Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc.

• Citation: 75 Ill.2d 393,389 N.E.2d 155,27 Ill.Dec. 343
• Decision Date: 26 January 1979
• Docket Number: No. 50358,50358
• Parties: , 27 Ill.Dec. 343 John Darrill CONNELLY, Appellee, v. UNIROYAL, INC., et al. Appeal of UNIROYAL ENGLEBERT BELGIQUE, S. A.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Page 155

389 N.E.2d 155

75 Ill.2d 393, 27 Ill.Dec. 343

John Darrill CONNELLY, Appellee, v. UNIROYAL, INC., et al.

Appeal of UNIROYAL ENGLEBERT BELGIQUE, S. A.

No. 50358.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 26, 1979.

Rehearing Denied March 30, 1979.

Norton, Bonifield & Associates, Belleville, and Peter A. Fasseas, Chicago (Edward J. Kionka, Columbia, of counsel), for appellant John Darrill Connelly.

David J. Gibbons and Stephen A. Gorman, Chicago (Chadwell, Kayser, Ruggles, McGee & Hastings, Ltd., Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

GOLDENHERSH, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff, John Darrill Connelly, brought this action in the circuit court of Cook County against defendants, Uniroyal Englebert Belgique, S. A. (hereafter Englebert), and Uniroyal, Inc. (hereafter Uniroyal), and other defendants not involved in this appeal, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries. The circuit court denied both Englebert's motion to quash the service of summons and Uniroyal's motion for summary judgment and in its orders included the findings requisite to an application for leave to appeal. (S.Ct. Rule 308 (58 Ill.2d R. 308).) The appellate court allowed defendants' application for leave to appeal, affirmed as to Englebert, and reversed as to Uniroyal (55 Ill.App.3d 530, 13 Ill.Dec. 162, 370 N.E.2d 1189), and we have allowed defendant Englebert's petition for leave to appeal.

It is alleged in plaintiff's complaint, as amended, that in November 1970 he suffered personal injuries when a tire manufactured by Englebert and bearing Uniroyal's trademark failed while his 1969 Opel Kadett was being operated on a highway in Colorado. Plaintiff's father had purchased the automobile in September 1969 from a Buick dealer in Evanston. The tire bore the name "Uniroyal" and the legend "made in Belgium" and admittedly was manufactured by defendant Englebert, sold in Belgium to General Motors, and subsequently installed on the Opel when it was assembled at a General Motors plant in Belgium. The automobile was shipped to the United States for distribution by General Motors. It appears from answers to interrogatories that between the years 1968 and 1971 in excess of 4,000 Opels imported into the United States from Antwerp were delivered to dealers in Illinois each year; that in each of those years between 600 and 1,320 of the Opels delivered to Illinois dealers were equipped with tires manufactured by Englebert, and that the estimated number of Englebert tires mounted on Opels delivered in Illinois within each of those years ranged from 3,235 to 6,630.

Defendant Englebert alleged in its motion to quash the service of process that its principal place of business is in Belgium; that it is not registered to do business and has never had an agent, employee, representative or salesman in Illinois; that it has never possessed or controlled any real property or maintained any office or telephone listing in Illinois; that it has never sold or shipped any products into Illinois, either directly or indirectly; and that it has never advertised in Illinois. Defendant avers that the summons is "a nullity and (has) no legal effect in that Englebert Belgique has not done any of the acts enumerated in the Illinois Long Arm statute (ch. 110, sec. 17, Illinois Revised Stat.), nor has it otherwise submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state"; and that "there is a total lack of contact between Englebert Belgique and the State of Illinois so that an assertion of jurisdiction by this court over this defendant would be contrary to substantial justice and would violate the rights of this defendant under the Constitutions of the United States of America and of the State of Illinois."

The relevant statutes in pertinent part provide:

"Sec. 13.3. Service on private corporations.

A private corporation may be served (1) by leaving a copy of the process with its registered agent or any officer or agent of said corporation found anywhere in the State; or (2) in any other manner now or hereafter permitted by law. A private corporation may also be notified by publication and mail in like manner and with like effect as individuals. " Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 110, par. 13.3.

"Sec. 16. Personal service outside State.

(1) Personal service of summons may be made upon any party outside the State. If upon a citizen or resident of this State or upon a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, it shall have the force and effect of personal service of summons within this State; otherwise it shall have the force and effect of service by publication. " Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 110, par. 16(1).

"Sec. 17. Act submitting to jurisdiction Process.

(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:

(a) The transaction of any business within this State;

(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;

(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, as provided in this Section, may be made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, as provided in this Act, with the same force and effect as though summons had been personally served within this State.

(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this Section.

(4) Nothing herein contained limits or affects the right to serve any process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law. " Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 110, par. 17.

In affirming the order denying Englebert's motion to quash, following a review of the authorities the appellate court said:

"Based on these authorities, we conclude that the phrase 'commission of a tortious act' as employed in the long-arm statute applies not only to an injury which occurs in Illinois, but also to all elements and conduct which significantly relate to or have significant causal connection with the injury suffered." 55 Ill.App.3d 530, 535, 13 Ill.Dec. 162, 166, 370 N.E.2d 1189, 1193.

In Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1978), 72 Ill.2d 548, 21 Ill.Dec. 888, 382 N.E.2d 252, we considered the question whether Beech Aircraft was amenable to process in this State in an action for the wrongful deaths of two residents of Illinois who were killed when an airplane manufactured by Beech crashed in Canada. We noted that in Shaffer v. Heitner (1977), 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683, the Supreme Court had held "that the standards elucidated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, continued to be the test of a State's jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. The standards prescribed in International Shoe Co. are that 'due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment In personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." ' (326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102.)" 72 Ill.2d 548, 553-54, 21 Ill.Dec. 888, 890, 382 N.E.2d 252, 254.

We quoted from Shaffer v. Heitner the Supreme Court's comment that:

"(T)he inquiry into the State's jurisdiction over a foreign corporation appropriately focused not on whether the corporation was 'present' but on whether there have been

'such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.' (326 U.S. 310, 317, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102.)

Mechanical or quantitative evaluations of the defendant's activities in the forum could not resolve the question of reasonableness:

'Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment In personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.' (326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 160, 90 L.Ed. 95, 104." 433 U.S. 186, 203-04, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2580, 53 L.Ed.2d 683, 697. We reviewed this court's earlier opinion in Nelson v. Miller (1957), 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, wherein the court said:

"The foundations of jurisdiction include the interest that a State has in providing redress in its own courts against persons who inflict injuries upon, or otherwise incur obligations to, those within the ambit of the State's legitimate protective policy. The limits on the exercise of jurisdiction are not 'mechanical or quantitative' (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)), but are to be found only in the requirement that the provisions made for this purpose must be fair and reasonable in the circumstances, and must give to the defendant adequate notice of the claim against him, and an adequate and realistic opportunity to appear and be heard in his defense." (11 Ill.2d 378, 384, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676).

We agreed with the statement in Nelson that "Sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Practice Act reflect a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-process clause." 11 Ill.2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679.

In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (1961), 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766, this court said:

"As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its...