Conner v. Branstad

• Decision Date: 09 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 4-86-CV-30871.,4-86-CV-30871.
• Parties: Evert CONNER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Terry BRANSTAD, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

839 F. Supp. 1346

Evert CONNER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Terry BRANSTAD, et al., Defendants.

No. 4-86-CV-30871.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, C.D.

December 9, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Sondra B. Kaska, Iowa City, IA, and Richard A. Pundt, Cedar Rapids, IA, for plaintiffs.

Gordon E. Allen, Asst. Atty. Gen. for the State of Iowa.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BENNETT, United States Magistrate Judge.

This is a class action lawsuit in which Plaintiffs' class, a group of institutionalized mentally and physically disabled individuals, challenges the State of Iowa's system for providing services to individuals with mental and physical disabilities as violating federal statutory and constitutional principles. Specifically, this litigation arises from Defendants' continued providing of services to Plaintiffs' class in an institutional setting rather than in a community based environment advocated by Plaintiffs.¹

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b). Defendants' motion raises thorny legal questions regarding discernment of the living environment and habilitation to which Plaintiffs are entitled under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a multiple of federal civil rights statutes. A hearing on Defendants' motion was held on October 7, 1993. Plaintiffs were represented at the hearing by Sondra B. Kaska of Iowa City, Iowa and Richard A. Pundt of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and Defendants were represented by Gordon E. Allen, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Iowa. On December 3, 1993, Plaintiffs filed their Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Resistance to Motion for Summary Judgment. On December 6, 1993, Defendants filed their Reply to Supplemental Brief of Plaintiffs. The matter is now fully submitted.

This case recently had its seventh anniversary; Plaintiffs having filed their initial complaint in this litigation on December 8, 1986.² Some of the history of this lengthy litigation bears being set out. On September 8, 1987, Judge Vietor conditionally certified a class to consist of "all persons who are or who may become residents of Glenwood or Woodward State Hospital-Schools and who could be appropriately placed in community-based living environments but who remain institutionalized." On July 8, 1988, this case was placed on Judge Vietor's trial calendar for November 14, 1988. Almost immediately, Plaintiffs moved to continue the trial date. On September 12, 1988, Judge Vietor granted the first of five trial continuances in this matter. On December 7, 1988, the case was transferred to the docket of Judge Stuart. On April 2, 1993, the parties consented to proceed before the undersigned. On May 27, 1993, the court set this matter for trial commencing on February 8, 1994.

Despite the age of this case, the parties have engaged in several recent exercises in legal jousting. On November 4, 1993, the court denied Defendant's Motion for Joinder of Parties in which Defendants sought to join all 99 Iowa counties as a class defendant in this case. On the same date, the court also rejected Defendants' attempt to decertify Plaintiffs' class. On November 17, 1993, the court denied Defendants' latest motion for a continuance of the trial. Also on November 17, 1993, the court granted an eleventh hour motion to intervene by parents and guardians of Woodward and Glenwood residents, and the bargaining unit employees at those institutions.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Undisputed Facts.

For the purposes of the summary judgement motion only, the court finds the following facts:

1. Plaintiffs' class consists of all individuals who are or may become residents of Glenwood and Woodward State Hospital Schools and who could be placed in community based residential facilities but who remain at Glenwood and Woodward.³

2. Residents of Glenwood and Woodward are persons with disabilities, as that term is defined under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

3. An undisclosed number of Glenwood and Woodward residents are children, ages birth through 21, who are covered under the IDEA.

4. Glenwood and Woodward are both owned and operated by the State of Iowa. Both facilities have been certified as Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded ("ICF/MR's") pursuant to Title XIX, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d.

5. Glenwood and Woodward had a combined population of 822 residents as of July 1, 1993.

6. Approximately 98 to 99 percent of Glenwood and Woodward residents qualify for Medicaid.

7. Federal funds provide approximately 66 percent of the cost of care and services for residents at Glenwood and Woodward. Pursuant to Iowa law, the counties of legal settlement of Glenwood residents are billed for 80 percent of the non-federal share of their residents' costs. The counties of legal settlement of Woodward are billed for 84 percent of the non-federal costs. For non-medicaid eligible residents, the counties are billed for 80 percent of the cost of care.

8. Community based facilities for mentally retarded individuals are operated by private entities. There are 72 providers certified as ICF/MR's in Iowa.

9. Defendant Charles M. Palmer is the director of the Department of Human Services ("DHS") for the State of Iowa.

10. DHS is responsible for providing services and programs for the mentally retarded and developmentally disabled.

11. Defendant Terry Branstad is the Governor of the State of Iowa. Defendant Branstad, in his capacity as Iowa's Governor, is responsible for ensuring that the laws are faithfully executed in the State of Iowa.

12. Defendant William E. Campbell is the Superintendent of Glenwood.

13. Defendant Michael Davis is the Superintendent of Woodward.

B. Disputed Facts

1. Are the Plaintiff residents of Glenwood and Woodward who are covered under IDEA being provided with an appropriate public education tailored to meet the unique needs of each resident pursuant to each resident's individual assessments.

2. Are Plaintiffs "otherwise qualified" for placement in community based ICF/MR's?

3. Are Plaintiffs being excluded from these programs solely by reason of the severity and multiplicity of their handicaps and whether Defendants could have made reasonable accommodations for Plaintiffs' handicaps.

4. Do the conditions and habilitative services provided to residents of Glenwood and Woodward substantially meet professionally accepted minimum standards for care and habilitation?

5. Are the minimum standards of care and habilitation established by Title XIX being met in Woodward and Glenwood?

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment presents the court with a host of issues all related to Plaintiffs' continued residence and receipt of habilitation services at Glenwood and Woodward. Following an overview of the standards for considering a motion for summary judgment, the court will first consider the issue of whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that Plaintiffs receive habilitation services in the least restrictive setting consistent with qualified professional judgment. Next, the court must consider whether Plaintiffs have received minimally adequate habilitation consistent with qualified professional judgment. Third, the court will address Plaintiffs' claim that they are entitled by procedural due process to periodic hearings. Following that discussion, the court will then turn its attention to the issue of whether Plaintiffs may enforce the Medicaid provisions of Title XIX through a lawsuit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Fifth, the court will discuss the validity of Plaintiffs' claims brought pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Finally, the court will consider Plaintiffs' claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

A. Standards for Summary Judgment.

The standard for granting summary judgment is firmly established. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is proper only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law." Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)); Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir.1990).⁴ A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here the named Plaintiff and class members, and give these Plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1991).

The Eighth Circuit recognizes "that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine issues of fact away from juries." Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238. The Eighth Circuit, however, also follows the principle that "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir.1992).

Procedurally, the moving party bears "the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show lack of...