Connelly v. Comm'r of Correction

• Decision Date: 09 October 2001
• Docket Number: 16281
• Citation: 780 A.2d 903
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WILLIAM A. CONNELLY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION16281 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

WILLIAM A. CONNELLY v COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

No. SC 16281

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued November 30, 2000

October 9, 2001

Counsel Gregory T. D'Auria, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellant (respondent).

William A. Connelly, pro se, the appellee (petitioner). Monte P. Radler, supervisory assistant public defender, and Gerard A. Smyth, chief public defender, filed a brief for the office of the chief public defender as amicus curiae.

McDonald, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Sullivan, Js.¹

Opinion

Palmer, J.

The primary issue raised by this appeal is whether an insanity ² acquittee who succeeds in having his acquittal vacated and, following a retrial, is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, is entitled, under General Statutes § 53a-38 (c), ³ to credit toward his prison sentence for the period that he was confined in a mental health facility pursuant to a commitment order issued as a result of his insanity acquittal in accordance with what is now General Statutes § 17a582. ⁴ We answer the question in the affirmative.

The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. On November 10, 1989, the petitioner, William A. Connelly, became involved in an altercation ⁵ that resulted in his arrest on kidnapping and assault charges. Following his arrest on November 10, 1989, the petitioner was confined at the Newington police department until November 13, 1989, at which time he was transferred to the custody of the respondent, the commissioner of correction (commissioner). The petitioner remained in the custody of the commissioner, in lieu of bail, until April 20, 1990. On that date, the petitioner, who had been charged with two counts of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 53a-94 ⁶ and two counts of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 53a-60, ⁷ was tried to the court, Dunn, J., and found not guilty by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect. See General Statutes § 53a-13. ⁸ The petitioner was transferred to Whiting Forensic Institute (Whiting) in Middletown for an examination pursuant to what is now § 17a-582 (a). On October 26, 1990, following the completion of that examination, the petitioner was committed by the court, Holzberg, J., to the custody of the commissioner of mental health for a period of ten years, subject to periodic review by the psychiatric security review board. Judge Holzberg directed that the petitioner be confined at Whiting. See General Statutes § 17a-599. ⁹

In 1993, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to have the habeas court vacate the trial court's judgment of acquittal by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect. On August 16, 1994, the habeas court, Higgins, J., granted the petition on the ground that the record did not affirmatively establish that the petitioner had been advised of his right to a jury trial. The habeas court vacated the trial court's judgment of acquittal by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect and issued a writ of habeas corpus. On September 9, 1994, the petitioner was transferred from Whiting to the custody of the commissioner. In January, 1995, the petitioner was retried by a jury before Scheinblum, J., on the same charges of which he previously had been acquitted by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect, namely two counts each of kidnapping in the second degree and assault in the second degree. On January 26, 1995, the petitioner was found guilty on all counts, and, on March 3, 1995, the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of forty years imprisonment. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Appellate Court. State v. Connelly, 46 Conn. App. 486, 513, 700 A.2d 694 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 907, 713 A.2d 829, and cert. denied, 244 Conn. 908, 713 A.2d 829, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 907, 119 S. Ct. 245, 142 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998).

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he claimed, inter alia, that the commissioner improperly had refused to grant him credit toward his forty year sentence for the period of time from April 20, 1990, to September 9, 1994, during which he was confined at Whiting pursuant to the first trial court's order of commitment following his insanity acquittal. In particular, the petitioner claimed that he was entitled to such credit under § 53a-38 (c), which provides that, when a sentence has been vacated and a new sentence has been imposed for the same offense or for an offense based on the same act, the time served under the vacated sentence shall be credited against the new sentence. The petitioner further claimed that the commissioner improperly denied him good time credit under General Statutes § 18-7a (c) ¹⁰ for the time that he was confined at Whiting. Finally, the petitioner asserted that the commissioner improperly had refused to grant him presentence confinement credit under General Statutes § 18-98d (a) ¹¹ for the three days that he was incarcerated at the Newington police department immediately following his arrest.

The habeas court, Hon. Thomas H. Corrigan, judge trial referee, agreed with the petitioner's claims and ordered the commissioner to credit the petitioner's sentence for all of the time to which he claimed he was entitled under §§ 53a-38 (c), 18-7a (c) and 18-98d (a). ¹² The commissioner appealed from the judgment of the habeas court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

On appeal, the commissioner claims that the habeas court erroneously concluded that the petitioner was entitled to time credited toward his forty year sentence. We conclude that the petitioner is entitled to credit toward his sentence for the time that he was confined at Whiting and, in addition, that he is eligible for consideration by the commissioner as to whether he is entitled to statutory good time credit in connection with his confinement there. We also conclude, however, that the petitioner is not entitled to presentence confinement credit toward his sentence for the three days that he was confined at the Newington police department following his arrest. ¹³

The petitioner's claims raise issues of statutory construction, over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 26, 717 A.2d 77 (1998). Our resolution of those claims is governed by well established principles. ''[I]t is axiomatic that the process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. . . . In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ledbetter, 240 Conn. 317, 327±n28, 692 A.2d 713 (1997). Guided by these principles, we turn, first, to the issue of whether the petitioner is entitled to credit, under § 53a-38 (c), for the time that he was confined at Whiting following his insanity acquittal.

As with all issues of statutory construction, we begin with the pertinent statutory language. General Statutes § 53a-38 (c) provides: ''When a sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on a person is vacated and a new sentence is imposed on such person for the same offense or for an offense based on the same act, the new sentence shall be calculated as if it had commenced at the time the vacated sentence commenced, and all time served under or credited against the vacated sentence shall be credited against the new sentence.'' Under its plain terms, § 53a-38 (c) applies to a vacated sentence of imprisonment; it contains no mention of a commitment order issued in connection with a vacated insanity acquittal. Although there is no dispute that both of the petitioner's trials involved the same conduct and the same charges, the commitment order issued by Judge Holzberg as a result of the petitioner's insanity acquittal is not a ''sentence.'' Indeed, we consistently have noted the ''fundamental distinction between . . . incarceration pursuant to a criminal sentence and . . . commitment following an insanity acquittal''; Copeland v. Warden, 225 Conn. 46, 49, 621 A.2d 1311 (1993); accord Connelly v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. , , A.2d (2001); because commitment, unlike a criminal sentence, is not a sanction or penalty but, rather, a vehicle pursuant to which the court can ensure that a defendant who has engaged in unlawful conduct but has been found not guilty by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect will receive treatment for his or her mental disease or defect. See Connelly v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, . Strict application of the literal language of § 53a-38 (c), therefore, would preclude a determination that the petitioner is entitled to credit for the time that he was confined at Whiting following his insanity acquittal and subsequent commitment pursuant to § 17a-582.

For several reasons, however, we are persuaded that such a strict construction of § 53a-38 (c) is not warranted. First, it is by no means clear that the legislature, in enacting § 53a-38 (c), contemplated the scenario presented by this case. Because a defendant bears the burden of establishing the affirmative defense of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect under § 53a13; see footnote 1 of this opinion; and because proof of that affirmative defense relieves the defendant of criminal responsibility for his unlawful conduct, it is rare...