Conklin v. Davis

• Decision Date: 25 October 1893
• Citation: 28 A. 537,63 Conn. 377
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CONKLIN v. DAVIS et al.

28 A. 537

63 Conn. 377

CONKLIN

v. DAVIS et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Oct. 25, 1893.

Case reserved from superior court, Hartford county.

Action by Hamilton W. Conklin, executor of the will of Joseph W. Dimock, deceased, against Prank H. Davis and others. Heard on case reserved.

C. M. Joslyn, for the executor. E. H. Hyde, Jr., for heirs claiming per capita.

E. D. Bobbins, for heirs claiming per stirpes. E. B. Bennett, for sundry legatees.

FENN, J. This is a reservation for advice concerning the construction, validity, and effect of the following language contained in the last will and testament of Joseph W. Dimock,*late of Hartford, deceased: "I hereby give to each of my seven grandchildren [naming them] two thousand dollars each. [Then follow bequests to two nieces, not in question.] I give the trustees of the First Baptist Church in Hartford, in trust for the poor of said church, the sum of $500; I give to the Baptist Domestic Miss. Society the sum of $500; also, the Baptist Foreign Miss. Society the sum of $500; also, the Baptist Home Mission Society the sum of $500; also, the Sunday school of the First Baptist Church the sum of $500, under the supervision of the trustees of said church,—and the remnants of said estate to be divided pro rata among the heirs." The superior court, upon a hearing had before it, made a full finding of facts, unnecessary to recite at length, but from which it appears that, after payment of all the debts, charges, and legacies, a residue of the estate will remain; that the seven grandchildren named are the heirs at law and next of kin of the testator; that five of them are children of the deceased daughter of the testator, and claim that such residue should be divided per capita, and the other two are sons, respectively, of deceased sons of the testator, and claim that such division should be made per stirpes; that the "Deacons of the Baptist Church in Hartford," is "a corporation duly organized under a charter granted by the General Assembly of Connecticut in May, 1811, and that under its charter it is authorized to hold estate, given to or otherwise vested in them, in trust for the use and benefit of said church, provided that the income of such estate shall by them be expended for the support of the gospel ministry in said church, and for building and repairing a suitable house of public worship for said church, and for no other purpose whatever; that said corporation represents the church, which has long been designated and known, both by its members and the general public, as the 'First Baptist Church in Hartford,' and that among the members of said church, in common speech, the persons who hold the estate and funds for the use and benefit of the church are called the 'trustees' of the church; that said corporation for many years has held funds in trust, the income of which has been expended yearly by the corporation in assisting members of said First Baptist Church who are poor and unable to support themselves; that said corporation for some years has held a fund, the income of which has been expended yearly in support of the Sunday school of said church, under the supervision of said corporation." And the court also, as a conclusion from facts specially recited, found that the testator intended his gift to the "Trustees of the First Baptist Church" to be to the "Deacons of the Baptist Church in Hartford," and his gift to the "Sunday school of the First Baptist Church, under the supervision of the trustees of said church," to be to the "Sunday school of the First Baptist Church," under the supervision of the "Deacons of the Baptisf. Church in Hartford;" his gift to the "Baptist Domestic Mission Society" to be to the "Connecticut Baptist Convention;" his gift to the "Baptist Foreign Mission Society" to be to the "American Baptist Missionary Union;" and his gift to the "Baptist Home Mission Society" to be to the "American Baptist Home Mission Society." And it was further found that "no evidence was offered on the trial as to the amount of funds or property held or enjoyed by any of the corporations claiming under the will, nor as to the income received by any of said corporations from any funds or property." Upon this finding the only contested questions presented to us by the reservation are—First, whether the division of the remainder of the estate among the grandchildren shall be per capita or per stirpes; second, whether the corporations other than the Deacons of the Baptist Church in Hartford can take the bequests intended for them, respectively, it appearing from their charters (in evidence) that the amount of property which they can hold is expressly limited, and their power to take these bequests not having been proved by showing the amount of their property now held to be within the limits fixed; third, whether the trusts, respectively, for the "poor" and for the "Sunday school" of the First Baptist Church, are valid.

It is a settled principle of construction that when the language and purpose of a will permit, if the testator's intention is in doubt, the statute of distributions is to be taken as a guide, and the rules of inheritance followed. This principle was clearly laid down in Lyon v. Acker, 33 Conn. 222, and has been affirmed in repeated instances appearing in the subsequent volumes of our Reports; and although, as was said in Lyon v. Acker, "perhaps there is no class of cases where precedents have so little weight as in the construction of wills," for that very reason, perhaps, there is none where principle, underlying precedent, should have so much. While it is needless, therefore, to refer more at length to the cases in which the question has arisen since Lyon v. Acker, which are all consistent with each other, it is important that our present decision should be based upon the principle on which they rest, and so be consistent with them. Hence, it would be sufficient to say that, where the testator directed "the remnants of said estate to be divided pro rata among the heirs," it must at least be doubtful whether he intended such division to be one at variance with the statute of distributions. How can it be clear that such was his purpose when the language itself is apt, in all its parts, to denote a distribution in accordance with such statute? But we will go further, and say that, looking at mere probabilities, the provisions of the will, taken as a whole, render it more likely than otherwise that the testator did intend a division of the remainder of his estate in accordance with the statute, per stirpes and not per capita. He gave to each of his...