Connecticut Junior Republic Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Litchfield

Decision Date27 July 1934
Citation174 A. 304,119 Conn. 106
PartiesCONNECTICUT JUNIOR REPUBLIC ASS'N, Inc., v. TOWN OF LITCHFIELD.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Case Reserved from Superior Court, Litchfield County; John Richards Booth, Judge.

Appeal by the Connecticut Junior Republic Association, Inc., from the refusal of the board of relief of the Town of Litchfield to exempt appellant's land, buildings, and personal property from taxation. Reserved for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors.

Questions reserved answered in the affirmative.

George H. Day and Lillian L. Malley, both of Hartford, for plaintiff.

James E. McKnight, of Waterbury, for defendant.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

HINMAN, Judge.

The questions upon which advice is desired are: (a) Whether the plaintiff is a Connecticut corporation organized exclusively for educational or charitable purposes or both: and (b) whether the real property described in the agreed statement of fact is the real property of the plaintiff, within the meaning of subsection 7 of section 1163 of the General Statutes: also (c) whether the real and personal property upon which the assessment was levied from which this appeal is taken is exempt from taxation by the defendant town under the provisions of subsection 7.

The relevant provision of the statute under which the plaintiff claims exemption from taxation reads as follows: " Sec 1163. Exemptions . The following-described property shall be exempt from taxation: *** (7) *** The real property of, or held in trust for, a Connecticut corporation organized exclusively for scientific, educational, literary, historical or charitable purposes or for two or more such purposes and used exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes and the personal property of, or held in trust for any such corporation, provided (a) any officer, member or employee thereof does not receive or at any future time shall not receive any pecuniary profit from the operations thereof, except reasonable compensation for services in effecting one or more of such purposes or as proper beneficiary of its strictly charitable purposes. ***"

It is conceded that the plaintiff is conducting an educational institution. In some aspects it might also be regarded as exhibiting characteristics of a charitable enterprise. St. Bridget Convent Corporation v. Milford, 87 Conn. 474, 88 A. 881; Stoughton v. Hartford, 85 Conn. 674, 678, 84 A. 95. The contentions in justification of refusal to accord it exemption from taxation are: First, that the uses to which the property is devoted are not public in the sense contemplated in order to entitle it to exemption; second, that the real estate is not " the real property of *** a Connecticut corporation," within the meaning of the statute.

As to the first, it has been settled in the several cases in which the statute and its predecessors have been under consideration that, in order to entitle property such as that of the appellant to exemption from taxation, it must be shown that it is sequestered from private, and devoted to public, use. In order to satisfy this prerequisite, it must appear that the property is so held as to be dedicated to public, instead of to private, advantage or gain, and that it is devoted to the public use. Brunswick School v. Greenwich, 88 Conn. 241, 90 A. 801;Pomfret School v. Pomfret, 105 Conn. 456, 459, 136 A. 88; Female Academy v. Darien, 108 Conn. 136, 142 A. 678; Canterbury School, Inc., v. New Milford, 111 Conn. 203, 149 A. 685; Stamford Jewish Center, Inc., v. Stamford, 117 Conn. 379, 385, 168 A. 5; Masonic Building Ass'n v. Stamford (Conn.) 174 A. 301. One of the attributes essential to such dedication to public use-that no individual can derive any profit from the property or its use, recognized in Brunswick School v. Greenwich, supra, page 244 of 88 Conn., 90 A. 801-has since been accorded legislative expression in what is now proviso (a) of subsection 7, above quoted. Pomfret School v. Pomfret, supra, page 462 of 105 Conn., 136 A. 88. This condition is satisfied by the provision in the plaintiff's amended articles of association (adopted in 1930), article II (c), that " no officer, member or employee thereof shall ever receive any pecuniary profit from the operations of said corporation except reasonable compensation for services in effecting its purposes," and by the agreed fact that no such pecuniary profit is received.

It is claimed by the defendant, however, that the institution conducted by the plaintiff, like the Brunswick and Pomfret Schools and the Female Academy involved in the cases pertaining to them (supra) is not a public institution but " a private school, calculated, manifestly, to interest only those who have the means and disposition to separate their children from the public schools." Brunswick School v. Greenwich, supra, page 243 of 88 Conn., 90 A. 801. Comparison of the facts significant of the nature of these other schools with those descriptive of the plaintiff's institution effectively disposes of the attempted analogy. The facts pertaining to those schools clearly show them to be designed and maintained for children of persons having the ample means required to pay generous compensation for luxurious living accommodations and the special facilities for instruction, recreation, and other characteristics of a select private school in the modern sense. On the other hand, the plaintiff's institution significantly accords " with the conception of public education and public benefit which is at the root of the exemption claimed-the performance, though by [a private corporation] of functions which otherwise would devolve upon the state or municipal government." Pomfret School v. Pomfret, supra, page 460 of 105 Conn., 136 A. 88, 89. It appears from the agreed statement that the general funds upon which the plaintiff depends for its operating expenses are derived from contributions from the general public and from community chests of sundry cities in Connecticut, income from invested endowment funds, payment toward the board of children from parents, charitable organizations, and public authorities, and a small amount from the sale of farm produce and miscellaneous items. The plaintiff receives in its institution boys between fourteen and eighteen years of age whose conduct and care present some special problem in the home, the school, or the community, and who are in need of guidance. It is nonsectarian in character, and its population includes all denominations. Preference is given to residents of Connecticut, and never more than four or five at a time come from other states. The number of children in its care is limited by its physical capacity to 100, and the average number during 1930 was 86. Approximately 40 per cent. come through the board of child welfare of the state of Connecticut or charitable child-placing agencies, because they lack homes or because of improper home conditions or improper guardianship; approximately 10 per cent. through juvenile courts without formal commitment; and the remainder through voluntary direct application of parents at the suggestion of school principals, child guidance clinics, and other agencies. They are drawn generally from underprivileged economic classes, and the training given them is with the purpose of making them useful citizens instead of public charges. While an attempt is made to secure agreement of the parent, some charitable organization, county commissioners, or others to pay $25 per month for the support of a child, less than that sum is paid for many, and there are always boys who are maintained out of the plaintiff's general funds without any reimbursement. The average annual per capita cost of the service rendered is approximately $600.

The plaintiff maintains a school in the sixth seventh, and eighth grades and a trade school in which instruction in certain trades is given in conjunction with appropriate academic subjects. The students do all the baking, cooking, and laundry, operate the farm, and in general do all of the work of the institution under staff guidance. Practical ...

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    ...Assessment, 102 N.J.L. 525, 133 A. 886; Beta XI Chapter v. New Orleans, 18 La.App. 130, 137 So. 204; Connecticut Junior Republic Ass'n v. Litchfield, 119 Conn. 106, 174 A. 304, 95 A.L.R. 56. 17 "The moneys and credits, including moneys loaned and invested, bonds and shares of stock * * * of......
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    ...similar to those of California have so held in factual situations akin to the instant case. In Connecticut Junior Republic Ass'n v. Litchfield (1934) 119 Conn. 106, 174 A. 304, 95 A.L.R. 56, 62, the deed conveyed property "in trust, ... as long as [the grantee] shall continue its existence ......
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