Connell v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.

• Decision Date: 19 March 1901
• Docket Number: 112-1900
• Citation: 16 Pa.Super. 520
• Parties: Connell v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

16 Pa.Super. 520

Connell v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

No. 112-1900

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

March 19, 1901

Argued November 21, 1900 [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter]

Appeal by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Delaware Co.-1897, No. 103, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Owen Connell v. The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

Assumpsit on a policy of life insurance. Before Clayton, P. J.

At the trial it appeared that on June 9, 1894, Margaret Connell made a written application to the defendant company for insurance upon her life. The application mentioned Owen Connell, her husband, as beneficiary. The application also contained a warranty that the representations and answers made by the applicant were correct and true, and that any untrue answers rendered the policy null and void. In the answers the applicant stated that she had no disease of the kidneys. The application was not attached to the policy.

The policy contained the following provision: " This form of policy is issued upon an application which omits the warranty usually contained in applications, and the policy contains the entire agreement between the company and the insured and the holder and owner thereof."

The policy further contained this clause: " This policy is void if the insured before its date has been rejected for insurance by this or any other company, or has been attended by a physician for any serious disease or complaint; or has had before said date any pulmonary disease, or chronic bronchitis, or cancer or disease of the heart, liver or kidneys; or, if before said date any parent or brother or sister of insured have died of any pulmonary disease, or bronchitis or any scrofulous disease."

Dr. Stover, a witness called by the defendant, testified he had attended the insured in January, 1893, for Bright's disease, and that she had died from it in 1895. He was asked this question on cross-examination:

Mr. Schaffer:"

Q. Doctor, did you ever tell Margaret Connell what was the matter with her?"

Mr. Fronefield: " One moment." That is objected to as immaterial, and irrelevant.

The Court: I will receive it.

Mr. Fronefield: Will your honor give me an exception?

The Court: " Yes." Exception and bill sealed.

Mr. Schaffer:"

Q. Did you ever tell her what was the matter with her?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did she know that she had Bright's disease?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Did she know that she had any kidney disease to your knowledge?

A. Not to my knowledge. No, sir.

Q. About July __ "

The Court:"

Q. What had been her state of health previous to that; good or bad?

A. Previous to the kidney disease her condition was very good she was able to attend to her household business.

Q. It was pretty good before that?

A. To the best of my knowledge."

Mr. Schaffer:"

Q. What was her general condition of health in July, 1894?

A. She was not under my care at all then.

Q. She had recovered sufficiently at that time to have dispensed of your services?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Doctor, what was her appearance at that time or about that time?"

Mr. Fronefield: That is objected to, if the court please.

The Court: I think it can go in evidence. Exception and bill sealed.

" Q. Doctor, might a person have Bright's disease and not know it?"

Mr. Fronefield: " One minute."

The Court: I think your exception covers all that.

Mr. Fronefield: I want to be protected.

The Court: I will admit the question. Exception and bill sealed.

The Court: If the woman believed she was in good health and presented the general appearance of good health, it bears materially upon the question whether there was anything to induce the company to make an examination. It is the pinch of the case as I understood it under the act of assembly, the representation must be material to the issue.

When D. H. Kelly was on the stand he was asked these questions on cross-examination:

Mr. Schaffer:"

Q. Did you solicit and write this policy upon the life of Margaret Connell?

A. I did.

Q. What was her appearance at the time that this was written as indicating whether or not she was in good or bad health?"

Mr. Fronefield: One minute, that is objected to because it is immaterial and irrelevant.

The Court: I will receive it upon the good faith of the woman, that if she believed she was in good health and nothing to warn her that she was not, it may be a question upon the materiality of representation. Exception and bill sealed.

" A. Yes, sir; she appeared to me to be in very good health."

The court charged in part as follows:

Now the plaintiff alleges that the true meaning of the contract between the deceased and the insurance company was that the insured should make answers which she believed to be true, and which she had no reason to believe to be untrue, and that while it may be admitted that she had Bright's disease at the time that the policy issued, the allegation is that she did not know and could not have known it without being examined by some physician or some person giving her information upon that subject. Now the policy alleges, " This policy shall be void if the insured before its date has been rejected for insurance by this or any other company." Now, of course, if she had been rejected she would know it and if she said she did not it would be false and fatal to this policy.

[" Have you been attended by a physician for any serious disease or complaint?" Now they do not require that she shall inform them if she has had a physician for any complaint, but for any serious disease or complaint. Now this lady knew that she had a physician for the grippe. If you find that was not considered a serious complaint, it would not be fatal to the policy, because this policy being written by the defendant, it is to be construed strictly against the one that wrote it; they chose the language, she did not. The policy is prepared by skilful lawyers, and the construction to be put upon it by the court, where there is reason for doubt, is to be against the company and not in its favor.]

[" Had you before said date any pulmonary disease or chronic -- disease of the heart, liver or kidneys?" I consider that to mean that if she had any of these diseases and knew it, it was her duty to communicate it, or if she had any of these diseases and could have known it by any reasonable means; or if there was any reason for her to suspect that she had any of these diseases, I construe this policy to mean that then it was her duty to communicate it. That is the construction I put upon this policy, and according to the construction put upon such policies by the Supreme Court. It is to have a reasonable construction. Would it be reasonable if this lady had answered that " No" to a question that could not be known only by a post-mortem examination? Suppose she was born with tubercles undeveloped or virus in her blood, and it was found in twenty or thirty years that she had been born with it, and that it could only be discovered by a most critical examination by a most skilful physician. Suppose she had said she never had any symptoms of consumption, and at her death it was proved that she was born with undeveloped tubercles in her lungs, and that she had these tubercles in the state undeveloped at the time that the policy was issued, but that they were not noticeable, but that a post-mortem examination showed that the lungs were diseased, although nobody knew it, and nobody could know it without the knife of the dissector. I say that would be unreasonable, and therefore it is not the proper construction to put upon this contract.

I, therefore, construe this second clause of the conditions of this policy to mean that the insured at the time she made her answers believed them to be true, had no reason to doubt of their truthfulness, had nothing to put her upon inquiry upon the subject and that there was nothing that any ordinary person could notice that would indicate that she had any of these diseases.

That is the construction I put upon this clause. That it does not mean to absolutely warrant that the insured has none of these diseases, but it means that to her knowledge and belief she had no disease of any kind such as described here.

If, therefore, gentlemen of the jury, you come to the conclusion from the evidence that this woman did not know that she had any of these complaints, and had not any reasonable ground to suspect that she had, and that there was no external evidence of such disease and could only be disclosed by a critical examination, then I charge you that her answers to this second clause of the conditions were not material, because the company would in all probability not inquire any further, and would be willing from the appearance of the patient and believing that she should know whether she had them, make the policy; the materiality means something that would have induced the company to suspect, and whenever the company finds that the woman did not know herself and that she answers truly that she does not know of any complaints, then the probability is that they would go no further, and if there was anything to put them upon their guard, then it would be their duty to inquire further and the answers would be material.]

[" Now name the last physician who last attended life proposed and when and for what complaint." The answer is " No." And I say to you gentlemen that that " No" answer, it is nothing else. How can " No" answer this question? " Name the last physician who last attended the life proposed." " 'No,' I won't name him." " Now then there is your answer, go and find him out yourself." That would be one answer to it. " 'No,' I won't answer it." Then they...