Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wood
| Decision Date | 21 December 1897 |
| Citation | 74 N.W. 656,115 Mich. 444 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | CONNECTICUT MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. WOOD ET AL. |
Appeal from circuit court, Wayne county, in chancery; William L Carpenter, Judge.
Petition by the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company against Eugene B. Wood and another to have certain tax sales set aside, and the deeds canceled. Decree for petitioner, and respondent Wood appeals. Affirmed.
Moore & Goff and John H. Goff (John D. Conely, of counsel), for petitioner.
Charles W. Nichols and A. A. Ellis, for respondent Wood.
Fred A Maynard, Atty. Gen. (Avery Bros. & Walsh, of counsel), for respondent auditor general.
In 1894, defendant Wood purchased the land involved here at the annual tax sales held in Wayne county, that year. He also at the same time purchased the same description of land from what is known as the those lands having been bid in by the state at the sale of 1893 and the bids still held by the state. The petitioner filed its petition on March 27, 1897, in the Wayne circuit court, in chancery, to have these sales set aside and the deeds canceled, alleging, among other things, that it was, and for several years prior thereto had been, interested in such premises, being the owner of one tract and mortgagee of the other; that the first is of the value of $5,000, and the other, $14,000. There are several grounds upon which it is asked to have the sale set aside, only one of which need be considered, as that is decisive of the case. Both these parcels of land were bid off to the state at the tax sales of 1893 for the taxes of 1891, and were so held by the state during the years 1893 and 1894, and at the time the lands were included in the petition made by the auditor general for the sales to be made in 1894 for the taxes of 1892.
Section 61 of the tax law of 1893, among other things, provides, "Lands hereafter bid off in the name of the state and thus held shall not be included in such petition;" referring to the petition of the auditor general for the sale of lands returned delinquent. The contention of counsel for petitioner here is that, these lands being held by the state under the bid of 1893, for the taxes of 1891, the auditor general had no authority under this statute to include them again in the petition for the sales in 1894 for the taxes of 1892. On the other hand, counsel for Mr. Wood admits that this might be a reasonable construction of the statute were it not for other provisions to which he calls attention. Section 68 provides: "All lands bid off for the state as provided in this section shall continue liable to be taxed in the same manner as if not held as belonging to the state, and all such taxes shall be a charge and lien upon such lands as in case of other tax lands, except as hereinafter provided." Section 70 provides: Section 80 provides: "In all cases where a description of land is offered as state or county tax land, and the same description or any part thereof shall be offered in the list of lands delinquent for taxes, as provided in this act, the county treasurer shall inform the person bidding for the same of that fact, and such person shall be required to purchase said description at the same time, and if he refuses so to do, the treasurer shall refuse his bid, and shall again offer it as if no bid had been made thereon." Section 85 provides: "Neither the sale of state tax lands, nor the sale of any of the bids of the state for which the time of redemption has not expired, shall in any wise prejudice the right to enforce the collection of any tax subsequent to the year or years for which the same has been sold as aforesaid; and for the taxes and charges remaining unpaid for said subsequent year or years the auditor general shall cause such lands to be offered in regular succession at the next ensuing annual sales for taxes, giving notice as required by law unless previously redeemed or otherwise discharged." The contention is that, reading these sections together, but one conclusion can be reached as to what the legislature intended, and that is that a resale may be made each year though the state holds the lands under former bids. We think this construction cannot be given the statute. The provisions of section 61 above quoted may be given force, and yet the other provisions referred to by counsel stand. What is meant by the language used in section 61 is that when lands have been bid off to the state, and are yet held by the state, such lands shall not again be sold for the delinquent taxes of succeeding years. Of course, it would follow that, while the state had assigned its bid, the lands would be again subject to sale, as it would be the duty of the purchaser of such bids to pay the taxes of succeeding years. The auditor general, under the provision of section 61, had no authority to include these lands in the petition for the sale for the year 1894, as at that time the state held them under the bid of 1893. The court below, by its decree, having reached the right result, that decree must be affirmed, with costs against defendant Wood, he alone having appealed.
GRANT, J., did not sit. The other justices concurred.
On Rehearing.
(March 29, 1898.)
After able arguments by several eminent counsel, several exhaustive briefs, and a careful examination by ourselves, we again reach the same conclusion stated in the former opinion.
1. Counsel for the defendants now seek to sustain their position by applying a restricted meaning to the word "lands" in the statute. They insist that it does not mean the lands and the title thereto, but only such interest as the state has acquired by former sales, and that only that interest is excluded from the petition. This contention cannot be maintained. The term has a well-defined meaning. There may be cases where, in instruments or in laws, other language may be used, showing that a term is used in a restrictive sense. We, however, find no language in this statute which can be construed into a restriction of a well-understood term "lands." "In law, 'land' signifies any ground forming part of the earth's surface which can be held as individual property, whether soil or rock, or water covered, and everything annexed to it, whether by nature, as trees, water, etc., or by the hand of man, as buildings, fences," etc. Cent. Dict. & Enc. When the lien given by the statute is foreclosed by the court in chancery, the evident purpose is to convey to the state or to the private purchaser the absolute title in fee, a title which completely destroys the original one. It is of no significance that the state does not bid in the lands for speculative purposes, or that it acquires no possessory rights therein, or that it remains liable to taxation for successive years. When the lien is foreclosed, the land sold, and the time of redemption expired, the state or the private purchaser owns the complete title in the land, or it owns nothing. The law may preserve the lien in case the title is held void, but that does not affect the title of the quantity conveyed, which is the entire or nothing.
2. Section 61 provides for the contents of the petition, which must have annexed thereto lists or schedules containing "a description of all lands in such county upon which taxes have remained unpaid for more than one year prior to the first day of May, 1893, or the first day of May in the year the petition is filed," etc. Then follows an express prohibition as to lands "hereafter bid off in the name of the state, and thus held." It is conceded that this language standing by itself can have but one meaning, and that it should control but for other provisions of the statute which are incompatible with it. Usually, when negative words are used in a statute, it becomes imperative and mandatory. There is no room in such case to hold that the language is directory simply. Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass. 230; Stayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144; Koch v. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247; Sibley v. Johnson, 1 Mich. 380. Can this express language, prescribing what shall not be included in the petition, be set aside and held meaningless, from the fact that there are other provisions following it in the statute which seem to contemplate that the petition might also include things which are thus excluded? We think not. These incompatible provisions appear to have been taken bodily from previous statutes. Considering the frequent and continuous changes made by the legislature in the tax laws, the haste of legislation, and the inexperience of many upon the subject, it is not surprising that many incongruities creep in. This court has frequently had to deal with such legislation, which oftentimes presents difficult questions. It was said by Mr. Justice Campbell in Attorney General v. City of Detroit, 71 Mich. 97, 38 N.W. 717: "The frequent and careless revision and re-enactment of charters for Detroit has led to a good deal of confusion." Treating the question from the statute alone, we are compelled to hold that the incompatible sections quoted in our former opinion do not destroy the clear and unequivocal provision of section 61. In addition to the section cited in the former opinion, section 127 of the tax law of 1893 is also cited, as being incompatible with the provisions of section...
To continue reading
Request your trial