Conley v. Com.

• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Lawrence L. Koontz
• Citation: Conley v. Com., 643 S.E.2d 131, 273 Va. 554 (2007)
• Decision Date: 20 April 2007
• Docket Number: Record No. 060120.
• Parties: Mark Anthony CONLEY v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

643 S.E.2d 131

Mark Anthony CONLEY v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Record No. 060120.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

April 20, 2007.

Charles L. Weber, Charlottesville, for appellant.

Eugene Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

OPINION BY Justice LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.

In a jury trial held in the Circuit Court of Albemarle County, Mark Anthony Conley was convicted on one count of abduction with intent to defile, Code § 18.2-48, and two counts of forcible sodomy, Code § 18.2-67.1. In this appeal, the sole issue we consider is whether the trial court erred in permitting a licensed clinical social worker to testify as an expert that Conley's nephew ("the victim"), suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD").¹

BACKGROUND

Our resolution of the issue presented in this appeal does not require a recitation of the trial evidence that led to Conley's criminal convictions. It suffices to relate that the Commonwealth introduced evidence to support the allegations that Conley coerced the victim, who was under the age of thirteen at that time, into engaging in unlawful acts of oral sex. The focus of our analysis in resolving the issue presented is upon the challenged testimony at trial of the Commonwealth's expert witness, Anna H. Vanhoy.

Vanhoy is a licensed clinical social worker² who provided treatment services to the victim, subsequent to Conley's criminal acts, upon a referral by the child's pediatrician. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth designated Vanhoy as an expert witness who would be asked to give an expert opinion that the victim suffered from PTSD.³

Conley filed a motion in limine to exclude Vanhoy's anticipated testimony. Conley principally asserted in the motion, and thereafter during oral argument on it, that Vanhoy was not qualified to render an expert opinion that the victim suffered with PTSD because "she's not a medical doctor."⁴

In response, the Commonwealth contended that Vanhoy possessed sufficient training, experience, and knowledge to testify as an expert regarding her diagnosis that the victim suffered with PTSD. The Commonwealth conceded that Vanhoy could not give an expert opinion that the victim's PTSD was caused by sexual abuse.

The trial court denied Conley's motion in limine, rejecting Conley's assertion that only a medical doctor may qualify to render an expert opinion regarding the diagnosis of PTSD. The trial court indicated that Vanhoy's qualification as an expert would depend on a showing that she possessed sufficient expertise in the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD.

At trial, the Commonwealth and Conley conducted extensive voir dire of Vanhoy regarding her qualification as an expert in the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD. Vanhoy testified that currently she is a licensed clinical social worker who works with families and children as a private practice therapist. Her testimony revealed that she received a bachelor's degree in psychology and a master's degree in social work, and her educational background involved "training towards making diagnos[es] of a variety of emotional disorders."

Regarding her experience with the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD, Vanhoy testified that during graduate school she took a family violence course where PTSD was "one of the more significant diagnoses." Also during graduate school she interned at a family violence and rape crisis center where she worked with victims of sexual trauma. She estimated that over 50% of the individuals she encountered there suffered from "all stages" of PTSD.

Vanhoy further testified that after graduate school she worked for approximately two years in a family preservation clinic. There, she performed in-home services with families and children in crisis, carrying a caseload of six families at a time. Vanhoy related that some of the children she worked with had been sexually abused or had experienced episodes of violence, and estimated that 20% of the care recipients had PTSD.

Continuing, Vanhoy testified that she worked for approximately two and a half years as a clinical social worker at a state hospital for children and adolescents. In this setting, she provided evaluation and treatment for children who presented a large variety of psychological diagnoses. She "mainly" performed psycho-social evaluations but "also ran support groups as well as carried some individual therapy clients." Vanhoy estimated that approximately 25% of the children she treated had PTSD. Vanhoy stated, however, that since patients are often given a concurrent diagnosis where another disorder is given greater weight than PTSD, a "much greater number would have been impacted by PTSD." Vanhoy estimated that of the children she treated at the state hospital, between 50% and 75% of those were impacted by PTSD.

