Conduitt v. Ross

• Decision Date: 21 April 1885
• Citation: 26 N.E. 198,102 Ind. 166
• Parties: Conduitt v. Ross.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

102 Ind. 166

26 N.E. 198

Conduitt

v.Ross.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 21, 1885.

Appeal from superior court, Marion county.

T. A. Hendricks, C. Baker, O. B. Hord, A. W Hendricks, A. Baker, E. Daniels, and W. S. Shirley, for appellant.J. M Judah and O. B. Jameson, for appellee.

MITCHELL, J.

On the 26th day of April, 1875, Julia A. Ross and John Hauck were the owners of adjoining lots in the city of Indianapolis.Pursuant to a written agreement entered into by Mrs. Ross and her husband on the one part, and Mr. Hauck on the other, she placed one-half the width of the south wall of a four-story brick and stone building which she erected on her lot on the north margin of the Hauck lot.After erecting the building she conveyed the lot, with the improvements thereon, to George P. Bissell, reserving, by a stipulation contained in her deed, the right to receive compensation from adjoining property owners for the building, or use of existing party-walls.Subsequently the appellant became the owner of the Hauck lot, and in 1882 commenced the erection of a building thereon, and attached the same to and used the wall erected by Mrs. Ross.Refusing to make payment, this suit was commenced to recover one-half the original cost of the wall.Upon issues made, a trial was had, which resulted in a finding and judgment for the plaintiff.

Counsel for appellant rest their argument for a reversal of this judgment mainly upon the proposition that the agreement between Hauck and Mrs. Ross was purely personal to them, and that Conduitt, by using the wall erected in pursuance thereof, came under no obligation whatever in consequence of such use.They insist further, that, if liable at all, the extent of his liability was the actual value of the wall when used, and not its original cost.The rights and obligations of the parties must be determined by a construction of the agreement already referred to, which is of the following tenor: “This agreement between John Hauck of the first part, and Julia A. Ross, and Norman M. Ross, her husband, of the second part, witnesseth: That, in consideration that the parties of the second part shall erect a substantial brick wall, twelve inches in thickness, and four stories high, on the line dividing the property of John Hauck and Julia A. Ross, in square 87, in the city of Indianapolis, Marion county, Indiana, which line is twelve feet south of the south line of lot No. 4, in Morris Morris' subdivision of square 87, in the city of Indianapolis, and which wall is to stand six inches in width upon the ground of said Hauck, and six inches upon the ground of said Ross, and is to run back the depth of said Ross' present building, and may at any time be extended further back on the same line the full depth of said lots, by either party, the full consent of said Hauck to the erection of said walls being hereby granted: Now, therefore, said John Hauck hereby binds himself, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, that whenever, after the erection of said wall or walls by the party of the second part, said Hauck, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, shall, in any building he or they may erect on the present ground of said Hauck, use said wall, or any part thereof, or attach any part of his or their building thereto, then the said Julia A. Ross shall be paid, without relief from valuation or appraisement laws, the full value of one-half the original cost of said wall or walls.And it is further agreed that neither party shall have the right to so use any part of said wall or walls as to weaken or endanger the same; and that said Hauck, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns shall not, in any wise whatever, use or attach to said wall or walls so to be erected by said Ross, until the said value and costs of one-half thereof shall be ascertained, and paid or tendered to said Julia A. Ross.In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and seals, this 26th day of April, 1875.[Signed]John Hauck.[Seal.]Julia A. Ross.[Seal.]N. M. Ross.[Seal.]”This agreement was duly acknowledged, and recorded in the miscellaneous records of Marion county, and it is averred that the appellant had actual notice of it at the time he purchased.

The liability of the appellant depends upon whether the contract set out constituted a continuing covenant, which became annexed to, and ran with, the Hauck lot.If it did, he is liable according to its terms; if it did not, he is liable in this form of action for nothing.

In considering whether a covenant is one which does, or does not, run with land, there are always embraced the following inquiries: (1) Is the covenant one which, under any circumstances, may run with land?(2) Was it the intention of the parties, as expressed in the agreement, that it should so run?Doubtless, a covenantwhich, from its character, might run with the land, may be so restricted in terms as to make it purely personal, and available to the parties to it, and no other.So, too, a covenant may contain apt words to make it a continuing covenant, yet if its nature or the subject-matter of it is such that it does not concern some interest or estate in land, either existing or created by it, it cannot run with land.When an instrument conveys or grants an interest or right in land, and at the same time contains a covenant in which a right attached to the estate or interest granted is reserved, or when the grantee covenants that he will do some act on the estate or interest granted which will be beneficial to the grantor, either as respects his remaining interest in the lands out of which an interest is granted, or lands adjacent thereto, such covenant is one which may become annexed to, and run with, the land, and bind its owners successively.When such grant is made, and contains a covenant so expressed as to show that it was reasonably the intent that it should be continuing, it will be construed as a covenant running with the land.A covenant which may run with the land must have relation to the interest or estate granted, and the act to be done must concern the interest created or conveyed.In Bally v. Wells, 3 Wils. 25, it was said: “When the thing to be done, or omitted to be done, concerns the lands or estate, that is the medium which creates the privity between the plaintiff and defendant.”By the contract under consideration, Mrs. Ross acquired the right to enter upon the Hauck lot and erect, and permanently maintain thereon, a party-wall.This was a grant to her of an interest in land, and was of such a character that a perpetual covenant might be annexed to it.Snowden v. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10;Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488; 1 Smith Lead.Cas. (8th Ed.) 161, 162.In consideration of this grant to her, she covenanted to do an act beneficial to the remaining interest of Hauck.That act was the erection of a wall so situated as that one-half of it should rest on the margin of his lot and the other half on hers, thus devoting each estate to the mutual support of the party-wall.She, at the same time, covenanted that when she should be reimbursed one-half of the cost of the wall, he or his grantees should acquire a reciprocal interest in her lot, and, in legal effect, become owner of one-half the party-wall...