Connell v. Commission Council of City of Baton Rouge

• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: OVERTON, J.
• Citation: Connell v. Commission Council of City of Baton Rouge, 153 La. 788, 96 So. 657 (La. 1922)
• Decision Date: 29 December 1922
• Docket Number: 25266
• Parties: CONNELL v. COMMISSION COUNCIL OF CITY OF BATON ROUGE et al

96 So. 657

153 La. 788

CONNELL v. COMMISSION COUNCIL OF CITY OF BATON ROUGE et al

No. 25266

Supreme Court of Louisiana

December 29, 1922

On Rehearing, April 30, 1923

Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. F. Brunot, Judge.

Suit by W. P. Connell against the Commission Council of the City of Baton Rouge and others. From a judgment dismissing the suit plaintiff appeals.

Reversed, exceptions overruled, and case remanded on rehearing.

Taylor & Porter, of Baton Rouge, for appellant.

H. P Breazeale and C. C. Bird, Jr., both of Baton Rouge, for appellees.

OPINION

OVERTON, J.

Plaintiff, an elector and taxpayer of the city of Baton Rouge, alleges that said city, in violation of its charter, and of the laws of this state, has, in the past, granted to the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company the right to use and occupy parts of Front and Natchez streets in that city, and partially to obstruct those streets with buildings for its own use, without first submitting the question of making those grants to the property taxpayers, at an election called for that purpose, as required by Act 79 of 1896. He further alleges that the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company has recently made application to the city of Baton Rouge for additional grants to use its streets, and especially for the right to lay and use additional railroad tracks and switches on Front, Natchez, and St. James streets, and for the right to entirely close Europe street, between St. James and Natchez streets, by building a freight depot entirely across Europe street, thereby closing it to the public. He then alleges the injury that will result, if the application of the railroad should be granted, and avers that the mayor and members of the commission council of the city have publicly committed themselves to the granting of said application, and have openly announced their intention of granting it without submitting the question to the property taxpayers of the city, as provided by law. He further alleges, in effect, that, in order to confer authority on the commission council to pass an ordinance granting the application, it is necessary that a majority of the property taxpayers, voting at an election called for that purpose, should approve the proposed grant, and then he prays that a writ of injunction issue prohibiting the commission council, and the members thereof, from passing an ordinance or resolution, or entering into a contract or agreement, conferring the right on the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company, or on any other corporation, to thus use and obstruct the streets of the city, until the council shall have obtained the consent of the taxpayers as aforesaid.

The court below issued a rule nisi on the application for the injunction. The defendant, on the day that it was ordered to show cause why the writ should not issue, filed an exception to the jurisdiction of the court to issue it and also exceptions of prematurity and of no cause of action. The lower court maintained the first two exceptions, and dismissed the suit, but did not pass on the third.

The exception to the jurisdiction, which was maintained, is based on the ground that courts are without jurisdiction to interfere with legislative action, and the exception of prematurity, which was also maintained, is based on the ground that, until the council has acted, the suit is premature. The two exceptions may be considered together.

The ruling of the trial judge, in our view, is correct. As a rule, subject to a few exceptions, the writ of injunction cannot be used to obstruct the ordinary functions of a municipal corporation. In the case of State ex rel. Behan v. Judges, 35 La.Ann. 1075, it was said:

"The general rule that courts cannot impede, by preliminary injunction, the usual functions of a municipal corporation rests on the most solid foundation, daily strengthened by judicial assistance, and is subject to very few exceptions, where, from the nature of the act to be performed, and of the consequent,...