Vanhoy testified that she subsequently entered private practice as a therapist. In this capacity, she worked with an adult female with chronic PTSD and a "couple" of small children who were diagnosed with PTSD. At the time of trial, Vanhoy practiced at a clinic implementing a "multi-disciplinary approach" to therapy. Vanhoy testified that in this environment she encountered issues regarding various mental disorders, but only had one patient whom she would have diagnosed with PTSD.

Vanhoy further testified that, in addition to her work experience, she regularly reviews scholarly literature on psychology, has done a presentation on borderline personality disorder, and has been on the board of directors of an agency that provides services to victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and child sex abuse.

On cross-examination during voir dire, Vanhoy testified that she had personally diagnosed six or seven cases of PTSD during her career. Vanhoy conceded that she had never qualified to testify as an expert witness on PTSD or published any articles or scholarly works regarding PTSD, and that she cannot prescribe medication.

At the conclusion of voir dire, the Commonwealth moved to qualify Vanhoy as an expert in the field of diagnosis and treatment of PTSD. Over Conley's objection, the trial court ruled that Vanhoy was qualified to testify as an expert regarding the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD.

Upon direct examination during the trial, the Commonwealth elicited substantially the same testimony from Vanhoy regarding her educational background and professional experience. Vanhoy then testified regarding her treatment of the victim, recounting that she first met with him ten months prior to trial after a referral from his pediatrician. Beginning with the initial therapy session, Vanhoy recounted that she conducted therapy sessions with the victim approximately once a week and continued to do so until the time of trial.

Vanhoy testified that she initially diagnosed the victim with depressive disorder, but that since counseling with him over a period of time, she had "diagnosed him with [PTSD]." Vanhoy explained that PTSD is caused by a traumatic event such as "witnessing or experiencing violence, being in combat or a natural disaster," or experiencing "physical or sexual abuse." Vanhoy stated that the victim exhibited a "multitude" of the symptoms associated with PTSD.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Conley guilty of the charged offenses. By order entered on December 16, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied Conley's petition for appeal for reasons stated in a prior unpublished per curiam opinion. Conley v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0097-05-02 (June 8, 2005). This appeal followed.⁵

DISCUSSION

Previously, we have not been called upon to address the particular issue whether a licensed clinical social worker may be qualified to render an expert opinion regarding the diagnosis of a mental disorder over the defendant's objection. Cf. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 53, 66-67, 591 S.E.2d 47, 54 (2004)(licensed clinical social worker, without objection, qualified as an expert regarding Dissociative Identity Disorder and borderline personality disorder). However, the general principles pertaining to the qualification of an expert witness are well-established. Generally, to qualify as an expert the witness needs only to have a degree of knowledge of a subject matter beyond that of persons of common intelligence and ordinary experience so that the witness' opinion will have value in assisting the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. See Velazquez v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 95, 103, 557 S.E.2d 213, 218 (2002). An expert witness may acquire the requisite knowledge of a subject matter through experience and observation in a variety of ways, including participation in a vocation, without formal training or education. See Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 207 Va. 567, 571, 151 S.E.2d 628, 631 (1966); Neblett v. Hunter, 207 Va. 335, 339, 150 S.E.2d 115, 118 (1966). Whether to permit a witness to qualify as an expert on a given subject matter is an issue submitted to the discretion of the trial court, and on appeal we will not reverse the trial court's ruling in this regard unless it plainly appears that the witness was not qualified. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 144, 153, 631 S.E.2d 93, 97 (2006); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 679, 529 S.E.2d 769, 783 (2000).

Notwithstanding these general principles regarding the qualification of an expert witness, Conley contends that we have established in Combs v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 256 Va. 490, 496-97, 507 S.E.2d 355, 358-59 (1998), and in John v. Im, 263 Va. 315, 321, 559 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2002), that only a medical doctor may give an expert opinion regarding the cause of a physical human injury.⁶ Upon this premise, Conley contends that because only a medical doctor may give an expert opinion regarding the cause of a human injury and "causation of a human injury is a component part of a diagnosis" as we stated in Combs, 256 Va. at...