Condosta v. Condosta
| Decision Date | 06 February 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-78,80-78 |
| Citation | 137 Vt. 35,401 A.2d 897 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | Guido CONDOSTA v. Rosalie CONDOSTA and Charles Buckley. |
Guido Condosta, pro se.
Robert Grussing, III, Brattleboro, for Condosta.
John H. Carnahan of Fitts & Olson, Brattleboro, for Buckley.
Before BARNEY, C. J., and DALEY, LARROW, BILLINGS and HILL, JJ.
A motion to disqualify the Court as constituted was made in this case, based on a claim of prejudice. Disqualification is a sensitive concern for judges, and if the slightest question exists, all doubts should be resolved in its favor. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 C, 12 V.S.A. App. VIII, A.O. 10. However, if it appears that the motion is frivolous, or made to delay proceedings, or has no foundation justifying recusal, it should be denied. Finding the supporting allegations to be unfounded in this case, the motion is therefore denied.
The litigation on appeal involves the interruption of the plaintiff's electric power by the defendants. The event occurred after the defendant Rosalie Condosta had been given exclusive possession of the premises of herself and the plaintiff, as the result of a temporary order in a divorce action, free of any interest of the plaintiff as her ex-husband. The plaintiff lived across the street in a trailer owned by another. The trailer received its electricity by an extension line carrying 220 volts from the service box in the basement of the Condosta house run through a culvert under the highway to a receptacle at the trailer. Defendant Condosta, with the help of the other defendant, disconnected this extension. The litigation before us followed.
One aspect of the plaintiff's complaint is based upon the provisions of 13 V.S.A. § 3782:
A person who wilfully commits or causes to be committed an act with intent to injure a machine, apparatus or structure appertaining to the works of a person, firm, association or corporation engaged in manufacturing, selling or distributing electrical energy in this state, or whereby such works may be stopped, obstructed or injured, or who taps an electrical line of a person, firm, association or corporation so that electricity can be taken therefrom, or knowingly uses electricity taken from such line without the consent of such person, firm, association or corporation, shall be imprisoned not more than two years or fined not more than $300.00, or both. Such person shall also be liable to such person, firm, association or corporation or to anyone injured for actual damages, with full costs, in an action of tort on this statute.
The plaintiff claims that the disconnection of the extension comes within the purview of the statute, and that he is a person entitled to sue in an action of tort under the last sentence of the section. However, even though the statute refers to "anyone injured," this is not enough to bring the plaintiff within its protection. The essential ingredient is an act against the "works of a person, firm, association or corporation engaged in manufacturing, selling or distributing electrical energy." Since the act of disconnection, whatever its character, took place beyond the meter and within the circuitry of the house, it did not operate on the "works" of a distributor of electricity. The action could not support a criminal prosecution under the statute, and therefore it cannot support a tort claim under the same statute. The lower court so ruled and was correct.
Putting aside the statute, the plaintiff claims a right of action against the defendants...
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State v. Putnam, 95-344
..." 'if the slightest question exists, all doubts should be resolved' in favor of disqualification," id. (quoting Condosta v. Condosta, 137 Vt. 35, 36, 401 A.2d 897, 898 (1979)), a standard required because the judge subject to the motion to disqualify would decide if disqualification were ap......
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Hill, In re, 86-395
...a reasonable, disinterested observer.Richard v. Richard, 146 Vt. 286, 287-88, 501 A.2d 1190, 1191 (1985) (quoting Condosta v. Condosta, 137 Vt. 35, 36, 401 A.2d 897, 898 (1979)).13 We note with approval Justice Hill's citation to Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at Oc......
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Condosta v. Grussing, 83-212
...Condosta v. Condosta, 139 Vt. 545, 431 A.2d 494 (1981); Condosta v. Condosta, 138 Vt. 193, 413 A.2d 805 (1980); Condosta v. Condosta, 137 Vt. 35, 401 A.2d 897 (1979); Condosta v. Condosta, 136 Vt. 630, 388 A.2d 33 (1978) (mem.); Condosta v. Condosta, 136 Vt. 360, 395 A.2d 345 (1978); Condos......
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O'Bryan Const. Co., Inc. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 369-79
...any substantial evidence reasonably tending to support the plaintiff's claim, the directed verdict is improper. Condosta v. Condosta, 137 Vt. 35, 38, 401 A.2d 897, 899 (1979). The issue on appeal is thus whether there was substantial evidence reasonably tending to support the plaintiff's cl......