Conley v. Moe
| Decision Date | 03 February 1941 |
| Docket Number | 27798. |
| Citation | 7 Wn.2d 355,110 P.2d 172 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | CONLEY v. MOE et al. |
Action by Charles L. Conley, trustee in bankruptcy of the marital community, consisting of John Moe and Borghild J. Moe against John Moe and others to cancel as a fraudulent conveyance a quitclaim deed executed by the named defendant and to establish in favor of the trustee an equitable lien upon the realty in an amount to be determined by the court and to foreclose that lien. Decree for the plaintiff, and the defendants appeal.
Decree affirmed.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Howard M Findley, judge.
James C. McKnight, of Seattle, for appellants.
J Speed Smith and Henry Elliott, Jr., both of Seattle, for respondent.
Plaintiff, trustee in bankruptcy of the marital community, consisting of defendants John Moe and Borghild J. Moe, instituted an action March, 1938, to cancel as a fraudulent conveyance a quitclaim deed, executed by John Moe, covering certain realty which was his separate property; also, to establish in favor of the trustee an equitable lien upon the realty in an amount to be determined by the court, and to foreclose such lien. The cause was tried to the court, which filed its memorandum decision February 20, 1939, and entered decree May 12, 1939, granting plaintiff the relief sought and fixing the amount of the lien at two thousand dollars. The defendants appealed.
The cause is Before us on an agreed statement of facts which was filed in this court September 22, 1939. The brief of appellants was filed in this court September 26, 1939. By stipulation of the parties, time for filing respondent's brief was extended to December 1, 1939, and later extended to December 26, 1939. On the latter date, the cause was set for hearing January 11, 1940, Before department 2 of this court. The death, April 29, 1940, of the judge to whom the cause was assigned for opinion in the January, 1940, term of this court necessitated reassignment. On July 9, 1940, the cause was set for rehearing en banc at the September, 1940, term of this court. On request of the parties, the cause was heard en banc November 7, 1940. The cause was then assigned to another judge for opinion. With that opinion a majority of the court did not agree. December 11, 1940, the cause was assigned to the present writer for opinion, which was written December 20, 1940, and placed in circulation among the members of the court.
The agreed statement of facts is as follows: John Moe and Borghild J. Moe were married in 1927. Prior to their marriage, Moe acquired title to an unimproved lot, fronting on 36th Ave., S. W., in Seattle, and Borghild J. Moe had acquired title to two lots, which apparently were improved with a dwelling house, located on 44th Ave., S. W., in the same city. This action has to do solely with the 36th Ave., S. W., property, the title to which stood in the name of John Moe.
In 1929 or 1930 a house was erected upon the lot owned by John Moe, at a cost of approximately thirty-five hundred dollars. The improvement was financed by means of eleven hundred dollars which Mr. Moe saved prior to his marriage; also, by the proceeds of a loan in the amount of fifteen hundred dollars obtained from a savings and loan association, secured by a mortgage on the property involved in this action; and by means of a loan of one thousand dollars obtained from Axel Neilsen, father of Borghild J. Moe. Whether Mrs. Moe was a party to the transaction under which the loan was obtained from the savings and loan association is not disclosed by the agreed statement of facts. The loan obtained from Axel Neilsen is evidenced by a promissory note executed by John Moe alone.
As soon as the house was completed, some time in 1929 or 1930, the Moes moved into it and occupied the property as their family home. They continued to reside there until May, 1937, when they moved into the 44th Ave., S. W., property owned by Mrs. Moe, where they lived until August, 1938. They then moved back into their former home on 36th Ave., S. W., prior to which time the present action was commenced.
