Connecticut v. Spellings

Citation453 F.Supp.2d 459
Decision Date27 September 2006
Docket NumberNo. 3:05CV1330(MRK).,3:05CV1330(MRK).
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesState of CONNECTICUT, et al, Plaintiffs, v. Margaret SPELLINGS, Secretary of Education, Defendant.

Clare E. Kindall, Ralph E. Urban, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiffs.

Elizabeth Goitein, Washington, DC, John B. Hughes, U.S. Attorney's Office, New Haven, CT, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

KRAVITZ, District Judge.

This case arises from a dispute between the State of Connecticut and the U.S. Secretary of Education over each other's obligations under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub.L. 107-110, codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (the "Act"). Although the State and the Secretary have fundamental, important, and bona fide disagreements about the interpretation and implementation of the Act, they are united in affirming its basic goal of seeking to improve the education of our Nation's children. Indeed, the State expressly disclaims any intent to challenge the Act itself. Moreover, the State is currently in compliance with the Secretary's interpretation of the State's obligations under the Act.

In this case, the State challenges the Secretary's interpretation of several key elements of the Act. In particular, the State asks the Court to clarify the meaning of the so-called "Unfunded Mandates Provision" of the Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a), and to declare that the Secretary's interpretation of that provision is contrary to its plain language and Congress's intent in enacting it. In addition, the State seeks a ruling that the Secretary's implementation of the Act violates both the Spending Clause of the United States Constitution and the Tenth Amendment. Finally, the State alleges that the Secretary violated the Administrative Procedures Act (the "APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, by denying the State's requests for waivers from the Act's requirements and also by denying certain plan amendments submitted by the State.

On the merits, the Secretary disputes the State's interpretation of the Unfunded Mandates Provision and asserts that all of her actions are in accordance with the express terms of the Act. However, the Secretary also raises a number of threshold concerns, including whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this pre-enforcement challenge to the Secretary's interpretation of the Act, whether the State lacks standing to assert its claims, whether the claims themselves are even ripe, and finally, whether the Secretary's denials of the State's waiver requests are decisions "committed to the agency" and thus not subject to judicial review under the APA. For these reasons, the Secretary filed a Motion to Dismiss [doc. # 18] asserting under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the State's claims; the Secretary also argues under Rule 12(b)(6) that the State has failed to state an adequate legal claim. Both parties have submitted truly superb briefing and argument on the difficult issues presented by this case. The Court is most grateful to counsel for their professionalism and skill in presenting their positions to the Court.

In this ruling, the Court addresses only the threshold issues relating to its jurisdiction and authority to consider the various claims raised by the State, since the Court concludes that any consideration of the merits of either party's statutory arguments would require further development of the record. Thus, nothing in this ruling should be read as indicating the Court's views about the merit (or lack of merit) in the State's or the Secretary's underlying arguments about the scope and interpretation of the substantive provisions of the Act. Instead, this decision is all about whether, how, and when the State may present its underlying arguments about the Act to a court.

The "whether, how, and when" are nonetheless critical questions for several reasons. For one, the lower federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the scope of that jurisdiction is determined by Congress. As the Supreme Court famously remarked in Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850), "[c]ourts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers." For another, the Constitution establishes certain rules regarding who can assert claims and when claims can be asserted in order to ensure that courts are not called upon to resolve abstract questions or provide advisory opinions but instead confine themselves to deciding concrete cases or controversies involving par ties who are actually threatened with a real injury that a court decision is likely to remedy. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). For over a year now, the political branches of the State and the federal Government have sparred over their competing interpretations of the Act and its implications for Connecticut. While both parties have engaged in substantial negotiation, posturing and even legal briefing, there has been significantly less concrete action. Finally, courts have wisely developed important prudential rules to ensure that they exercise restraint and do not unnecessarily inject themselves into disputes committed to the other branches of Government or before the time at which judicial action is required.

Each of the foregoing restrictions on judicial authority is "founded in concern about the proper — and properly limited role — of the courts in a democratic society." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). As explained in more detail below, after careful thought and consideration, the Court has decided that it lacks jurisdiction over most of the State's claims, though one claim will remain pending after this ruling.

I.

The procedural history of this case is as follows. On August 22, 2005, the State filed a three-count Complaint [doc. # 1] against the Secretary regarding the Secretary's interpretation and implementation of the Act. The Secretary moved to dismiss the Complaint on December 22, 2005, asserting lack of jurisdiction and other grounds. See Motion to Dismiss [doc. # 18]. Following briefing, the Court heard over four hour of oral argument on the Secretary's Motion to Dismiss on January 31, 2006. Underscoring the importance of this case to the State, the Connecticut Attorney General personally argued the motion. At argument, the parties agreed that the State should have an opportunity to amend its Complaint to respond to several concerns expressed by the Secretary and the Court. The parties and the Court also agreed that the Secretary's Motion to Dismiss would apply to any amended complaint filed by the State. See Order [doc. # 36] ("Secretary Spellings' Motion to Dismiss [doe. # 18] will be deemed to apply to any amended complaint the State may file."). The State filed an Amended Complaint [doc. # 43] on February 28, 2006. Another round of briefing ensued, with additional oral argument by way of an on-the-record telephonic conference on April 28, 2006. See Defendant's Memorandum Regarding Amended Complaint [doc. # 50]; Minute Entry [doc. # 59]; State's Supplemental Brief on Matters Raised During the April 28, 2006 Oral Argument [doc. # 64]; Defendant's Memorandum Regarding Issues Raised at April 28, 2006 Conference [doc. # 65].

During the April 28, 2006 supplementary oral argument, and in response to allegations in the State's Amended Complaint, the Secretary offered an interpretation of a key provision of the Act that prompted the State to request leave to amend its Complaint for a second time, in order to add a fourth count under the APA relating to the Secretary's rejection of the State's plan amendments. After briefing on the propriety of further amendment, the Court granted the State's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint [doc. # 72]. See Ruling and Order [doc. # 80]. The State filed its Second Amended Complaint [doc. # 81] on August 1, 2006, and the Secretary responded with Defendant's Memorandum Regarding the State's Second Amended Complaint [doc. # 83] on August 11, 2006. In accordance with the Court's prior rulings, the Secretary's Motion to Dismiss applies to the State's Second Amended Complaint, which for convenience will be referred to in this ruling as the "Complaint."

While the Secretary's Motion to Dismiss was pending, the Court also received from interested non-parties a number of requests to participate in the proceedings. See Motion to Intervene [doc. # 33] on behalf of the Connecticut State Conference of the NAACP and Individual Minority Parents and Students ("NAACP Motion"); Letter Motion for Leave to Answer Amended Complaint by Connecticut State Conference of the NAACP and Individual Minority Parents and Students in CT [doc. # 54]; Motion of the National Educational Association and Connecticut Educational Association for Leave to File Amicus Brief in Support of the State of Connecticut [doc. # 58]; Motion to Intervene by Bally and Olf Veldhuis [doc. # 62]; Amended Motion to Intervene by Bally and Olf Veldhuis [doc. # 63]; Motion for Joinder and to Counterclaim State of Connecticut by Bally and Olf Veldhuis [doc. # 71]. While reserving a final decision on the propriety of intervention, the Court granted permission for the NAACP to file a response to the State's Amended Complaint, see Intervenors' Memorandum in Response to Amended Complaint [doc. # 56], and also granted permission for and received an Amicus Brief from the National Educational Association and Connecticut Educational Association in Support from the State of Connecticut [doc. # 61]. In August the Court denied the motions to intervene without prejudice to their renewal once the Court had ruled on the challenges to its own subject matter jurisdiction. See Ruling...

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