Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., Civil Action No. 11-851
| Decision Date | 20 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11-851 |
| Parties | PATRICK S. CONNELLY, Plaintiff, v. THE STEEL VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Gary L. Lancaster,
Chief Judge.
This is a civil rights action. Plaintiff, Patrick Connelly ("Mr. Connelly"), alleges that, by failing to fully credit his out-of-state teaching experience for purposes of setting his salary, defendant, The Steel Valley School District ("Steel Valley"), violated his right to interstate travel under the Privileges or Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law.
Steel Valley moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that: (1) the claims are time-barred; and (2) the complaint fails to state a claim on the merits because the allegedly discriminatory classification does not plausibly burden Mr. Connelly's right to interstate travel.
For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted.
The following facts are as presented by Mr. Connelly in his complaint. Because Steel Valley has filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts these allegations as true for the purpose of deciding the motion.
In 2006, Mr. Connelly was hired to teach sixth grade in the Steel Valley School District. He continued to teach with Steel Valley through June 2011. Prior to being hired by Steel Valley, Mr. Connelly taught for nine years in Maryland public schools. Mr. Connelly is certified to teach in both Pennsylvania and Maryland.
Steel Valley sets teacher salaries using a system that takes into account both the teacher's educational background and teaching experience. At the time he was hired by Steel Valley, Mr. Connelly had nine years of teaching experience. In determining his starting salary, however, Mr. Connelly was credited with only one year of experience because he acquired his prior teaching experience exclusively outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
As a result of this decision, Mr. Connelly's 2006 starting salary was $38,023. Had he been given full credit for his years teaching in Maryland, his starting salary would have been $49,476. This discrepancy persisted throughout Mr. Connelly's time teaching in the Steel Valley School District. For the 2010-11 academic year, Mr. Connelly earned $43,335, while he would have been paid $65,854 had he been given full credit for his Marlyandteaching experience.
To survive a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, the claimant must allege sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, state "a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. _, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the facts alleged allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the opposing party may be liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 1949. The court, however, is "'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
Therefore, when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the following rules apply. The facts alleged in the complaint, but not the legal conclusions, must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The court may not dismiss a claim merely because it appears unlikely or improbable that the non-moving party can prove the facts alleged or will ultimately prevail on the merits. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 563 n.8. Instead, the court will assess whether the facts alleged raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidenceof the necessary elements. Id. at 556. In short, the motion to dismiss should not be granted if the claimant alleges facts that could, if established at trial, entitle him to relief. Id. at 563 n.8 .
The pending motion to dismiss presents two overarching issues: (1) whether the applicable statute of limitations bars Mr. Connelly's claims; and (2) whether the complaint states a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim. We find that Mr. Connelly brings a timely claim, but does not state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim because the classification alleged is based on location of teaching experience, not residency.
Steel Valley argues that both claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, so the two-year limitations period for personal injury claims in Pennsylvania applies. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524). "A section 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based." Id. The statute of limitations is typically presented as an affirmative defense, but may also be raised in a motion to dismiss. Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (collecting cases). Dismissal is warrantedwhere it is apparent on the face of the complaint that the claims are time-barred. West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 105 n.13 (3d Cir. 2010).
The complaint states that Mr. Connelly was initially harmed by Steel Valley's 2006 decision to deny him full credit for his prior teaching experience when it set his salary. Steel Valley argues that Mr. Connelly's claims accrued at this time, and thus the claims are time-barred because the statute of limitations ran in 2008. Mr. Connelly counters this argument by relying on the paycheck accrual rule, which provides that each paycheck affected by a discriminatory act gives rise to a new cause of action. Because the paycheck accrual rule applies to section 1983 actions, Mr. Connelly has stated a claim based on the paychecks he received within two years of filing his complaint.
The Supreme Court put an apparent end to use of the paycheck accrual rule in discriminatory compensation claims with its opinion in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). There, the Court held that a paycheck issued within the limitations period is not separately actionable simply because it "gives some effect to" a past discriminatory act. Id. at 632. Congress rejected this reasoning, and revived the paycheck accrual rule by passing the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 ("FPA"), Pub. L. No. 111-2. The FPA expressly overturned Ledbetter. Id. at § 2(l)-(2).
There is discord, however, among the courts that have addressed the effect of the Ledbetter decision and enactment of the FPA on the statute of limitations for claims brought under section 1983. As Steel Valley points out, the FPA expressly amends Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and modifies the Americans with Disabilities Act, but it is silent with respect to section 1983. In Russell v. County of Nassau, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded that, because of this silence, the Supreme Court's analysis in Ledbetter continues to control section 1983 discriminatory payment claims, and thus the paycheck accrual rule does not apply in this context. 696 F. Supp. 2d 213, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
In Groesch v. City of Springfield, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. 635 F.3d 1020, 1027 (7th Cir. 2011) . The court reasoned that the FPA "remov[ed] the Ledbetter decision as an obstacle to following our earlier precedents, which recognized the paycheck accrual rule for all allegations of unlawful discrimination in employee compensation." Id. at 1028. This approach is more persuasive than the Russell court's strict separation of Title VII and section 1983 statute of limitations analysis.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's pre-Ledbetter precedent is consistent with the precedent on which the Groesch court relied. Both courts of appeals recognize that theSupreme Court's decision in Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), controls the statute of limitations analysis in section 1983 cases. O'Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Hildebrandt v. 111. Dep't of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1036 (7th Cir. 2003) . Under Morgan, "discrete" discriminatory acts within the limitations period give rise to a claim, but these timely acts cannot revive untimely claims, even if they are related factually. 536 U.S. at 113. O'Connor demonstrates that this statute of limitations analysis applies consistently in employment discrimination cases, regardless of whether they are brought under Title VII or section 1983.
After the FPA, the Court of Appeals returned to applying the paycheck accrual rule in Title VII actions, considering paychecks arising from an allegedly discriminatory employment decision discrete, actionable acts. Mikula v. Allegheny County of Pa., 583 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) . Because the Court of Appeals has historically treated Title VII and section 1983 actions uniformly, the paycheck accrual rule applies in this case.
Accordingly, Mr. Connelly is eligible to recover damages for discriminatory paychecks received from June 28, 2009 - two years prior to the filing of the complaint in this case - to the end of Mr. Connelly's employment with Steel Valley in 2011. See Groesch, 635 F.3d at 1026 (). Mr. Connelly's complaint indicates that he received discriminatory paychecks within the statute of limitations period, as he alleges that his pay during the 2010-11 academic year was diminished by $22,519 because of the initial classification of his out-of-state teaching...
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