Confederacion Hipica De Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Confederacion De Jinetes Puertorriquenos, Inc.

• Citation: 296 F.Supp.3d 416
• Decision Date: 08 November 2017
• Docket Number: Civil No. 16–2256 (DRD)
• Parties: CONFEDERACION HIPICA DE PUERTO RICO, INC.; Camarero Racetrack Corp., Plaintiff(s), v. CONFEDERACION DE JINETES PUERTORRIQUENOS, INC., Defendant(s).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

296 F.Supp.3d 416

CONFEDERACION HIPICA DE PUERTO RICO, INC.; Camarero Racetrack Corp., Plaintiff(s),

v.CONFEDERACION DE JINETES PUERTORRIQUENOS, INC., Defendant(s).

Civil No. 16–2256 (DRD)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed November 8, 2017

Manuel Porro–Vizcarra, Luz Yaniz Vargas–Perez, Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Office, Francisco Ramos–Martinez, Roberto Lefranc–Morales, Martinez Alvarez, Menendez Cortada & Lefranc Romero PSC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Peter John Porrata, Peter John Porrata Law Office, San Juan, PR, Thomas M. Kennedy, New York, NY, Axel A. Vizcarra–Pellot, Vizcarra–Pellot Law Offices, Carolina, PR, for Defendants.

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER

DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ, United States District Court

Pending before the Court are: (a) Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction filed by defendant Confederacion Hipica de Puerto Rico, Inc. (hereinafter "CHPR"), at Docket No. 153; (b) Co–Plaintiff Camarero Racetrack's Brief in Support of its Request for Injunctive Relief and Request for Attorney's Fees for Temerity Against Confederacion de Jinetes de Puerto Rico, Inc. , filed by plaintiff Camarero Racetrack Corp. (hereinafter "Camarero"), at Docket No. 154; and (c) Confederacion de Jinetes Puertorriquenos Brief, in Opposition to the Issuance of the Preliminary Injunction Requested by Camarero Race Track and Confederacion Hipica de Puerto Rico, filed by defendant Confederacion de Jinetes Puertorriquenos. (hereinafter "CJP"), at Docket No. 173. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs' request for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is granted.

Introduction

This action was filed on June 30, 2016 by CHPR and Camarero in response to sua sponte actions taken by certain jockeys associations, to wit, CJP, Inc. and Asociacion de Jinetes de Puerto Rico, Inc.¹ Plaintiffs alleges that the cancellation of the horse races scheduled for June 30, July 1 and July 2, 2016 due to certain jockeys' boycott and refusal to ride the horses in the scheduled races constitute a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 – 7, and the Clayton Act, as the jockeys are not employees of the CHPR, an association of the owners of racing horses. The CJP alleges that they are a union, hence, the jockeys, as employees, can legally call a boycott to plaintiffs and refuse to ride the horses, to force a payment increase for their horse mounts.

Issue

The core of this matter is whether the CJP, which is an independent jockeys' association, may also be considered a labor union, and as such, have a right to call strikes to force plaintiffs to increase their horse mount fees . It is important to note that CJP are currently not employees of CHPR and/or Camarero.² Notwithstanding, there are two additional issues pending: whether the jockeys may call a strike to force plaintiffs to increase their horse mount fees, and other economic considerations, such as protection of their image in commercial advertising of the Camarero Race Track.

Factual and Procedural Background

The facts of this case are familiar to the Court, indeed this is not the first time that the jockeys have called a boycott against the scheduled races in an effort to force the San Juan Racing Association, Inc. to grant a payment increase. See San Juan Racing Association, Inc. v. Jinetes de Puerto Rico, Inc., et al. , 590 F.2d 31 (1st Cir.1979) (Coffin, J.).

In the instant case, the jockeys played a similar strategy, but this time the boycott was against the plaintiffs, that is the owners of the horses represented by CHPR, and the owner of the racetrack, Camarero. Both CHPR and Camarero have vehemently opposed to the demands of the jockeys members of the CJP. The Court held several long and extensive hearings, and allowed CJP sufficient opportunity to present their evidence, however, the Court was not persuaded by the legal arguments nor the evidence presented by the CJP to engage in a "concerted refusal to deal," as the Court granted a preliminary restraining order at Docket No. 46.³ Our analysis follows.

Preliminary Injunction Standard

The Court will revisit the Second Amended Nunc Pro Tunc Opinion and Order Re: Temporary Restraining Order , Docket No. 46, which addresses all the facets pending before the Court. The Court will include the analysis and discussion included therein, as the legal analysis remain the same after having reviewed all the evidence presented and admitted during all the evidentiary hearings held, to allow CJP an opportunity to show the Court why the injunctive relief requested by plaintiffs was not warranted.

