Connecticut State Emp. Ass'n v. Board of Trustees of University of Connecticut

• Decision Date: 15 January 1974
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CONNECTICUT STATE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION et al. v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT et al.

Page 36

345 A.2d 36

165 Conn. 757

CONNECTICUT STATE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION et al. v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Jan. 15, 1974.

John G. Hill, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., for appellants (defendants).

Jack Rubin, Hartford, with whom was Barry Scheinberg, Hartford, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

MacDONALD, Associate Justice.

The primary question presented by this appeal is whether the State Personnel Act, chapter 67 of the General Statutes, precludes the board of trustees of the University of Connecticut from entering into a contract with an independent food management contractor, thereby subjecting the 240 classified state employees presently employed in food service operations at the University of Connecticut to the elimination of their positions.

The plaintiffs, the Connecticut State Employees Association (hereafter the CSEA), Chapter 20 of the CSEA, a chartered affiliate of the above-named association consisting exclusively of state employees at the University of Connecticut (hereafter the university), and a group of individual food service employees at the university, brought an action in the Superior Court seeking to enjoin the named defendant and various other state officials from entering into a contract with the Saga Administrative Corporation (hereafter Sage) for the provision of food dispensing service at the university and from dismissing the individual plaintiffs and those similarly situated, claiming that the proposed agreement violated the state civil service law. The court determined the issues for the plaintiffs and issued temporary and permanent injunctions restraining the defendants from taking such action. The defendants have appealed to this court from the judgment rendered.

The defendants have assigned as error (1) the conclusion of the court 'that a permanent injunction should issue on the facts found and/or on the evidence,' (2) the court's determination that the plaintiffs met their burden of proof to establish the facts of their complaint, in particular the third count of their complaint, ¹ (3) the court's conclusion that a contract for food service by the state is not permissible where the agency retains control over the selection of employees as it did in the proposed contract, (4) the court's failure to rule on the defendants' plea in abatement as to the propriety of the CSEA and Chapter 20 as parties plaintiff, and (5) the court's finding that the proposed contract was not a legal way for the university to contract out its food dispensing service without contravening the merit system.

The court found the following relevant facts, none of which is disputed on this appeal: The food dispensing operation at the university, a state institution, has been and is being served presently by approximately 240 state employees, including all of the individual plaintiffs, who are serving the state under the classified service pursuant to the State Personnel Act. These employees have been so employed for varying lengths of time, ranging from one month, to thirty-two years, and all have accrued rights of various kinds resulting from their positions under the state classified service system. The university has provided food service to its student body at least since 1937. On December 15, 1972, however, the board of trustees, by a vote of seven to four, voted to contract out its food dispensing services with Saga. Simultaneously with the signing of the agreement the university intended to give to all the state employees a two-week notice dismissing or laying them off from their positions in the state classified service. In reaching its decision to enter into such a contract the university was carrying out the recommendations of the so-called Etherington Report, the 1971 Report of the Governor's Commission on Services and Expenditures.

The number of students presently availing themselves of the food services involved here is approximately 4500, out of a total student body of approximately 13,000. All of the funds for the operation of the food services come from money collected from the students, there being no state subsidy therefor. The university also has facilities for serving food in a number of dormatories and approximately 3700 students avail themselves of these services. The students themselves operate the food services in the dormitories without any control or regulation as to price, personnel, quality of food or manner of service.

The trial court also made numerous undisputed findings concerning the terms of the proposed contract. To summarize these findings, the contract. To summarize contractor to provide food service at the university, but the university retained extensive controls over its operations, including the right to review menus, provide specifications for food, and to approve the credentials and qualifications of management personnel. In the contract Saga agreed to offer employment on a fair trial basis to present state employees.

The defendants' primary assertion is that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof to establish the facts alleged in their complaint. The gist of this contention is that the plaintiffs had the burden of showing the truth of their allegations, that the proposed action of the board was decided upon in bad faith and 'has as its basic purpose the dismissal of the Plaintiffs as State employees and the deprivation of their accrued benefits and existing rights as State employees, in violation of the spirit, purpose and intent of the provisions of Title 5 of the General Statutes' and that they failed to do so. An examination of the State Personnel Act and the statutes relating to the board of trustees convinces us of the merit of this position and we find it dispositive of this appeal.

Section 10-119 of the General Statutes provides that '(t)he board of trustees of The University of Connecticut shall make rules for the government of the university and shall determine the general policies of the university, including those concerning the admission of students and the establishment of schools, colleges, divisions and departments, and shall direct the expenditure of the university's funds within the amounts available.'

The statute is clearly written in the broadest possible terms, evincing an obvious legislative intent to clothe the board of trustees with sole jurisdiction over the university in all phases. Section 10-119 grants the board the authority to make rules for the 'government' of the university, power to determine the general 'policies' thereof, and to 'direct' the expenditure of the university's funds. Section 1-1 of the General Statutes provides that '(i) n the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language.' State v. Benson, 153 Conn. 209, 214, 214 A.2d 903. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines 'government' as 'the act or process of governing: authoritative direction or control.' 'Policy' is defined as 'a definite course or method of action selected (as by a government, . . .) from among alternatives . . ..' 'Direct' is a synonym of 'administer' and is definied to mean 'to guide and supervise: to carry out the organizing, energizing, and supervising of, esp(ecially) in an authoritative capacity.'

In applying the foregoing definitions to the statute, it becomes evident that the intent of the legislature was to grant to the board the authority to exercise complete direction and restraint over the actions of those connected with the university, including the teaching staff, employees and students. The course of conduct to be followed by all those connected with the university, including those involved in the operation of the food service system, must be as prescribed and set out by the board. Equally clearly, the board has the authority to make 'policy' decisions regarding the status of that food service system. The plaintiffs themselves concede that the board could legally cease all operation of its food service program. They maintain, however, that as long as the university is supplying, directly or indirectly, food to its students, it must render that service with state personnel under the classified system. They are, essentially arguing that, however broad the statutory powers of the board of trustees, they cannot supersede or contravene the requirements of the State Personnel Act. We do not need to decide that precise question in that we find that the prosposed action of the board is not inconsistent with the State Personnel Act.

The plaintiffs place great reliance on § 5-197 of the General Statutes, which states that '(a)ny office or position in the state service, whether full-time or part-time, shall be a position in the classified service, except as hereinafter set forth in this chapter or otherwise specified by statute.' The plaintiffs apparently read this to mean that all services rendered by the...