Concessions Co. v. Morris

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MACKINTOSH, J.
• Citation: Concessions Co. v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46, 186 P. 655 (Wash. 1919)
• Decision Date: 15 December 1919
• Docket Number: 15556.
• Parties: CONCESSIONS CO. v. MORRIS, Sheriff, et al.

186 P. 655

109 Wash. 46

CONCESSIONS CO. v. MORRIS, Sheriff, et al.

No. 15556.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 15, 1919

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; John D. Fletcher, Judge.

Suit by the Concessions Company against Thomas N. Morris, as sheriff of Pierce county, and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Judgment reversed.

Revelle & Revelle, of Seattle, for appellant.

William D. Askren, Frank D. Nash, and J. A. Sorley, all of Tacoma for respondents.

MACKINTOSH J.

The superior court sustained the respondents' demurrer to appellant's complaint, which, in substance, alleged that the appellant is a Washington corporation, with its principle place of business in Seattle, King county, and that the respondents are the county of Pierce and its assessor treasurer, and sheriff. The appellant has a concession to operate barber shops at Green Park, which is a portion of the federal army post known as Camp Lewis. This concession was granted by the Camp Lewis Amusement Company, which holds a license and authority from the commanding officer at Camp Lewis, and by the terms of the concession the appellant had the right to construct and operate buildings according to plans and specifications approved by the commanding officer and to pay said commanding officer a location fee and a privilege tax of 10 per cent. of the daily gross receipts of the concession; the concession further providing that all rights under it might be terminated by the commanding officer for breach of its terms or for military reasons; that the appellant should submit to the commanding officer's auditor its records and accounts, and should abide by the tariffs, charges, rates, prices, and rules which the commanding officer may make from time to time. It was further provided that if the appellant failed to operate the concession for five days, the commanding officer could command the appellant to vacate, and upon such order the appellant would have seven days to take from the buildings his personal property, and during those seven days the appellant might sell the buildings to any one else holding a concession approved by the commanding officer. If no such sale was made the appellant's rights in the buildings terminated. The concession could not be assigned without the commanding officer's consent. The complaint then alleges that the appellant erected the buildings on the military reservation as provided in the contract; that the reservation is the property of the United States; that the buildings could not be removed therefrom, and that the appellant had only the right of use and occupation; that in the buildings the plaintiff had located personal property which is not within the jurisdiction of Pierce county or the state of Washington, but in the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States government. It is then alleged that the respondents assessed the buildings, fixtures, and personal property for taxes for the year 1918, and that the officials of Pierce county are threatening to sell this property to collect the tax. The complaint then prays for an injunction against Pierce county and its officers, and asks that the assessments be canceled of record. The respondents, by demurring, admit the appellant's allegation that the title to the reservation is in the federal government, and that therefore the provisions of the act of 1917, hereinafter referred to, relating to the acquisition of such title have been complied with.

This appeal presents for the determination of this court the question as to whether or not property interests of the appellant, located on the military reservation at Camp Lewis, are subject to taxation by the state as a part of the property within the state, the appellant claiming that this property, being situated on a military reservation, is within the jurisdiction of the United States, and not within the jurisdiction of the state of Washington or Pierce county.

Const. U.S. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17, provides that:

'Congress shall have power * * * to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings.'

The state of Washington, by section 6853, Rem. & Bal. Code, consented to the acquisition by the United States of lands for military purposes, this act being in harmony with the federal constitutional provision above quoted, and the act providing that----

'The jurisdiction of this state is hereby ceded to the United States of America over all such land or lands as may have been or may be hereafter acquired by purchase or by condemnation, or set apart by the general government for any or either of the purposes before mentioned: Provided, that this state shall retain concurrent jurisdiction with the United States in and over all tracts so acquired or set apart as aforesaid, so far as that all civil and criminal process that may issue under the authority of this state against any person or persons charged with crimes committed, or for any cause of action or suit accruing without the bounds of any such tract, may be executed therein, in the same manner and with like effect as though this assent and cession had not been granted.'

And in the following section, being section 6854, the Legislature provided:

'The tracts, pieces, or parcels of land so acquired or set apart, together with the tenements and appurtenances for the purposes before mentioned, shall be held exempt from taxation by the state of Washington.'

The Legislature in 1917, in chapter 3 and chapter 4, was dealing particularly with the Camp Lewis Reservation, and in those chapters consented to the acquisition and granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Congress of the United States of the territory donated for a military reservation; section 20, chapter 3, being as follows:

'Pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and especially to paragraph 17 of section 8 of article 1 of such Constitution, the consent of the Legislature of the state of Washington is hereby given to the United States to acquire, by donation from Pierce county, title to all lands herein intended to be referred to, * * * and the consent of the state of Washington is hereby given to the exercise by the Congress of the United States of exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such tracts or parcels of land so conveyed to it: * * * Provided, that all civil process issued from the courts of this state and such criminal process as may issue under the authority of this state, against any person charged with crime in cases arising outside of said reservation, may be served and executed thereon in the same mode and manner and by the same officers as if the consent herein given had not been made.'

The state of Washington and its subsidiary municipalities have no right to assess and tax the lands, buildings, and fixtures situated within the military reservation, which are the property of the United States government, and it cannot be disputed that so much of such property as has been attempted by the respondents to be assessed against the appellant has been assessed wrongfully; under the contract the buildings and fixtures being the property of the government, and not of the appellant. The contract clearly provides that the buildings are to be of a permanent nature and to remain where constructed, and the contract especially provides against their removal by the appellant, whose only right was to their use and occupation, subject to the power of the commanding officer to terminate that right at any time for military reasons. That right is also terminated by the cessation of the use by the appellant. Therefore, by express agreement in the contract, as well as by the common-law principle governing the construction of buildings upon lands of another and the attachment of fixtures thereto, the buildings and fixtures used by the appellant are the property of the United States. The Laws of 1915, chapter 131, expressly provide that 'all property, whether real or personal, belonging exclusively * * * to the United States' shall be exempt from taxation. There then only remains a question of whether the appellant's personal property situated upon the reservation is subject to state and county assessment and taxation.

Under our law, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 9101, only personal property in the state of Washington can be listed for taxation, and the question, therefore, must be answered by a determination of whether personal property situated upon this military reservation is in the state of Washington. It seems to us that the answer to this is clear, and that such property is without the state in both a jurisdictional and territorial sense, for, as we have seen by the Constitution of the United States, and the act of the Legislature of this state, both the military reservation itself and the jurisdiction and legislation over it have been granted to the United States, and thereby there has been created an independent sovereignty the territory of which is surrounded by the state of Washington, but over which the state of Washington has no jurisdiction. A territory has been created which resembles that of the District of Columbia, the only reservation being that the state of Washington can serve civil and criminal process therein on actions arising outside the reservation.

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