Plaintiffs have requested a temporary injunctive relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1)(A)(B), (b)(2) followed by a preliminary injunctive relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(3), including damages relief.

The First Circuit follows the quadripartite test, which the Court must examine and strictly comply:

(1) likelihood of prevailing in the merits;

(2) significant risk of irreparable harm;

(3) the balance of hardships weigh on the movant's favor; and

(4) whether the injunction will harm the public or third parties by granting the remedy.

New Comm. Wireless Inc. v. SprintCom Inc. , 287 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir.2002) ; Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert , 934 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1991). See also Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Scientific Advancements, Inc. , 794 F.3d 168, 171 (1st Cir.2015) (Souter, J.), wherein the Court citing Narragansett , held that "a party losing the battle on likelihood of success may nonetheless win the war at a succeeding trial on the merits." In the instant case, however, and after extensive evidentiary hearings, the Court finds that CJP was unsuccessful in convincing the Court that it has a legal right to call a strike to demand an increase in the horse mount fees.

In Arborjet , 794 F.3d at 171, the Court reaffirmed that:

To grant a preliminary injunction, a district court must find the following four elements satisfied: (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm absent interim relief, (3) a balance of equities in the plaintiff's favor, and (4) service of the public interest. See Voice of the Arab world, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc. , 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir.2011) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ).

The probability of prevailing has been found to be the heaviest "furcula" of the TRO, and has been referred as the "sine qua non" of the injunctive relief, Weaver v. Henderson , 984 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir.1993)... to succeed in the merits, Narragansett , 934 F.2d at 6. Further, should a party not be able to show likelihood of success, "the remaining factors become matters of idle curiosity." New Comm. Wireless Inc. , 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002). Moreover, "of the four factors, the probability of success component in the past has been regarded by us as critical in determining the propriety of injunctive relief." Lancor v. Lebanon Housing Authority , 760 F.2d 361, 362 (1st Cir.1985). Hence, the factor of probability of prevailing constitutes the principal criteria to overpass, Le Beau v. Spirito , 703 F.2d 639, 645 (1st Cir.1983) (ending the court inquiry after concluding that plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits).

In 1979, the First Circuit determined that the jockeys are independent contractors when engaged in a "concerted refusal to deal" in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See San Juan Racing Association, Inc. v. Asociacion de Jinetes de Puerto Rico, Inc., et al. , 590 F.2d 31, 32 (1st Cir.1979) (confirming antitrust injunctive relief as to a "concerted refusal to deal" by the jockeys against management of the racetrack). Further, the jockeys are not covered by the "labor dispute exemption" as premised by Parker v. Brown , 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1942), which is not applicable as expressed in a similar situation of jockeys versus management of the racetrack and horse owners under state law. In San Juan Racing Association , 590 F.2d at 31–32, the Court held:

That they acted together, in combination, is a supportable finding on this record. (Citations omitted). Their openness does not immunize agreement. (Citations omitted). That defendants' collective refusal to deal with plaintiff until their fees were increased constituted an illegal effort to control prices through concerted action was also supportable on the pleadings and evidence before the court. (Citations omitted).

... [but] the rates of compensation [are] compelled by state law; their whole purpose [the jockeys] is to abolish such rates [the jockeys fees as payment to ride then for San Juan Racing Assoc.] and establish new ones." (Emphasis ours).

San Juan Racing Association , 590 F.2d at 32. The critical factor is that the remuneration of the jockeys is "compelled" by state regulation.

Further, the actions of "concerted refusal to deal" are unrelated to actions by the management of the racetrack nor the horse owners, but they are in fact related to the current regulation issued under the governmental authority of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico relating to the distribution of the prize money of each race. See San Juan Racing Association, Inc. v. Asociacion de Jinetes de Puerto Rico, Inc. , 590 F.2d at 32. Hence, the dispute is not a "labor dispute" as defined under Section 13 of the Norris–La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113, or under the "labor dispute" definition under the Sherman and Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 17.

The Court understands that the probability of plaintiffs prevailing in the instant case is extremely high, as the jockeys herein do not receive deductions from their salary, such as, income tax; social security, unemployment. They have the ability to choose the race they want to run, and the particular horse they aspire to run, and they may run a different horse from a different owner creating a conflict with the horse owner of the previous or later race.⁴ The jockeys also pay for all the equipment th...