Connecticut Sav. Bank v. Heghmann

• Citation: 193 Conn. 157,474 A.2d 790
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 15 May 1984
• Parties: CONNECTICUT SAVINGS BANK v. R.A. HEGHMANN et al.

Page 790

474 A.2d 790

193 Conn. 157

CONNECTICUT SAVINGS BANK v. R.A. HEGHMANN et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 2, 1984.

Decided May 15, 1984.

Robert A. Heghmann, pro se.

Richard B. Cramer, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA and GRILLO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The sequence of events relevant to a consideration of the issue presented in this appeal is as follows: On May 12, 1981, the plaintiff, Connecticut Savings Bank, commenced a foreclosure action against the defendants, Robert A. Heghmann and Beatrice M. Heghmann, who allegedly defaulted on the payment terms of a mortgage note and deed executed in October, 1976. On May 28, 1982, the trial court, Belinkie, J., rendered an interlocutory summary judgment against both defendants. ¹ The court, relying on the plaintiff's affidavit and other documentary proof and on the defendants' opposing affidavit, concluded that no genuine issue existed. On July 16, 1982, the court, Jacobson, J., rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale. On August 3, 1982, the defendants took an appeal to this court from this judgment, the granting of the summary judgment, and the severing of the defendants' counterclaims. This appeal was dismissed on February 16, 1983, since the defendants had failed to file their brief.

On December 6, 1982, the judgment of July 16 was opened for the purpose of setting a new sale date, April 2, 1983, the previous sale date having passed. ² The defendants did not appeal from the judgment of December 6, 1982, but on March 7, 1983 moved to open the final judgment rendered on December 6, 1982. This motion was denied on March 18, 1983.

The defendants now appeal from the denial of the motion to open the judgment of December 6, 1982, "and the prior decisions granting summary judgments and severing." The crux of the defendants' appeal pertains to the summary judgment upon which the final judgment of December 6, 1982 was predicated. They argue that a review of the affidavits illustrates that the rendering of summary judgment was improper. They maintain that the pleadings and the defendants' affidavit make it "abundantly clear" that the defendants tendered payment, that they were entitled to a jury trial on the issues, and that they were denied due process of law.

The question presented reduces itself to a consideration of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to open the judgment of December 6, 1982. Freccia v. Martin, 163 Conn. 160, 165, 302 A.2d 280 (1972). We find no such abuse.

It is beyond cavil that the sine qua non of the judgment of December 6, 1982, establishing a new date for the sale of the premises, was the July 16, 1982 judgment of foreclosure which was based upon the interlocutory summary judgment rendered on May 28, 1982. The defendants insist that the trial court abused its discretion "in not setting aside the summary judgment and the final judgment predicated upon it." A...