Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul
| Decision Date | 27 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-5413,89-5413 |
| Citation | 912 F.2d 215 |
| Parties | CONDOR CORPORATION, a Minnesota corporation, Appellant, v. CITY OF ST. PAUL, a municipal corporation, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Frank J. Walz, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.
Jerome J. Segal, St. Paul, Minn., for appellee.
Before LAY, Chief Judge, BEAM, Circuit Judge, and HANSON, * Senior District Judge.
Condor Corporation filed suit challenging the City of St. Paul's denial of its application for a conditional use permit to operate a heliport. Condor asserts in its complaint federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 (1988). Condor raises three claims: (1) Condor's permit was wrongfully denied for reasons of federal preemption; (2) the denial of the permit violated Condor's substantive due process rights under the United States Constitution; (3) the denial of the permit was an invalid zoning action under Minnesota law. The district court 1 granted summary judgment in favor of the City on all three claims. We find Condor's Supremacy Clause claim to be frivolous and dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction. We further find Condor has failed to assert a claim based upon substantive due process. However, we reverse and remand the pendent state claim for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Condor Corporation owns a six acre parcel of real estate located at the corner of University and Cleveland Avenues in St. Paul, Minnesota. This location is zoned Industrial-1 (I-1), and has most recently been used as a truck terminal. The immediately surrounding property is also zoned I-1. Residential property is located within 1100 feet of Condor's property. 2 Condor seeks to use this site as a privately operated heliport for two helicopter services: Life In 1987, heliports were classified as a conditional permitted use in I-1 zoned areas, which allowed the City to impose conditions on the issuance of a heliport permit. 3 See St. Paul, Minn., Zoning Code, Sec. 60.614(2) (1987). However, since the City's Zoning Code did not identify any specific conditions required for the issuance of a heliport permit, 4 the City imposed a one year moratorium on October 7, 1987 on the issuance of heliport permits in order to study zoning issues. St. Paul, Minn., Res. No. 87-1377 (Oct. 7, 1987) (Joint App. at 341). 5 In 1988, Condor requested that the moratorium be lifted to allow the City to consider its application for a conditional use permit to operate a heliport. In response to Condor's request, the City adopted a resolution which allowed Condor to apply for the permit while the moratorium remained in effect:
Link III, an emergency medical service operated by three area hospitals; and JR Copters, a helicopter leasing service that currently leases helicopters to a local television station to broadcast weather and traffic conditions.
Resolved, that the City Council may repeal the moratorium in I-1 zoning districts prior to October 9, 1988, if all the following steps and conditions described below are complied with:
1. While the moratorium is in effect, any applicant for a special condition use permit agrees in writing to the procedure outlined in this resolution and to the use of a $5,000 consultant fee which will assist the city in determining what conditions for heliports are appropriate and within the city's authority. The fee is to be paid by the applicant.
2. The applicant then applies for a special condition use permit, according to regular city regulations and procedures.
3. City staff, with the assistance of the consultant and legal counsel, will study and draft for Planning Commission review conditions for issuance of a special condition use permit. These may be any restrictions within the city's authority, including but not limited to: number of helicopters, type of helicopters, hours of operations for non-emergency flights, designation of flight paths, on-site noise abatement, special building height limits, and operational restrictions and their enforcement.
4. The Planning Commission's Zoning Committee will hold a public hearing on the permit application. After the public hearing, the Planning Commission will act to approve or deny the permit. Planning Commission action is subject to appeal to the City Council * * *.
5. If the Planning Commission approves a permit and no appeal is filed, the moratorium may be lifted in I-1 zoning districts. If an appeal is filed and the City Council approves a permit, the moratorium may be lifted in I-1 zoning districts. If a permit is not approved, the moratorium remains in force in all zoning districts.
6. If special condition use permit applications for a heliport are requested after the moratorium is lifted but before zoning text amendments are adopted by the City Council, these applications shall follow procedures 1 through 4 above.
St. Paul, Minn., Res. No. 88-1138 (Jul. 14, 1988) (J.App. at 351) [July 14 resolution].
Condor paid the $5000 fee and filed an application for a special condition use permit The July 14 resolution instructed the consultant to propose conditions to govern the operation of heliports, such as hours of operation, flight paths, and noise problems. The consultant accordingly suggested that the City enter into an agreement by which Condor would agree to restrict the users of the heliport with respect to certain heliport operations matters. The consultant's proposed agreement covered hours of operations, flight paths, level of activity, noise abatement procedures, and training and maintenance operations. The City also received an opinion from its attorney that "[i]t may be possible for the owner of the heliport to enter into an agreement with the City whereby the owner, voluntarily, would agree to restricting the use of its heliport." 7 Consequently, Condor and representatives of the City prepared a draft operations agreement addressing the issues suggested by the consultant. In the meantime, Condor received approval from the FAA for the operation of the heliport.
to operate a heliport. Condor, aware of the City's concern that conditions for heliports in I-1 districts be developed, proposed several conditions for the use of its heliport designed to address noise concerns in residential areas. A consultant hired by the City found the heliport would be compatible with adjacent land uses, and concluded that Condor's proposed site was "an ideal location for a heliport." Condor's proposed twenty operations per day, i.e., total takeoffs and landings, and proposed approach and departure paths were deemed reasonable. The consultant also performed a noise assessment analysis, based on the noise created by the largest and noisiest helicopter Condor intended to operate, and found the noise generated by Condor's estimated twenty operations per day was compatible with local residential development. 6
On September 29, 1988, after a public hearing at which members of neighborhood groups opposing the heliport testified, the City Zoning Committee recommended denial of the permit. The City Planning Commission referred the matter back to the Zoning Committee for consideration of the proposed operations agreement between Condor and the City. The Zoning Committee again recommended denial of the permit. On November 4, 1988, however, the Planning Commission overturned the Zoning Committee's action, and approved the permit, imposing as conditions those proposed in the operations agreement.
Neighborhood groups opposing the heliport appealed to the City Council, which held a public hearing on December 15, 1988. The City Attorney attending the hearing informed the council that the proposed operations agreement would not be legally enforceable because it covered subject-matter areas preempted by FAA regulations. The City Council heard testimony from citizens opposing the heliport, and from representatives of Condor, Life Link III and JR Copters. In addition, an acoustical vibrational engineer presented the results of noise assessment tests performed at Condor's request. The City Council voted to grant the appeal, and later adopted a resolution denying the permit. The basis for the City Council's action was its conclusion that the Planning Commission erred in assuming that the City and Condor could enter into a private agreement to regulate operations at the heliport. St. Paul, Minn., Res. No. 89-139 (Jan. 29, 1989) (J. App. at 411). Condor then filed suit in the district court, challenging the City Council's denial of the permit.
This appeal is before this court on review of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. There are no disputed facts in this case and we review the grant of summary judgment only to determine if judgment should have been granted as a matter of law. Buford v. Tremayne, 747 F.2d 445, 447 (8th Cir.1984). We review this case in a light most favorable to Condor, the party against whom judgment was granted. In re Stevenson Assoc., Inc., 777 F.2d 415, 418 (8th Cir.1985).
We first consider our jurisdiction in this case. Condor sought relief in the federal district court on the basis of its allegations of federal questions under the United States Constitution. It asserts that the denial of the permit by the City (1) violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and (2) was arbitrary and capricious and thereby offends the substantive due process clause of the 14th amendment. We must determine whether these federal claims present substantial questions sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); see also 13B Wright, Miller & Cooper Federal Practice & Procedure, Sec. 3564, at 66-67 (1984).
We find Condor's claim under the Supremacy Clause to be specious and totally insubstantial. W...
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