Conley v. Whittlesey

• Decision Date: 24 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 19993,19993
• Citation: 888 P.2d 804,126 Idaho 630
• Parties: Dennis K. CONLEY, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant, v. Craig D. WHITTLESEY, a single person; Gary Bishop and Norma Bishop, husband and wife, Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents, and Richard Ward and Kelly Ward, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 804

888 P.2d 804

126 Idaho 630

Dennis K. CONLEY, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant, v. Craig D. WHITTLESEY, a single person; Gary Bishop and Norma Bishop, husband and wife, Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents and Richard Ward and Kelly Ward, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 19993.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Jan. 24, 1995.

[126 Idaho 631] Dennis K. Conley, pro se.

Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., Moscow, for respondents Whittlesey and Bishop. Charles L. Graham argued.

PERRY, Judge.

The subject of this litigation is an easement which was conveyed to Dennis Conley in 1980 by the grantors of his real property A right of way easement for ingress and egress together with the right to construct, reconstruct, repair and maintain an existing road running over and across the North One-half of the Northeast Quarter (N 1/2NE 1/4) of Section 26, Township 40 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Latah County, State of Idaho.

[126 Idaho 632] located on Moscow Mountain and described as follows:

At issue are the precise perimeters of the easement, which may have been modified by prescriptive use, over and across separate parcels of land owned by Craig D. Whittlesey, Gary and Norma Bishop, and Richard and Kelly Ward. Also at issue are the scope of the easement, which the parties sought to define by means of a stipulation addressing roadway width and maintenance, and an injunction restraining certain actions of the parties with regard to the roadway during the pendency of this action.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the district court's finding that the parties were bound by the terms of a purported settlement articulated on the record at a July 10, 1989, hearing and the district court's order for the parties to execute a writing reflecting that agreement were erroneous. We reverse and remand for Conley to be accorded a trial on the merits of his claim. However, we affirm the district court's finding of contempt and the sanctions imposed for Conley's willful defiance of its order.

BACKGROUND

A trial in this matter was originally scheduled for July 10, 1989. On that date, however, the parties advised the district court that the trial would not proceed as scheduled. The parties then set forth on the record the settlement terms they believed they had agreed upon, including: the width of the easement; no moratorium on Conley's development of his property using the easement; and the respective parties' responsibilities to make and pay for repairs and maintenance of the easement in accordance with an engineering firm's specifications. The parties stated that these terms would establish a status quo to govern for a period of seven years, after which time the parties would again be free to litigate the scope of the easement as conveyed and any increased burden caused by Conley's use of the easement in developing his property.

As a result, the district court vacated the trial. The district court then indicated that if a written agreement memorializing the proposed settlement was not executed within a reasonable time, the court would set a new trial date, which would be, at the earliest, nine months hence.

The parties exchanged proposed drafts of settlement agreements, but neither party's draft was acceptable to the other and, therefore, neither was executed. In October 1989, the district court sua sponte issued an order directing the parties to show cause why the court should not order the parties to execute a written agreement in conformity with the settlement terms expressed at the July 10, 1989, proceeding or, in the alternative, dismiss the action. At the show cause hearing held November 8, 1989, the district court inquired as to which points precluded the parties' execution of the agreement they had purportedly reached in July. Counsel for Whittlesey and Bishop advised the district court that his proposed draft went beyond the scope of the pleadings and included more detail than the terms discussed on the record at the July hearing. Counsel for Conley submitted that the record of the July 10, 1989, hearing did not reflect that the parties "ever said that the 'agreement' was final."

At the November hearing, the district court acknowledged having stated at the July 10, 1989, hearing that, if a settlement agreement was not executed, the court would reset the matter for trial, but indicated that it might order the parties to execute an agreement. Concluding that the parties had entered into a binding stipulation in July 1989, the district court ordered the parties to prepare a written agreement to conform with what had been placed on the record. The district court further stated that it would order the parties to execute a written agreement which conformed to what had been entered on the record or, in the alternative, "take this to trial."

