Conn v. Manchester Amusement Co.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1920
• Citation: 111 A. 339
• Parties: CONN v. MANCHESTER AMUSEMENT CO.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

111 A. 339

CONN

v. MANCHESTER AMUSEMENT CO.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Merrimack.

June 25, 1920.

Transferred from Superior Court, Merrimack County; Branch, Judge.

Writ of entry by Jacob Conn against the Manchester Amusement Company. Verdict directed for defendant, and case transferred on plaintiff's exception. Exception overruled.

Trial by jury. The plaintiff leased the Star Theatre to the defendant, a Massachusetts corporation, in October, 1915, for the term of five years. The Legislature repealed its charter in March, 1917, but continued it as a body politic for three years for the purpose of "enabling it gradually to settle and close up its affairs." Transferred from the October term, 1919, of the superior court, on the plaintiff's exception to a directed verdict.

Robert W. Upton, of Concord, for plaintiff.

John M. Stark, of Concord, and Warren, Howe & Wilson, of Manchester, for defendant.

YOUNG, J. The plaintiff's contention that he is entitled to the immediate possession of the leased property because of the act of the Massachusetts Legislature (Sp. Laws 1917, c. 157, § 1) is based on the proposition that that act dissolved the defendant corporation. This contention has no foundation to rest on, for the act provides in terms that it shall continue as a body politic for three years to enable it to close up its affairs. This act, therefore, instead of "invalidating the lease, gave the defendant three years in which to dispose of it, and while it is probably true that the defendant could not sell the lease, it can purchase the leased property under the option contained in the sixth clause, and then dispose of it in any way it sees fit. In short, if it is assumed, as the plaintiff contends that it is, illegal for the defendant to carry on the moving picture business, it conies to nothing in so far as his rights are concerned, for the repealing act neither gives, nor was intended to give, him any rights in or to the leased property he would not have had if that act had not been passed; and, while that act may have taken from the defendant the right to carry on its ordinary business, it did not relieve it or its property from liability to perform all of its legal obligations, including its obligations to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot maintain this suit unless he shows that the defendant has failed to comply with the provisions of the lease; he contends that it has failed to comply with the provisions of the fourth...