D.N.Y.1996). He ruled that when a plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment and an injunction against the enforcement of state law, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction unless a state actor is joined as a defendant. Id. at 225-26.

JMAI appeals from the judgment dismissing CCCV's complaint, 2 and Avoca appeals from the judgment dismissing its complaint. We consolidated both appeals.

Discussion
1. JMAI's Appeal from Dismissal of CCCV's Complaint

One of the prerequisites to appellate jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), is that the appellant has standing to pursue the appeal. Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980); 15A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902 (2d ed. 1992) ("Wright et al."); see Public Service Commission v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 306 U.S. 204, 206-07, 59 S.Ct. 480, 481-82, 83 L.Ed. 608 (1939). Because standing to appeal is conferred only on parties "aggrieved" by the judgment, a party generally does not have standing to appeal when the judgment terminates the case in his favor. Ashley v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals (In re DES Litigation), 7 F.3d 20, 23 (2d Cir.1993); Great American Audio Corp. v. Metacom, 938 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir.1991); see Deposit Guaranty, 445 U.S. at 333, 100 S.Ct. at 1171. Thus, if a court grants the ultimate relief a party requested, even though on grounds other than those urged by the prevailing party, that party is generally not "aggrieved" by the judgment and may not appeal, Spencer v. Casavilla, 44 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Deposit Guaranty, 445 U.S. at 333, 100 S.Ct. at 1171).

JMAI seeks to appeal, notwithstanding that it prevailed in the District Court. Appellant's basis for claiming to be aggrieved is not entirely clear. Appellant's main brief confines itself to arguing that the District Court erred in ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over CCCV's complaint. Nothing is said as to how that ruling aggrieves JMAI. The party nominally aggrieved, CCCV, has accepted its dismissal on jurisdictional grounds and refiled its claim in state court.

Only in its reply brief does JMAI endeavor to contend how it is aggrieved by the jurisdictional dismissal of CCCV's suit. First, it contends that the dismissal "denied [appellant] a federal forum to defend against CCCV's challenges to Avoca's federal certi ficate." See Reply Brief for Appellants at 20. That claim is entirely unavailing. No party is entitled to a federal forum to defend against a plaintiff's state law claim. A federal defense, including the defense of federal law preemption, generally does not suffice to confer district court jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law claim. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2430, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). A preemption defense creates federal court jurisdiction only in instances of complete preemption, i.e., where the preemptive force of federal law is "so powerful as to displace entirely" the plaintiff's state cause of action ...

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