During the time the spouses occupied the 36th Ave., S. W., property, the legal title was in the name of John Moe. The community did not pay any rent therefor and the husband and wife never mentioned the matter of rent. During the period of fifteen months they were absent from that property, the place was rented and the rentals were collected by John Moe. Subsequent to the marriage, Mr. Moe had no income other than the wages which he received as an employee of the city of Seattle. From his earnings as such employee, the obligation of fifteen hundred dollars to the savings and loan association, together with the accrued interest thereon, was paid at the rate of twenty-five dollars monthly. Also, out of his earnings, interest of fifty dollars annually on the Neilsen note was paid. The general taxes on the property averaging fifty dollars per annum, special assessments amounting to four hundred or five hundred dollars against the property, additional improvements costing approximately two hundred or three hundred dollars, and premiums on fire insurance policies amounting to twenty dollars for each three-year period, were all paid from the same source--the earnings of Mr. Moe as an employee of the city of Seattle.
In March, 1936, an action for wrongful death was brought against the Moes and against Mrs. Moe's son by a former marriage, in which action a judgment was obtained about one year later against the marital community composed of John Moe and Borghild J. Moe and against Mrs. Moe's son.
Shortly subsequent to the commencement of the action for wrongful death, John Moe executed a quitclaim deed to his father-in-law, Axel Neilsen, covering the 36th Ave., S. W., property which is the subject matter of this controversy; at the same time Mrs. Moe executed a quitclaim deed to her brother-in-law, Andrew Hegdahl, covering the 44th Ave., S. W., property owned by her. Both deeds were executed for the purpose of preventing liens from attaching against those two pieces of property by reason of any judgment which might be rendered in the wrongful death action against either John Moe or Borghild J.
Moe; however, neither of those deeds was delivered to the grantee named therein, but both were retained and later filed for record by the attorney for the Moes. Axel Neilsen, the grantee in the quitclaim deed covering the 36th Ave., S. W., property, never made any request or demand for security for the note mentioned above in the amount of one thousand dollars, but, at the instance of the attorney for the Moes, consented to be named as grantee in such deed.
Within two months after the rendition of judgment in the wrongful death action, John Moe and Borghild J. Moe, as a marital community, filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The community was duly adjudicated bankrupt, and respondent was elected trustee in bankruptcy thereof. Claims aggregating $15,840 arising out of the wrongful death action were filed against the estate of the bankrupt community. Respondent, as such trustee, thereafter brought this action.
In the decree, the trial court adjudged that the title and interest of the appellants in the real estate covered by the quitclaim deed from John Moe to Axel Neilsen were subject to a lien in favor of the trustee in bankruptcy in the amount of two thousand dollars 'by reason of contributions which the said community made to said real estate in the improvement thereof.'
The agreed facts disclose that the conveyance of the property from John Moe to his father-in-law was a fraudulent conveyance. The very purpose of that conveyance was to defeat the collection of any judgment obtained in the wrongful death action. We will treat this case (as we should) as if the quitclaim deed had never been executed and as if the title to the property in question were still in the name of John Moe.
Whether, under the facts and circumstances present in this cause, the trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to have an equitable lien impressed upon the property, the title to which is in John Moe, is dependent upon whether an equitable lien in favor of the marital community should be impressed upon the separate property of John Moe to the extent that community funds were expended in connection with that property. Any right in favor of the trustee must be founded upon a similar right vested in, or accruing to, the marital community.
It is, as contended by counsel for appellants, well settled in this jurisdiction that the status of property, whether real or personal, becomes fixed as of the date of its purchase or acquisition, and remains so fixed unless changed by deed, by due process of law, or by the working of some form of estoppel. In re Deschamps' Estate, 77 Wash. 514, 137 P. 1009; In re Woodburn's Estate, 190 Wash. 141, 66 P.2d 1138; In re Finch's Estate, 198 Wash. 567, 89 P.2d 218; and Binge v. Mumm, Wash., 105 P.2d 689.
