Connelly v. Connelly
| Decision Date | 22 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. 3-18-0193 |
| Citation | 2020 IL App (3d) 180193,438 Ill.Dec. 188,145 N.E.3d 724 |
| Parties | IN RE MARRIAGE OF Stacy CONNELLY, Petitioner-Appellee, and Ryan Connelly, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
David J. Silberman, of Weiman Silberman, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.
Gregory B. Jumbeck and Timothy J. Reeb, of Reich, Jumbeck & Stole, L.L.P., of Joliet, for appellee.
¶ 1 Petitioner Stacy Connelly and respondent Ryan Connelly entered into a joint parenting agreement (JPA) and marital settlement agreement (MSA) in 2015 that awarded residential custody of the parties' two children to Stacy and required Ryan to pay Stacy child support. Less than a year later, Ryan filed a petition to increase his parenting time, which the trial court granted. One year later, Ryan filed a petition to modify child support. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Ryan's petition. Ryan appeals, arguing that the trial court's denial of his petition constituted an abuse of discretion. We affirm.
¶ 3 The parties married in 2005. During their marriage, they had two children, one born in 2007, and one born in 2009. In 2014, Stacy filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In June 2015, the parties approved a JPA, and the trial court entered an order of joint custody. The judgment named Stacy as the residential parent of the children and established a visitation schedule for Ryan. Under the schedule, Ryan had parenting time with the children as follows: (1) every Wednesday from 5 p.m. to Thursday at 8 a.m., (2) every other weekend from Friday at 6 p.m. to Sunday at 6 p.m., (3) on four to five specified holidays a year, (4) on Father's Day, (5) on a portion of each child's birthday, (6) during half of winter break, (7) during spring break every other year, and (8) for two nonconsecutive weeks during the summer.
¶ 4 The trial court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage in September 2015, which incorporated the parties' MSA. In the MSA, Stacy was awarded as "her sole and exclusive property" a "Raymond James portfolio and the receipt of life insurance proceeds in the approximate total amount of $750,000." The MSA required Ryan to pay child support to Stacy of $1500 per month, which was 28% of Ryan's "net annualized salary of $100,000," plus 28% of "the net of any future performance bonus, commission, or additional income over [his] current annual base gross income of $100,000."
¶ 5 In May 2016, Ryan filed a petition to increase his parenting time. A few months later, the parties entered into an agreed order that (1) extended Ryan's weekend visitation from Sunday to Monday year round, (2) granted Ryan parenting time every other Monday during the school year, (3) expanded Ryan's summer weekend visitation so that it began on Thursdays instead of Fridays, and (4) discontinued Ryan's Wednesday parenting time every other week in the summers.
¶ 6 In October 2017, Ryan filed an amended petition to modify child support. In the petition, Ryan alleged that a substantial change in circumstances warranted a modification of child support because (1) his annual salary had increased from $100,000 to $110,000, (2) Stacy's income had increased by approximately 50%, and (3) his parenting time had increased from 32% to more than 45%.
¶ 7 The trial court held hearings on Ryan's petition. The evidence established that Stacy's annual salary in 2015 was $66,581. She also earned dividend income of $16,194 that year from the Raymond James portfolio she was awarded in the MSA. In 2016, Stacy's salary was $73,775. In 2017, Stacy's annual salary was $75,000. That year, Stacy also received a $5,000 bonus from her employer and $23,232 in dividend income from the Raymond James portfolio.
¶ 8 Stacy testified that the Raymond James portfolio and life insurance proceeds awarded to her in the MSA were an inheritance from her grandmother and great-aunt. Stacy testified that Ryan knew about the inheritance at the time of the dissolution judgment. She admitted that she did not include dividend income from the portfolio in her 2015 Income/Expense Affidavit filed in the dissolution case.
¶ 9 Stacy agreed that Ryan's visitation with the children has increased since the dissolution. She determined that Ryan spent approximately 137 nights with his children in 2017. Ryan testified that his time with his children has increased since August 1, 2016. He initially testified that he spent 151 nights with his children in 2017, but later admitted that the total was 148 nights. Ryan testified that he spends more money when the children are with him for food, clothes, daycare, gas, activities, and entertainment.
¶ 10 Ryan testified that he is a financial planner and employed by Waddell & Reed. At the time of the dissolution, he was earning $100,000 per year. In 2016, he received a promotion and earned $110,000 per year at the time of the hearing. In 2017, Ryan paid Stacy child support of $1500 per month, plus $14,740 based on his bonus income. Ryan never testified that he did not know Stacy would receive dividend income from the Raymond James portfolio.
¶ 11 After Ryan testified, Stacy moved for a directed finding in her favor, which the trial court granted. The trial court found that Ryan failed to establish a substantial change in circumstances because (1) Ryan's 10% salary increase did not constitute a substantial change, (2) "the marital settlement agreement precludes consideration of a change in Ryan's salary as a basis to modify child support" because the MSA contains a "true-up" provision requiring Ryan to pay 28% of any income over his base salary at the time of the dissolution, (3) Stacy's increase in income does not amount to a windfall for her and was considered by the parties at the time of the MSA, and (4) Ryan's increased parenting time, which amounted to 22 additional nights with his children, was not a substantial change. The court stated:
¶ 13 Pursuant to section 510(a)(1) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act), an order for child support may be modified "upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances." 750 ILCS 5/510(a)(1) (West 2018). The moving party bears the burden of showing that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since entry of the original child support judgment. In re Marriage of Garrett , 336 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1021, 271 Ill.Dec. 521, 785 N.E.2d 172 (2003). Courts are afforded wide latitude in determining whether a substantial change in circumstances has taken place. In re Marriage of Saracco , 2014 IL App (3d) 130741, ¶ 16, 387 Ill.Dec. 444, 22 N.E.3d 489. "[W]e will not disturb a trial court's ‘substantial change’ finding unless no reasonable person would agree with the decision." Id.
¶ 15 In 2015, when the trial court entered its child support award in this case, the Act's child support guidelines were based on a percentage-of-obligor-income model, requiring the noncustodial parent to pay a percentage of his or her net income to the custodial parent. See 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1) (West 2014). Under those guidelines, a noncustodial parent with two children was required to pay 28% of his net income to the custodial parent. Id.
¶ 16 In 2017, the Illinois General Assembly passed Public Act 99-764 (eff. July 1, 2017), which drastically changed the child support guidelines. See 750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2018). The amended guidelines now provide for an award of child support on an income-shares model, which takes into account the incomes of both parents. See id. The amended guidelines apply to child support proceedings commenced after July 1, 2017. See Pub. Act 99-764 (eff. July 1, 2017). If a child support judgment was entered prior to July 1, 2017, the amended guidelines will be applied only if the obligor can establish a substantial change in circumstances. See In re Marriage of Salvatore , 2019 IL App (2d) 180425, ¶ 20, 429 Ill.Dec. 626, 124 N.E.3d 1136. Section 510(a) of the Act states:
750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 2018).
The second sentence of section 510(a) prohibits obligors from claiming that a disparity in child support obligations under the preamended guidelines and the amended guidelines constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of child support. See Salvatore , 2019 IL App (2d) 180425, ¶ 33, 429 Ill.Dec. 626, 124 N.E.3d 1136.
¶ 18 Not all changes in circumstances constitute a substantial change in circumstances for modification of child support purposes. See In re Marriage of Rash , 406 Ill. App. 3d 381, 388, 347 Ill.Dec. 120, 941 N.E.2d 989 (2010). Changes in circumstances warrant modification of child support only when "equitable action by the court" is necessary to protect the children's best interests. See ...
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