Condon v. Reno
| Decision Date | 03 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-2554,97-2554 |
| Citation | 155 F.3d 453 |
| Parties | 26 Media L. Rep. 2185 Charlie CONDON, Attorney General for the State of South Carolina; State of South Carolina, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and South Carolina Press Association; Virginia Press Association; North Carolina Press Association; West Virginia Press Association; Maryland/Delaware/District of Columbia Press Association; The Newspaper Association of America; American Society of Newspaper Editors, Intervenors-Plaintiffs, v. Janet RENO, Attorney General of the United States; United States of America, Defendants-Appellants. Better Government Bureau, Incorporated; State of Alabama; State of Oklahoma; State of Idaho, Amici Curiae. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Mark Bernard Stern, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Kenneth Paul Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Thomas Henry Odom, II, Arter & Hadden, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae. ON BRIEF: Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, J. Rene Josey, United States Attorney, Stephen W. Preston, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Alisa B. Klein, Daniel Kaplan, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Charles Molony Condon, Attorney General, Treva Ashworth, Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Gregory S. Feder, Marc R. Baluda, Arter & Hadden, L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; Bill Pryor, Attorney General, Billington M. Garrett, Assistant Attorney General, State of Alabama, Montgomery, Alabama; Jack Curtis, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Public Safety, Montgomery, Alabama; W.A. Drew Edmondston, Attorney General, James R. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Douglas F. Price, Assistant Attorney General, State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; John K. Lindsey, General Counsel, Department of Public Safety, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, State of Idaho, Boise, Idaho, for Amici Curiae.
Before HAMILTON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILLIAMS wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge HAMILTON joined. Senior Judge PHILLIPS wrote a dissenting opinion.
The Attorney General of the State of South Carolina (the State) challenged the constitutionality of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), see 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2721-2725 (West Supp.1998), in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina on the grounds that it violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the United States Constitution. 1 The United States defended the DPPA, arguing that it was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress's powers under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. After reviewing the parties' arguments, the district court held that the DPPA violated the Tenth Amendment and permanently enjoined its enforcement in the State of South Carolina. See Condon v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 977, 979 (D.S.C.1997).
On appeal, the United States first contends that the DPPA was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Although Congress may regulate entities engaged in interstate commerce, Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by the Tenth Amendment. As a result, when exercising its Commerce Clause power, Congress may only "subject state governments to generally applicable laws." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). The DPPA exclusively regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in state motor vehicle records. Thus, rather than enacting a law of general applicability that incidentally applies to the States, Congress passed a law that, for all intents and purposes, applies only to the States. Accordingly, the DPPA is simply not a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.
In the alternative, the United States contends that the DPPA was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. When enacting legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, Congress's power "extends only to enforc[ing] the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, ----, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2164, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (emphasis added). The United States asserts that individuals possess a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy in their names, addresses, and phone numbers, and that the DPPA enforces that constitutional right. Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court, however, has ever recognized a constitutional right to privacy with respect to such information. Congress is granted a remedial power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, not a substantive power. As a consequence, the DPPA is not a valid exercise of Congress's Enforcement Clause power.
Under our system of dual sovereignty, "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X. Because Congress lacked the authority to enact the DPPA under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
As recited by the district court, the pertinent facts are as follows:
Congress enacted the DPPA in 1994 in an effort to remedy what it perceived to be a problem of national concern: i.e., the active commerce in, and consequent easy availability of, personal information contained in State motor vehicle records. Testimony before Congress established that as many as 34 States allowed easy access to personal information contained in motor vehicle records and that criminals had used such information to locate victims and commit crimes. Congress also found that many States sell or other wise permit the use of information contained in motor vehicle records for direct marketing purposes.
The DPPA, which [was] scheduled to become effective on September 13, 1997, generally prohibits "a State department of motor vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor, thereof, [from] knowingly disclos[ing] or otherwise mak[ing] available to any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record." 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a). The DPPA specifies a list of exceptions when personal information contained in a State motor vehicle record may be obtained and used. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). Additionally, the DPPA permits State motor vehicle departments to:
[E]stablish and carry out procedures under which the department or its agents, upon receiving a request for personal information that does not fall within one of the exceptions in [§ 2721(b) ], may mail a copy of the request to the individual about whom the information was requested, informing such individual of the request, together with a statement to the effect that the information will not be released unless the individual waives such individual's right to privacy under [§ 2721].
18 U.S.C. § 2721(d). The DPPA also prohibits "any person [from] knowingly ... obtain[ing] or disclos[ing] personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted under section 2721(b)," 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a), and from "mak[ing] false representation to obtain any personal information from an individual's motor vehicle record." 18 U.S.C. § 2722(b).
The DPPA provides that "[a]ny State department of motor vehicles that has a policy or practice of substantial noncompliance ... shall be subject to a civil penalty imposed by the Attorney General of not more than $5,000 a day for each day of substantial noncompliance." 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b). The DPPA also creates a criminal fine, 18 U.S.C. § 2723(a), and a civil cause of action against a "person" who knowingly violates it. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a).
South Carolina currently has its own statutory provisions regarding the disclosure and use of its motor vehicle records, and South Carolina's scheme differs significantly from the DPPA. See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 56-3-510 to -540. Under South Carolina law a person who requests information contained in South Carolina's motor vehicle records must submit the request on a form provided by the State Department of Public Safety ("the Department") and must specify, inter alia, his or her name and the reason for the request, and must certify that the information will not be used for the purpose of telephone marketing or solicitation. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-3-510. The Department must retain all requests for motor vehicle record information for five years and must release a copy of all requests relating to a person upon that person's written request. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-3-520. The Department is authorized to charge a fee for releasing motor vehicle record information, and is required to promulgate certain procedural regulations relating to the release of motor vehicle record information, S.C.Code Ann. § 56-3-530, and to implement procedures to ensure that persons may "opt-out" and prohibit the use of motor vehicle record information about them for various commercial activities. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-3-540. The undisputed evidence submitted establishes that implementation of the DPPA would impose substantial costs and effort on the part of the Department in order for it to achieve compliance.
Condon v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 977, 979-81 (D.S.C.1997) (footnotes omitted) (all but first alteration in original).
In addition to challenging the constitutionality of the DPPA, the State sought a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the DPPA. The United States filed a motion to dismiss the suit based upon its contention that the DPPA was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress's powers under both the Commerce Clause and...
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