Condon v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 19 April 1911
• Citation: Condon v. City of Chicago, 249 Ill. 596, 94 N.E. 976 (Ill. 1911)
• Parties: CONDON v. CITY OF CHICAGO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

249 Ill. 596

94 N.E. 976

CONDON

v.CITY OF CHICAGO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 19, 1911.

Action by John Condon against the City of Chicago.From a judgment sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss the suit for want of sufficient statutory notice, the plaintiff brings error.Reversed and remanded.John C.King and James D. Power, for plaintiff in error.

Edward J. Brundage, Corp.Counsel, and Clyde L. Day, City Atty.(Edward C. Fitch, of counsel), for defendant in error.

DUNN, J.

The plaintiff in error sued the city of Chicago, the defendant in error, for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained, while in the city's employ, by its negligence in failing to provide against the falling upon him of the bank of a ditch in which he was working.Each count of the declaration alleged the giving of a notice, as required by section 2 of ‘An act concerning suits at law for personal injuries and against cities, villages and towns.’Hurd's Stat. 1909, p. 1248.The city pleaded the general issue, and afterward entered a motion to dismiss the suit for the ‘want of a sufficient statutory notice.’In support of the motion, affidavits were presented showing that the notices filed with the city attorney and city clerk did not give the hour of the accident.The court sustained the motion, dismissed the suit, and rendered judgment in bar of the action.

[1]The plaintiff in error insists that the application of the statute to a case of this character violates the Constitution, and that dismissing his case on motion deprived him of his constitutional right to a trial by jury.The section in question requires ‘any person who is about to bring any action or suit at law in any court against any incorporated city, village or town, for damages on account of any personal injury,’ to file in the offices of the city attorney and city clerk a statement in writing of certain particulars in connection with his cause of action.It is manifest that this case is within the letter of the statute, for the language is clear and applies to any action for any personal injury.It is, however, a rule in the interpretation of statutes that they are to be interpreted according to the intent and meaning, and not always according to the letter; that a thing within the letter is not within the statute, unless within the intention; and that a construction which leads to an absurd consequence is to be avoided.Perry County v. Jefferson County, 94 Ill. 214;Canal Com'rs v. Sanitary District, 184 Ill. 597, 56 N. E. 953.

[2] Such a construction will be followed, if possible, as will not render the enactment unconstitutional.This section has been before us in three cases, and we have held it to be a valid enactment.Erford v. City of Peoria, 229 Ill. 546, 82 N. E. 374;Walters v. City of Ottawa, 240 Ill. 259, 88 N. E. 651;Ouimette v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 501, 90 N. E. 300.Those were all cases of injuries received by persons using the streets or sidewalks of the city, and were founded upon the duty of the city, in its capacity of a municipal corporation, to exercise ordinary care to maintain its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for use by persons passing over them.It is insisted that to extend the application of the statute to actions brought by a servent for injuries received in the employment of a master would render the section unconstitutional, as being class legislation.It is said that a municipal corporation and its employés, in respect to the relation of master and servant, stand upon the same footing as a private corporation or an individual and its or his employés, and that a statute which discriminates between the servant of a municipal corporation and the servant of a private corporation or an individual suing their respective employers for a similar injury, would deprive the plaintiff, upon whom the additional burden is imposed, of the equal protection of the law.

[3] The obligation of a municipal corporation to use care to furnish its servants a safe place in which, and safe tools and appliances with which, to work, is not different from that of the private employer.The liability of such corporations upon their contracts and for their torts is the same as that of private corporations or individuals, and notice is no more necessary as a condition precedent to an action against a municipality than against an individual, unless required by a statute.The power of the Legislature, however,to require notice, has been generally recognized, and in many of the states a previous notice or presentation of the claim is essential to the maintenance of an action against a municipal corporation, either in all cases or in certain kinds of cases.In some jurisdictions, the statute requires notice in actions ex contractu only; in some, it applies to all claims, whether in tort or contract; in others, it is limited to injuries arising from defective streets; in others, it includes personal injuries of all kinds; and in still others, all actions of tort.Barrett v. Mobile, 129 Ala. 179, 30South. 36,87 Am. St. Rep. 54;Kenyon v. Cedar Rapids, 124 Iowa, 195, 99 N. W. 692;Bancroft v. San Diego, 120 Cal. 432, 52 Pac. 712;Springer v. Detroit, 102 Mich. 300, 60 N. W. 688;Davidson v. Muskegon, 111 Mich. 454, 69 N. W. 670;Kelly v. Faribault, 95 Minn. 293, 104 N. W. 231;Nance v. Falls City, 16 Neb. 85, 20 N. W. 109;Lincoln v. Grant, 38 Neb. 369, 56 N. W. 995;Jones v. Albany, 151 N. Y. 223, 45 N. E. 557;Winter v. Niagara Falls, 190 N. Y. 198, 82 N. E. 1101,123 Am. St. Rep. 540;Shields v. Durham, 118 N. C. 450, 24 S. E. 794,36 L. R. A. 293;Youngsville v. Siggins, 110 Pa. 291, 1 Atl. 736;Giuricevic v. Tacoma, 57 Wash. 329, 106 Pac. 908,28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 533;Steltz v. Wausau, 88 Wis. 618, 60 N. W. 1054;Van Frachen v. Howard, 88 Wis. 570, 60 N. W. 1062;Hay v. Baraboo, 127 Wis. 1, 105 N. W. 654,3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 84, 115 Am. St. Rep. 977.In the cases cited, statutes requiring such notices have been construed and applied.In none of them was the question of the constitutionality of the statute in the respect now suggested considered or raised.Though such statutes have long been in force in many states, no case has come to our knowledge where the requirement of such notice has been held unconstitutional for the reason advanced here...