Conner v. Motors Ins. Corp.

Decision Date05 December 1968
Docket NumberNo. 2505,2505
Citation216 So.2d 555
PartiesJohn A. CONNER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOTORS INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Peter A. Ciambotti, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellant.

Jones & Jones, by J. B. Jones, Jr., Cameron, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before TATE, FRUGE , and SAVOY, JJ.

TATE, Judge.

The plaintiff Conner sues his collision insurer ('Motors') for property damage sustained by a 1965 sport coupe. The collision policy had been obtained on a four-door sedan, but an automatic coverage clause is relied upon as also affording collision insurance upon the damaged vehicle. The defendant appeals from adverse judgment.

The sole issue upon appeal is whether the automatic insurance clause applies. Under this coverage, other vehicles acquired during the policy period are automatically insured if the company insures all private passenger automobiles 'owned by the named insured on the Date of such acquisition'. 1

The appellant Motors contends that the automatic coverage clause did not apply to the sport coupe damaged by the wreck, because, earlier on the 'date of acquisition' (March 31, 1966) of this vehicle, Conner had owned an uninsured 1963 Bel Air. He had traded the Bel Air for the sport coupe when he acquired the latter.

After a scholarly and full discussion, the trial court held that the sport coupe acquired during the policy period was automatically insured, since at the time (moment) of its acquisition the defendant Motors did insure all of his other passenger automobiles--i.e., at the time of acquisition, Conner owned only the 1965 four-door sedan described as insured by the policy. (This was the only vehicle owned by Conner at the time, because he acquired the sport coupe simultaneously with giving in exchange for it the uninsured Bel Air plus a cash boot.)

The trial court thus felt that the new sport coupe was automatically insured upon its acquisition no less than if Conner had paid all cash (for upon its acquisition, after the simultaneous trade of the 1963 Bel Air, the coupe was the only other car owned by Conner except for the insured four-door sedan); or no less than, for instance, if the uninsured Bel Air had been sold a day or a month earlier rather than simultaneously traded on the same date with the acquisition of the new sport coupe.

The trial court thus felt that the automatic coverage conditioned upon the company insuring all vehicles owned on the 'date' of the acquisition, referred to the company's insuring all vehicles at the particular point of time at which the transaction occurred, rather than during the entire calendar day on which the transaction occurred. On the other hand, the defendant insurer's counsel argues that, by the literal terms of the policy, the company did not insure All of the vehicles owned by Conner on the date (March 31st) he acquired the sports coupe, because for a portion of that calender day (i.e., prior to the trade-in) Conner owned an uninsured vehicle.

We agree with the trial court that the latter type of technical interpretation should not apply. In the first place, a prime meaning of 'date' is 'the Time at which an event occurs' or 'a given Point of time', not (as appellant suggests) the Calender day on which it occurs. Webster's New International Dictionary, verbo 'date' (3rd ed. 1961); Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, verbo 'date' (1961).

Further, in the connotation of ordinary speech, the reference to owning two vehicles on a given date connotes simultaneous ownership of them at the same time on that day, rather than ownership of one during only one part of the day and ownership of the other during only another part of the day. Words of an insurance policy should be construed in their ordinary and popular sense rather than in a technical sense, with ambiguities to be construed against the insurer which prepared the policy and in favor of coverage. Civil Code Articles 1947, 1957; Seguin v. Continental Service Life & Health Ins. Co., 230 La. 533, 89 So.2d 113, 55 A.L.R.2d 1014.

Thus, in explaining the purpose and application of the clause, it is stated at 7 Blashfield-Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, § 316.4 (3d ed. 1966): 'Coverage of after-acquired vehicles is automatically extended under some policy provisions where all automobiles owned by the policy holder have been insured by the Company on the date of delivery (or acquisition) of the newly acquired vehicle. For automatic coverage of newly acquired...

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12 cases
  • Walter v. Marine Office of America
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • August 16, 1976
    ...Ins. Co., La.App., 1967, 203 So.2d 762, application denied, 205 So.2d 605, 251 La., 687 (automobile insurance); Conner v. Motors Ins. Corp., La.App., 1968, 216 So.2d 555 (automobile insurance); J. M. Brown Constr. v. D & M Mechanical Contractors, Inc., La.App., 1969, 222 So.2d 93 (professio......
  • Business Air Center v. Puritan Ins. Co., Civ. No. 81-2103.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana
    • September 11, 1984
    ...Art. 194611); Andrus v. Police Jury of Parish of Lafayette, 270 So.2d 280, 282 (La.App., 3rd Cir. 1972); Conner v. Motors Ins. Co., 216 So.2d 555, 557 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1968). The special rules of construction favoring the insured apply only when there is no popular understanding of the chal......
  • Ellerson v. Scott
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • October 1, 1975
    ...200 So.2d 303 (La.App.1967); Altazan v. Reed, 154 So.2d 610 (La.App.1963). Its opinion conflicts with Conner v. Motors Insurance Corp., 216 So.2d 555 (La.App., 3d Cir. 1968). The plaintiff Ellerson contends that the additional vehicle was automatically covered by virtue of the provisions in......
  • In re Warren, 4:05 BK 40022.
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Arkansas
    • March 20, 2006
    ...(1980) (citing as examples Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Co., 263 U.S. 167, 44 S.Ct. 90, 68 L.Ed. 235 (1923); Conner v. Motors Ins. Corp., 216 So.2d 555, 557 (La. Ct.App.1968)). The court in Anderson opined that the rule interpreting "date" to include a specific time limitation "properly ap......
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