Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Harris Transport Co.
| Decision Date | 06 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-2094.,95-2094. |
| Citation | 909 F. Supp. 1212 |
| Parties | The CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. HARRIS TRANSPORT COMPANY, Mitchell Hogan, Ralph C. Hogan, Vanliner Insurance Company, and Dorothy Ella (Dot) Thomas, Personal Representative of the Estate of Kenneth Thomas, Deceased, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
David B. Vandergriff, Ft. Smith, AR, for Connecticut Indemnity Company.
Robert L. Jones, III, Robert L. Jones, Jr., Jones, Jackson & Moll, Fort Smith, AR, for Harris Transport Company, Vanliner Insurance Company.
J. Ray Baxter, Baxter, Wallace and Jensen, Daniel B. Thrailkill, Page & Thrailkill, Mena, AR, for Dorothy Ella Thomas.
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND JUDGMENT RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NOW on this 6th day of November, 1995, comes on for consideration the cross motions for summary judgment filed herein by the parties and the Court, being well and sufficiently advised, finds and orders as follows:
BACKGROUND
This case is before the Court for declaratory judgment concerning the respective rights and responsibilities of the parties in connection with a fatal vehicular accident which occurred on April 3, 1995, on U.S. Highway 71 in Polk County, Arkansas. Kenneth Thomas was killed in the accident when the vehicle he was operating collided, head-on, with a semi-trailer truck operated by Ralph Hogan. At the time of the accident, the semi-trailer truck was owned by Mitchell Hogan, brother of Ralph, and was leased to Harris Transport Co. (Harris). At the time of the accident, two (2) liability insurance policies were in force with respect to the semi-trailer truck. Vanliner Insurance Co. (Vanliner) had issued its policy (the Vanliner Policy) to Harris as lessee of the semi-trailer truck, and Connecticut Indemnity Company (CIC) had issued its policy (the CIC Policy) to Mitchell Hogan, as owner of the semi-trailer truck. As a result of the accident, Dorothy Ella (Dot) Thomas (Thomas), the personal representative of the Estate of Kenneth Thomas, filed a lawsuit against the Hogans and Harris seeking, inter alia, damages as a result of the death of Kenneth Thomas. That suit will be hereinafter referred to as the "underlying tort lawsuit."
The action presently before the Court relates to the rights and responsibilities of the various parties in connection with the underlying tort lawsuit. The Court is asked to declare, by way of declaratory judgment, whether Vanliner or CIC, or both of them, are obliged to defend the Hogans and/or Harris in the underlying tort lawsuit and to pay any judgment which Thomas might therein secure by reason of the respective provisions of the Vanliner Policy and the CIC Policy. Further, Thomas asks the Court to declare that Harris, as a matter of law, is responsible to Thomas for any damages which may ultimately be proven in the underlying tort lawsuit.
CIC and Thomas both filed their motions for summary judgment contending that there were no material facts in dispute and that, based on the undisputed facts, the Court should find, as a matter of law (1) that CIC has no duty, under the CIC Policy, to defend the Hogans or Harris in the underlying tort lawsuit nor to pay any judgment which Thomas might secure therein against them; (2) that Vanliner does have a duty, under the Vanliner Policy, to defend the Hogans and/or Harris in the underlying tort lawsuit and to pay any judgment which Thomas might secure therein against them; and (3) that Harris is liable, as a matter of law, to Thomas for any damages which might be proven by Thomas in the underlying tort lawsuit.
After first contending there were material facts in dispute, Harris and Vanliner subsequently agreed with CIC and Thomas that there were not and filed their Motions for Summary Judgment. In their motions, Harris and Vanliner say that, based on the undisputed facts, the Court should declare, as a matter of law, (1) that Vanliner has no duty, under the Vanliner Policy, to defend Hogans and Harris in the underlying tort lawsuit nor to pay any judgment which may be secured by Thomas therein against them; (2) that CIC has the duty, under the CIC Policy, to defend Hogans and Harris in the underlying tort lawsuit and to pay any judgment which may be secured by Thomas therein against them; and/or (3) that, in the alternative, both CIC and Vanliner, by reason of their respective policies, have the duty to defend the Hogans and Harris in the underlying tort lawsuit and to pay, pro-rata, any judgment which may be secured by Thomas therein against them.
The parties have agreed what constitutes the material facts in this case and have stipulated to them.
1. When examining a motion for summary judgment, the Court first looks to the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), which provides:
... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
It is also appropriate for the Court to consider its Local Rule C-10(b) and (c) which provides:
The Court's function at the summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine "whether the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Langley v. Allstate Insurance Co., 995 F.2d 841, 844 (8th Cir.1993). "To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party need only show sufficient evidence that supports a material factual dispute that would require resolution by a trier of fact." Id.
Id. at 844, quoting from Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). (Emphasis in original).
Where the party against whom summary judgment is sought has the ultimate burden of proof, the party seeking summary judgment can show his entitlement to summary judgment by "`showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After a movant does this, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the non-moving party fails to do this, then the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.
In evaluating evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the question is "whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.
2. All of the parties to this action have submitted with their respective Motions for Summary Judgment an Agreed Statement of Material Uncontested Facts in accordance with Rule C-10 of the Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas. The parties have agreed that this Agreed Statement supersedes and replaces each statement of material uncontested facts previously submitted by any party. Accordingly, the Court accepts the Agreed Statement of Material Uncontested Facts, which are as follows:
(a) Connecticut Indemnity Co. ("CIC") is a corporation authorized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut for the purpose of providing insurance to members of the general public. Its principal place of business is in Farmington, Connecticut. Defendant Harris Transport Company ("Harris") is a corporation authorized and existing under the laws of the State of North Carolina. Its principal place of business is in Monroe, North Carolina. Defendant Vanliner Insurance Company ("Vanliner") is a corporation authorized and existing under the laws of the State of Arizona for the purpose of providing insurance coverage to members of the general public. Its principal place of business is in Fenton, Missouri. Defendants Mitchell Hogan and Ralph C. Hogan are individual citizens and residents of the State of Louisiana. Defendant Dorothy Ella "Dot" Thomas is the duly appointed personal representative of the estate of Kenneth Thomas, having been so appointed by the Probate Court of Polk County, Arkansas. She is a citizen and resident of Polk County, Arkansas, as was Kenneth Thomas at the time of his death.
(b) Prior to the time of the occurrence herein described, CIC issued and delivered to Mitchell Hogan a certificate of non-trucking automobile liability insurance (Tab 1) under its commercial lines insurance policy ...
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