Conlin v. City of Des Moines
| Decision Date | 15 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:12-cv-00608 - JEG,4:12-cv-00608 - JEG |
| Parties | JAMES CONLIN and ROXANNE CONLIN, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF DES MOINES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Des Moines' (Defendant) Motion to Dismiss the Petition of Plaintiffs James Conlin and Roxanne Conlin (collectively, Plaintiffs) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs resist. A hearing was held on the matter on March 19, 2013. Attorneys Rebecca Brommel and Jonathan Gallagher represented Plaintiffs; Attorney Gary Goudelock Jr. represented Defendant. The matter is fully submitted and ready for disposition.
Plaintiffs are individuals and citizens of Iowa who own a steel-sided apartment building located at 826 18th Street, Des Moines, Iowa.2 Defendant is an Iowa Municipal Corporation, and its acts and omissions giving rise to the cause of action occurred in Polk County, Iowa.
Plaintiffs operate the Structure as a rental property, so in accordance with their status as landlords of a Section 8 apartment complex, the Des Moines Municipal Housing Agency(Housing Agency) conducted an inspection of the Structure on or about September 7, 2011. Based on its inspection, the Housing Agency found the windows on the Structure to be deficient and noted in its report that the windows must be repaired or replaced. According to the Housing Agency, any deficiencies must be fixed within 28 days of the original inspection, so Plaintiffs ordered and paid for ten replacement windows upon receiving the Housing Agency's report.3 Plaintiffs installed five of the ten new windows before receiving a "STOP WORK" order from the City of Des Moines. The "STOP WORK" order stated that the "work being performed at 826 - 18th Street is in violation of the zoning ordinance [and] historic district guidelines." Petition, ECF No. 1, ¶ 20 (alteration added by Plaintiffs). After receiving the "STOP WORK" order, Plaintiffs filed an application for a certificate of appropriateness with the Historic Preservation Commission.
The Commission held a meeting on November 30, 2011, wherein it reviewed Plaintiffs' application for a certificate of appropriateness and imposed three conditions on Plaintiffs as follows: Id. ¶¶ 40, 50. Thus, the Commission denied Plaintiffs' request to install vinyl windows on the Structure.
Plaintiffs appealed the Commission decision to the Des Moines City Council (Council), and after Plaintiffs continued the hearing multiple times, the Council heard their appeal onFebruary 13, 2012. The Council remanded the issue to the Commission for further consideration, giving Plaintiffs an opportunity to provide more evidence to support their application.
Plaintiffs presented their case to the Commission for a second time on May 16, 2012, and again the Commission rejected Plaintiffs' proposal to use vinyl windows. Plaintiffs appealed the Commission's decision to the Council again, and the hearing process took place in September of 2012, where the Council affirmed the Commission's decision.
Plaintiffs assert "[t]he City of Des Moines has allowed, not required removal, or otherwise not taken action against other property owners in the Sherman Hill neighborhood who have installed vinyl windows and features." Petition, ECF No. 1, ¶ 68. No specific properties or circumstances are revealed in the current record.
Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant in the Iowa District Court for Polk County on November 21, 2012, appealing the decision of the Council and alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Iowa Code § 303.34(3), as well as writ of certiorari claims. Defendant filed a Notice of Removal to this Court on December 19, 2012, alleging jurisdiction and venue are proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and (c) and 42 U.S.C. § 1443 due to Plaintiffs' claims brought against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In their Petition, Plaintiffs alleged seven counts: (1) due process violation through a writ of certiorari avenue for relief; (2) due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) equal protection violation through a writ of certiorari avenue for relief; (4) equal protection violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) taking without just compensation through a writ of certiorari avenue for relief; (6) taking without just compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (7) judicial review,presumably as set forth in Iowa Code § 303.34(3).4 Plaintiffs then request several types of relief from this Court:
Petition, ECF No. 1, pp. 20-21.
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Petition on January 10, 2013, pursuant to both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant asserts this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the three writ of certiorari claims because Plaintiffs failed to file their Petition within 30 days of the Council's September 24, 2012, decision, which violates Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1402(3). See Iowa R. of Civ. Pro. 1.1402(3) ().
Defendant also contends this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' takings claim, as it is unripe for adjudication because Plaintiffs failed to seek a state remedy for the alleged "taking" of Plaintiffs' property prior to filing this lawsuit. Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) as to the other claims in its Petition. Defendant attached to its motion several exhibits, including Council documents pertaining to Plaintiffs' appeals as well as guidelines for historic building preservation, rehabilitation, and repair within Des Moines.
Plaintiffs resisted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on January 28, 2013. In their resistance, Plaintiffs withdrew their writ of certiorari counts - Counts I, III, and V - and consent to this Court dismissing those claims. See Pl. Resist. to Def. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, p.1 fn. 1. Thus, the only counts in contention are II, IV, VI, and VII - Plaintiffs' claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and their judicial review claim under Iowa Code § 303.34(3). Defendant filed a reply in support of its Motion to Dismiss on February 8, 2013.
The Court must necessarily address the question of its jurisdiction initially. Thus, the Court begins with Count VI.
Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A party may contest the Court's subject matter jurisdiction by bringing a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), as Defendant did in this case.
The moving party must bring their challenge based on the "face or on the factual truthfulness of [the claim's] averments." Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). Facial challenges focus on the face of the complaint, and the Court must treat the motion under Rule 12(b)(1) similar to how it treats motions under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Id. This means the Court must find the moving party "successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction." Id. (citation omitted).
Conversely, a factual challenge allows the Court to go beyond the Petition with regard to what facts it can consider when deciding whether it has jurisdiction. See Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1990). If the moving party brings a factual challenge, "there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case," which means that "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Id. at 730 (internal quotation marks and quotation omitted).
In this case, Defendant has filed a factual challenge to this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, as Defendant attached an Appendix to its Motion to Dismiss containing factual information not included in Plaintiffs' Petition. "[I]f subject-matter jurisdiction turns on contested facts, the trial judge may be authorized to review the evidence and resolve the dispute on [his or her] own," but only if the court is not determining "an essential element of a claim for relief." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (...
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