The foregoing specific rule enunciated in the cases cited and followed in other cases from this court particularly refers to the legal title to the property, and not directly to such interests or rights as are founded upon equitable considerations. In quite a number of our cases, which announce and follow the rules stated above, the rule is conceded that the legal title may be subject to certain equities, according to the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
In Legg v. Legg, 34 Wash. 132, 75 P. 130, we specifically held that in equity and fairness to the wife who was the survivor of the community, she was entitled to reimbursement from separate real property of her...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
King v. Uhlmann
...cases. Donn v. Kunz, 52 Ariz. 219, 79 P.2d 965; Cosper v. Valley Bank, 28 Ariz. 373, 237 P. 175. Indeed, in Conley v. Moe, 7 Wash.2d 355, 110 P.2d 172, 174, 133 A.L.R. 1089, the Washington court stated what I believe to be the better 'It is * * * well settled in this jurisdiction that the s......
-
Pollock v. Pollock
... ... Bruch v. Rice, 37 Wash.2d 185, 222 P.2d 847 (1950); Leroux v. Knoll, 28 Wash.2d 964, 184 P.2d 564 (1947); Pekola v. Strand, 25 [499 P.2d 238] Wash.2d 98, 168 P.2d 407 (1946); Farrow v. Ostrom,16 Wash.2d 547, 133 P.2d 974 (1943); Conley v. Moe, 7 Wash.2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 ... Page 404 ... (1941); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. McLeod, 151 Wash. 221, 275 P. 700 (1929); Legg v. Legg, 34 Wash. 132, 75 P. 130 (1904). See DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wash.App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971); Neeley v. Lockton, 63 Wash.2d 929, 389 P.2d 909 (1964); In ... ...
-
Gapsch v. Gapsch
...185, 222 P.2d 847; Farrow v. Ostrom, 16 Wash.2d 547, 133 P.2d 974; Jones v. Davis, 15 Wash.2d 567, 131 P.2d 433; Conley v. Moe, 7 Wash.2d 355, 110 P.2d 172, 133 A.L.R. 1089; Salisbury v. Meeker, 152 Wash. 146, 277 P. 376; 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, § 510(5), p. 1081; 11 Am.Jur., Community......
-
E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Garrison
... ... determined as of the date of its acquisition. Heintz v ... Brown, 46 Wash. 387, 90 P. 211, 123 Am.St.Rep. 937; ... Katterhagen v. Meister, 75 Wash. 112, 134 P. 673; ... In re Binge's Estate, 5 Wash.2d 446, 105 P.2d ... 689; Conley v. Moe, 7 Wash.2d 355, 110 P.2d 172, 133 ... A.L.R. 1089 ... Separate ... property continues to be separate through all of its changes ... and transitions as long as it can be clearly traced and ... identified, and its rents, issues, and profits remain ... ...
-
§ 7.04 Characterizing Improvements
...Nevada: Malmquist v. Malmquist, 106 Nev. 231, 792 P.2d 372 (1990) (refusing to grant interest). Washington: Conley v. Moe, 7 Wash.2d.355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941). [57] See, e.g.: Arizona: Honnas v. Honnas, 133 Ariz. 39, 648 P.2d 1045 (1982). Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.075. Idaho: Hiatt v. Hi......
-
§3.4 Right of Reimbursement: The Equitable Lien
...of reimbursement, based on the value of the funds or labor used to make the improvement, should be recognized. See, e.g., Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn.2d 355, 360-62, 110 P.2d 172 (1941). The Supreme Court therefore necessarily has concluded that the independent character of the funds or labor expen......
-
Table of Cases
...Conejo Enters., Inc., In re, 96 F.3d 346, 36 C.B.C.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.04[1][b] Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn.2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.06[2] Connell v. Francisco, 74 Wn. App. 306, 872 P.2d 1150 (1994) . . . . . . . . ......
-
Table of Cases
...Dayton v. Embree, 2 Wash. 331, 26 P. 257 (1891): 4.14 Compton v.Schwabacher Bros., 15 Wash. 306, 46 P. 338 (1896): 6.5(5) Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn.2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941): 3.4(1)(a), 3.4(1)(c), 3.4(1)(d), 6.5(15)(c) Connell v.Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995): Ch. 1, 2.7(4), 2.8,......