Connecticut Indem. Co. v. DeGalleford

• Decision Date: 02 August 1971
• Citation: 470 S.W.2d 5,225 Tenn. 406,3 Pack 406
• Parties: , 225 Tenn. 406 The CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. John D. DeGALLEFORD, Jr., Respondent.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 5

470 S.W.2d 5

3 Pack 406, 225 Tenn. 406

The CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. John D. DeGALLEFORD, Jr., Respondent.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Aug. 2, 1971.

Bishop, Thomas, Leitner, Mann & Milburn, Chattanooga, for petitioner.

Brown & Walker, Chattanooga, for respondent.

OPINION

DYER, Chief Justice.

This case comes to this Court by grant of writ of certiorari directed to the Court of Appeals. In this opinion the Connecticut Indemnity Company will be referred to as the insuror, and John D. DeGalleford, Jr., as the insured.

On January 22, 1968, the insuror issued its policy to insured, insuring on the basis of actual cash value, a 1967 Chevrolet and a 1962 Volkswagen against loss by theft. The policy period was for six months with the right of renewal by payment of renewal premiums. Prior to the expiration of the policy period the insuror would mail insured a notice of renewal premium due, which notice described the vehicle covered and the amount and type of insurance. Upon payment of the renewal premium, this notice became a part of the policy of insurance. The first policy period ended on July 1, 1968, and insuror mailed a notice of renewal, which descirbed the vehicles insured as a 1967 Chevrolet and a 1962 Volkswagen. Insured paid this renewal premium. Prior to the expiration of the second policy period the insuror mailed to insured its renewal notice again, describing the vehicles insured as a 1967 Chevrolet and a 1962 Volkswagen. Insured paid this renewal premium.

In October, 1968, during the second policy period, insured sold the 1967 Chevrolet and replaced it with a 1964 Chevrolet. Neither the insuror nor its agent were notified of this change. On April 2, 1969, during the third policy period, the 1964 Chevrolet was stolen. Insuror denied coverage, resulting in this suit by insured. The theory upon which the suit was filed and tried was that this 1964 Chevrolet was an 'owned automobile' within the meaning of the policy in that it 'replaced an owned automobile' as defined in the policy. The pertinent provisions of the policy are as follows:

'Owned Automobile' means

(a) a private passenger, farm or utility automobile described in this policy for which a specific premium charge indicates that coverage is afforded,

(c) a private passenger, farm or utility automobile ownership of which is acquired by the named insured during the policy period, provided

(1) it replaces an owned automobile as defined in (a) above, or

(2) the company insures all private passenger, farm and utility automobiles owned by the named insured on the date of such acquisition and the named insured notifies the company during the policy period or within 30 days after the date of such acquisition of his election to make this and no other policy issued by the company applicable to such automobile, or

The chancellor found, as insured contended, this 1964 Chevrolet was an 'owned automobile' under the terms of the policy in that it replaced an 'owned automobile.' and coverage was afforded. On this holding the Court of Appeals reversed the chancellor.

On this issue the insuror contended that in order to constitute an 'owned automobile' under the terms of the policy, insured was required to notify the insuror of the purchase of the 1964 Chevrolet, replacing the 1967 Chevrolet, within thirty days, or at least within the policy period. Without such notice there was no coverage.

It is admitted the stolen 1964 Chevrolet was not a vehicle described in the policy, or any renewal thereof, and that insured had obtained title thereto during the policy period prior to the period in which the loss occurred. Coverage is then determined by the construction to be placed on subsection (c), copied above. There is no ambiguity in the language of this sub-section. As applied to the facts of this case it clearly states that for this 1964 Chevrolet to become an 'owned automobile,' for which coverage would be afforded, without said vehicle being described in the policy, insured would have to acquire ownership during the policy period.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the chancellor was in error in holding the policy afforded coverage to this 1964 Chevrolet.

The Court of Appeals then reached the same conclusion as the chancellor by reforming the contract on the ground there had been a mutual mistake of fact. The insuror assigns error to this action of the Court of Appeals on the ground reformation was not an issue in the trial court and the bill contained no specific prayer for such relief.

The rule is well settled in this state that under a prayer for general relief the court may grant any other and different relief from that specifically indicated and prayed for which is justified by the pleadings and the proof. Tennessee Ice Co. v. Raine, 107 Tenn. 151, 64 S.W. 29 (1901); Holston National Bank v. Wood, 125 Tenn. 6, 140 S.W. 31 (1911); Rhodes v. Johnson, 32 Tenn.App. 127, 222 S.W.2d 38 (1949); Haralson v. Jones, 33 Tenn.App. 572, 232 S.W.2d 415 (1950); Montgomery v. Nicely, 42 Tenn.App. 223, 301 S.W.2d 379 (1956). The issue here then is whether under the pleadings and proof the Court of Appeals was justified in reforming this contract.

In the early case of Dodd v. Benthal, 51 Tenn. 601 (1871), on this issue the Court said:

While the rules of pleading in a court of equity are more flexible and liberal than in a court of law, yet it is generally true that a court of equity can grant no relief unless such relief be within the purview and spirit of the equities set forth in the bill. But a court of equity regards not mere forms, but looks to the substance of things; and if the facts appear upon the face of the bill, that entile the party to a specific relief, the court will grant such relief, although the forms of speech adopted in the bill be not technically the most appropriate, and although the form of...