Condominium Owners 5-7 Slade Ave. v. Supervisor of Assessments of Baltimore County, 131
Citation | 388 A.2d 116,283 Md. 29 |
Decision Date | 20 June 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 131,131 |
Parties | CONDOMINIUM OWNERS 5-7 SLADE AVENUE et al. v. SUPERVISOR OF ASSESSMENTS OF BALTIMORE COUNTY. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Edwin J. Wolf, Baltimore (Archibald Eccleston, III, and Eccleston, Seidler & Miller, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.
Robert J. Aumiller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE, ORTH and COLE, JJ.
We shall here hold that the taxing authorities and the courts which have considered this matter have erred in their interpretation of the statute formerly governing the assessment of condominiums. Thus, we shall reverse the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion in this matter (No. 106, September Term, 1977, decided November 4, 1977).
The assessment is for the year July 1, 1974 June 30, 1975. Thus, under Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol., 1973 Cum.Supp.) Art. 81, § 29A the date of finality was January 1, 1974. The statute in controversy is Code (1957, 1973 Repl.Vol.) Art. 21, § 11-122 ( ) 1 The statute in question provides in pertinent part:
Appellants (the Owners) own condominium units located in a building at 5-7 Slade Avenue in Baltimore County. The Supervisor of Assessments of Baltimore County (the Assessor), appellee here, analyzed sales for a number of units in the condominium for a period of approximately six months between the date of creation of the condominium and the date of finality. From this sample he computed the value of the whole. It is the contention of the Owners that the Assessor and the courts which have since reviewed the matter failed to give effect to the statutory language which they say requires valuation of the whole. We agree.
The Owners were unsuccessful before the Maryland Tax Court, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, and the Court of Special Appeals. Code (1957, 1975 Repl.Vol., 1977 Cum.Supp.) Art. 81, § 229(o ) provides that review by a circuit court of a decision of the tax court shall be upon the record made in the tax court, and that the latter's order shall be affirmed "if it is not erroneous as a matter of law and if it is supported by substantial evidence appearing in the record."
The Owners rely heavily upon our decision in Supervisor v. Southgate Harbor, 279 Md. 586, 369 A.2d 1053 (1977). The taxpayers there contended that it was discriminatory error for the assessor to use a square foot basis of valuation of the land of the condominiums when a front foot basis was used for certain other land in the Annapolis area. They seized upon the language in Art. 21, § 11-122(b) to the effect that "condominium units shall be carried on the tax records of the county . . . as a separate and distinct entity and all real estate taxes . . . shall be assessed . . . and collected against each of the said . . . units . . . in the same manner . . . as such assessments are levied and collected in the case of individual land parcels." From this it was argued that if other waterfront land in the Annapolis area were assessed on a front foot basis, then their land must also be so assessed. Citing Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314, 317, 353 A.2d 256 (1976), together with the cases referred to in Thomas, we spoke in Southgate Harbor of the hornbook rule of statutory construction to which this Court has alluded many times: In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly, all parts of a statute are to be read together to find the intention as to any one part, and all parts are to be reconciled and harmonized if possible. A corollary to that rule is that if there is no clear indication to the contrary, and it is reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase shall be rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. We noted that the term "property" as used in § 11-122 is defined in § 11-101(m) as "mean(ing) and includ(ing) the land, whether leasehold or in fee simple, the building or buildings, all improvements and structures thereon, and all easements, rights and appurtenances thereunto belonging." We further noted that the language of a statute must be considered in its natural and ordinary signification, citing Bartell v. Bartell, 278 Md 12, 17, 357 A.2d 343 (1976), and St. Paul Fire & Mar. v. Ins. Comm'r, 275 Md. 130, 139, 339 A.2d 291 (1975). We then said:
279 Md. at 591, 369 A.2d at 1056.
It will be noted that in Southgate Harbor we were primarily concerned with interpreting the language used in § 11-122(b). However, what we said concerning § 11-122(a) has relevance to this controversy.
William Kerr, in Condominium Statutory Implementation, 38 St. John's L.Rev. 1 (1963), opens his discussion by saying, "The term 'condominium' was practically unknown in this country until 1960 when residents of Puerto Rico sought an amendment to the National Housing Act authorizing Federal Housing Administration insurance of mortgages on individual apartments or units in multi-unit buildings." The model statute for such ownership was promulgated by the Federal Housing Administration. See 1A P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Condominium Law & Practice, Appendix B-3 (1965). Kerr comments, at 2, in explaining the condominium concept, "The undivided ownership is in a fixed ratio, generally that which the value of the apartment bears to the value of the entire property at the time the condominium is established." He further states on the subject of real estate taxes:
The master deed necessary for the creation of a condominium at the time here pertinent was required by Art. 21, § 11-109(d) to express the "(v)alue of the property and of each unit, and, according to these basic values, the percentage appertaining to the co-owners in the expenses of and rights in the elements held in common." Thus, the Maryland provision did not differ markedly from Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 30, § 304(c), specifying that there be expressed in such a deed:
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 30, § 310 provides that "(r)eal property taxes . . . shall be assessed against and levied upon each unit and the owner's corresponding percentage of ownership in the common elements as a tract, and not upon the property as a whole." Accordingly, the discussion in Kane & Helms, The Illinois Condominium Property Act, 1970 U.Ill.L.F. 157 (1970), as to assessment for real estate tax purposes is of interest:
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