On August 16, 1991, the district court sua sponte issued an order declaring the status of the settlement between the parties to the easement litigation. The district court recited in the order that it had advised the parties during a hearing conducted on October 1, 1990, in a companion case (Whittlesey v. Conley, Latah County Case No. C-2828) that "it was ordering that the parties comply with the terms and conditions of the settlement orally articulated in the instant action." The district court went on to explain that "it was hoped by this Court that so advising the parties of its decision, that the parties would proceed with the steps necessary to carry into effect such settlement. Such expectation or hope of the Court was unfulfilled."

As part of the August 16, 1991, order, the district court concluded that, with the modifications mentioned therein, a "Roadway Easement Litigation Settlement Agreement-Revised" drafted by counsel for Whittlesey and Bishop, appropriately memorialized in writing the orally articulated settlement made upon the record in open court. The district court then ordered the parties to prepare a final redraft of the agreement within ten days, with the addition of a specific time frame for completion of various phases of the road's repair and restoration. To insure that the parties would promptly sign the agreement, the district court included the following paragraphs:

(3) Each of the parties shall sign the redraft within five days of receipt of the same and return the same immediately upon execution to Mr. Landeck, who is directed to file the same with the clerk of the above entitled Court when signed by all parties;

(4) In the event a party fails or refuses to execute the redraft the Court will appoint a commissioner to execute the redraft on behalf of such party with the same force and effect as if the recalcitrant party had executed the same, and such party will be deemed to be in contempt for failure to obey the dictate of paragraph (3) hereinabove.

Conley attempted to appeal from this order, which he claimed the district court had no authority to make. The district court, however, held that the August 16, 1991, order was not a final, appealable order and denied a Rule 54(b) certificate.

When Conley refused to execute the redraft agreement, Whittlesey and Bishop moved the district court to hold Conley in contempt. Pursuant to I.C. § 7-610, and upon Conley's admission that he had not complied with the August 16, 1991, order, the district court found Conley in contempt by order dated April 23, 1992. On May 13, 1992, the district court entered an order directing the clerk of the court to execute the agreement on behalf of Conley. On June 1, 1992, sanctions were imposed against Conley based upon the district court's previous finding of contempt. Conley filed a notice of appeal in which he sought review of this contempt order as well as the August 16, 1991, order holding that an enforceable agreement between the parties had been formed on July 10, 1989, and requiring execution of the redraft agreement.

Conley asserts on appeal that it was error for the district court sua sponte to enter an order holding that the parties had reached a settlement on July 10, 1989. Conley maintains that, until a formal, executed writing was accomplished, there was no agreement settling any part of the litigation on the easement. Conley also claims that the oral stipulation was invalid because it violated the statute of frauds. In the absence of such a signed agreement, Conley argues that he is entitled to have the matter reset for trial. As his second issue on appeal, he contends that the 1992 contempt order is invalid because the decree ordering him to execute the redraft agreement was also made by the court sua sponte and without proper authority.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Oral stipulations of the parties in the presence of the court are generally held to be binding, especially when acted upon or entered on the court records, and need not be signed by the parties or their attorneys. 73 AM.JUR.2d Stipulations § 3, at page 537 (1974). The validity of a stipulation or agreement between counsel regarding matters before Whether the parties to an oral agreement or stipulation become bound prior to the drafting and execution of a contemplated formal writing is largely a question of intent. 17A AM.JUR.2d Contracts § 37, at 66 (1974). The intent of the parties is to be determined by the surrounding facts and circumstances of each particular case. Id. at § 39, at 70. See also Elliott v. Pope, 42 Idaho 505, 247 P. 796 (1926). In the ascertainment of the intention of the parties, the question also arises whether any inference is to be drawn from the reference by the parties to a future contract in writing. 17A AM.JUR.2d Contracts § 39, at 70 (1974). The stipulations are best evaluated by looking to the very words of counsel and their clients. First Security Bank of Idaho v. Hansen, 107 Idaho 472, 690 P.2d 927 (1984). With these principles in mind, we examine the transcript of the July 10, 1989, hearing to determine whether there is...