Congleton v. Sansom

Decision Date16 November 1995
Docket NumberNo. 95-297,95-297
Citation664 So.2d 276
Parties20 Fla. L. Weekly D2528 Iris Smith CONGLETON, as guardian of Coleman C. Smith, Appellant, v. Elaine SANSOM, as personal representative of the Estate of Vera I. Smith, deceased, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Gordon Steven Dow, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Larry A. Bodiford of Hutto and Bodiford, Panama City, for Appellee.

BENTON, Judge.

As guardian of Coleman C. Smith, Iris Smith Congleton appeals a final judgment excluding her ward as a beneficiary of the estate of Vera I. Smith, whose death left Mr. Smith a widower. The judgment invokes section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1991), the so-called "slayer statute," which renders a person who unlawfully and intentionally kills another person ineligible to receive property on account of the death. The guardian argues for reversal on grounds, inter alia, that the circuit court erred in applying the slayer statute to Mr. Smith because he was never actually placed in jeopardy at a criminal trial; that the supposed fact of Mr. Smith's insanity makes the slayer statute inapplicable as a matter of law; that the trial court erred in relying on Prasad v. Allstate Insurance Co. 644 So.2d 992 (Fla.1994) in concluding otherwise; that the killing was a legal accident outside the slayer statute's purview; and that Mrs. Smith's personal representative failed to meet her burden to show that Mr. Smith unlawfully and intentionally killed Mrs. Smith. We affirm.

On the morning of July 29, 1992, Mr. Smith strangled his wife. He called 911 shortly afterwards to report the fact. The police found him alone with the corpse, took him into custody, and sent him for a "Baker Act evaluation," all within about half an hour. Charged with second degree murder, Mr. Smith filed a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) on the ground that the undisputed facts did not establish a prima facie case of guilt. On May 27, 1993, he was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity, never having gone to trial.

In a separate proceeding, the personal representative of Mrs. Smith's estate filed a petition to determine the beneficiaries of her estate. At an evidentiary hearing or bench trial on the petition, Officer Dennis Kiah of the Lynn Haven Police Department testified that Mr. Smith made several statements indicating that he remembered choking his wife to death. 1 The 911 tape also came into evidence. 2 Expert testimony was adduced to the unanimous effect that Mr. Smith was probably legally insane 3 at the time of the killing. After hearing the testimony, the trial court entered the order now on appeal.

Conviction Unnecessary

We find no merit in the guardian's contention that the circuit court could not apply the slayer statute in a probate proceeding because Mr. Smith was never tried criminally. Although a predecessor statute did require conviction for disqualification, see Hill v. Morris, 85 So.2d 847 (Fla.1956), since enactment of chapter 82-71, at 186, Laws of Florida (1982) on April 2, 1982, section 732.802(5), Florida Statutes, has provided:

A final judgment of conviction of murder in any degree is conclusive for purposes of this section. In the absence of a conviction of murder in any degree, the court may determine by the greater weight of the evidence whether the killing was unlawful and intentional for purposes of this section.

(Emphasis added.) The current statute plainly contemplates the "absence of a conviction of murder," and authorizes a court, in that event, to proceed independently, as the court did here, to "determine by the greater weight of the evidence whether the killing was unlawful and intentional." Sec. 732.802(5), Fla.Stat. (1991).

Unless criminal proceedings eventuate in a murder conviction, a judgment in the criminal case is not determinative for purposes of the slayer statute. In re Estate of Howard, 542 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (acquitted defendant disqualified under slayer statute). Acquittal on charges that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt does not foreclose proof that meets the lesser civil standard. See generally Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So.2d 1064 (Fla.1995); Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So.2d 917, 919 (Fla.1995) (rejecting "contention that there is no longer a requirement of mutuality for purposes of collateral estoppel"). A party invoking the slayer statute, also called the Murder Probate Statute, to prevent an unconvicted killer's acquisition of property has the burden of proving that the killing was both intentional and unlawful. Howard. Cf. Carter v. Carter, 88 So.2d 153, 159 (Fla.1956) ("The burden of proof in the first instance will rest on the party who alleges that the killing was intentional and unlawful.").

[I]f at the trial a preponderance of the evidence should establish the fact that the homicide was intentional and unlawful in nature and therefore was without the purifying effect of excuse or justification, the ... [killer cannot take]. If, however, the evidence preponderates in favor of justification or excuse, an example of which would be self-defense, accident or insanity, then there would be no area for the application of the rule that would prevent [the killer's] recovery.

Carter, 88 So.2d at 159 (describing procedure to determine whether slayer was eligible to receive life insurance benefits). Accord Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105, 512 A.2d 389, 396 (Md.1986) ("The protester would attempt to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant had killed the testator and that the homicide was felonious and intentional, so that under the slayer's rule the claimant would be excluded from the distribution of the estate. The claimant would defend against this by evidence refuting his guilt of felonious and intentional homicide or by establishing that, if he did commit it, at the time of its commission, he lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct....").

Intentionally

Because an unintentional killing does not trigger the slayer statute's bar, the personal representative had to show that Mr. Smith acted intentionally. Although a felony, involuntary manslaughter does not require intent and so does not, under common law principles, disqualify the perpetrator from taking an interest in property devolving as a result. Beene v. Gibraltar Indus. Life Ins. Co., 116 Ind.App. 290, 63 N.E.2d 299, 300 (1945); Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky.1966). Accord Huff v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 14 Ohio App.3d 135, 14 OBR 151, 470 N.E.2d 236, 239 (1984); State ex rel. Miller v. Sencindiver, 166 W.Va. 355, 275 S.E.2d 10 (1980). Accidental killings may be excusable. Sec. 782.03, Fla.Stat. (1993). On the other hand, an individual exonerated from criminal liability may nevertheless be found to have intended to cause a death.

Last year's decision in Prasad v. Allstate Insurance Co., 644 So.2d 992 (Fla.1994), which the trial court cited in the order under review, made clear that acquittal by reason of insanity did not require a particular result on the question of intent in parallel civil proceedings:

We note the apparent inconsistencies of finding that an individual intended a crime for purposes of this type of civil insurance claim but allowing that person to escape criminal liability by reason of insanity. That inconsistency, however, was appropriately addressed by the Virginia Supreme Court in Johnson [v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 232 Va. 340, 350 S.E.2d 616 (1986) ], where it stated:

On the surface, there appears to be a blatant inconsistency in concluding, as we do, that a person may be criminally insane when shooting another, and thus avoid full criminal sanctions, and yet that same individual can be denied insurance coverage because he "intended" to shoot his victim. A more careful analysis, however, will reveal there is no inconsistency at all.

In the law, there are many situations in which a person may intentionally injure or kill another and not be subject to criminal punishment. For example, an individual may kill in self-defense. The executioner may kill with the sanction of the State. A soldier may injure or kill under rules of combat. This conduct is intentional, but it is also excusable. Likewise, an individual may be excluded from penalty if he is insane at the time he commits a criminal act. As here, he may do the act with every intention of consummating it, but when it is shown that he was mentally ill, he is excused from the imposition of the usual sanctions. "The absence of punishment, however, does not retrospectively expunge the original intention." Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. [v. Wagner,] 380 S.W.2d [224, 226 (Ky.1964) ].

350 S.E.2d at 620-21.

Id. at 995. While the supreme court decided in Prasad only that a liability insurance policy's exclusion for intentional injuries ruled out coverage for injuries intentionally inflicted by a psychotic insured, the implications for the present case are clear.

A "purpose of incorporating intentional injury exclusions into insurance policies is to preclude persons from benefiting financially when they cause injury.... Johnson v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 232 Va. 340, 350 S.E.2d, 616, 619 (1986)," Prasad, 644 So.2d at 994, in keeping with the maxim: Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria. See Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848, 850 (Fla.1951) (" 'no one shall ... profit by ... his own wrong' "). This is also an apparent purpose of the slayer statute. The Prasad court concluded that

an injury inflicted by an insane person is intentional if the actor understands the physical nature and consequences of the act. This is true even if the actor is unable to distinguish right from wrong.

Prasad, 644 So.2d at 994. This view 4 is not universal. See, e.g., In re Estate of Vadlamudi, 183 N.J.Super. 342, 443 A.2d 1113, 1117 (Ct.Law Div.1982) ("[T]his court...

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