Connick v. City of Chehalis

• Decision Date: 18 December 1958
• Docket Number: No. 34282,34282
• Citation: 333 P.2d 647,53 Wn.2d 288
• Parties: Percy CONNICK and Nora Connick, husband and wife, Appellants, v. The CITY OF CHEHALIS, a municipal corporation, and Walter B. Graham, Sr., Fred Linn, Fred Moore, W. A. Alexander, and George Benton, the members of and constituting the Municipal Firemen's Relief and Pension Board of the City of Chehalis, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 288

53 Wn.2d 288

333 P.2d 647

Percy CONNICK and Nora Connick, husband and wife, Appellants, v. The CITY OF CHEHALIS, a municipal corporation, and Walter B Graham, Sr., Fred Linn, Fred Moore, W. A. Alexander, and George Benton, the members of and constituting the Municipal Firemen's Relief and Pension Board of the City of Chehalis Respondents.

No. 34282.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 1.

Dec. 18, 1958.

Hull & Armstrong, J. A. VanderStoep, Chehalis, for appellants.

Lee J. Campbell, Chehalis, for respondents.

OTT, Justice.

Percy Connick (who will be referred to herein as though he were the sole appellant) was in continuous service as a paid fireman in the Chehalis fire department from 1926 until 1950. He held the rank of captain for more than one year next preceding his retirement on March 31, 1950. The monthly salary attached to the rank of captain at that time was $280 per month. He was paid a fireman's retirement pension in the sum of $125 a month, as provided by Laws of 1935, chapter 39, § 2, p. 101 et seq. The monthly salary attached to the rank of captain of the Chehalis fire department was subsequently increased at various times to $305, $335, and, ultimately, to $355.

Mr. Connick commenced this action against the city of Chehalis and the firemen's relief and pension board of the city, in which he contended that the applicable pension act granted to him a fluctuating pension of one half of the salary of an active member of the fire department holding the rank of captain, and prayed for judgment accordingly.

The cause was tried to the court upon stipulated facts. Judgment was granted increasing his monthly pension allowance to one half of the salary which he had received while holding the rank of captain.

Percy Connick appeals, assigning as error the granting of a fixed rather than a fluctuating pension.

The city of Chehalis and the firemen's relief and pension board have not cross-appealed; hence, the question of the constitutionality of the 1935 act, which limited the maximum pension payments for firemen to $125 per month, is not before us.

The provision of the retirement act, which is pertinent to the issue here presented, is as follows:

'* * * such member so retired shall be paid from such fund a monthly pension equal to one-half the amount of salary attached to the rank which he may have held in said fire department for one year next preceding the date of such retirement. * * *' Laws of 1919, chapter 196, § 4, p. 670 et seq.

Appellant contends that, giving this clause its proper grammatical construction, the legislature granted fluctuating pensions to qualified pensioners. Although the clause is grammatically susceptible of such a construction, the language of the statute likewise can be constructed to sustain respondents' contention.

In O'Neil v. Harding, 1924, 314 Ill. 516, 145 N.E. 593, the supreme court of Illinois, in construing a similar statute, said:

'It is contended by appellant that the amount of the pension should vary as the 'salary attached to the rank' of active firemen varies. He argues that the phrase 'at the date of his retirement' does not qualify the word 'salary' but the group of words 'the rank which he may have held in the fire service.' This is a refined and artificial construction which does not find a basis in the context. The intention of the legislature is expressed in the whole sentence and not in a part of it. The amount of the pension is determined by the amount of the salary 'attached to' the rank held by the pensioner at the date of his retirement. This indicates that the pension shall be a fixed amount determined at the time the pension begins, and there is nothing to indicate that the amount of the pension is to fluctuate from month to month. A pensioner who is drawing a pension under the section under consideration is entirely severed from the public service and is not subject to call. The Legislature has not said that his pension shall vary as the salary of those on active duty varies, and we can think of no sound reason why it should say it.'

See, also, Sup v. Cervenka, 1928, 331 Ill. 459, 163 N.E. 396, and Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Relief & Pension Fund v. Hicks, 1932, 161 Okl. 116, 17 P.2d 428.

Our function is to ascertain the meaning which the 1919 legislature intended should be given to the clause in question. See 50 Am.Jur. 224, § 236. In placing a judicial construction upon a legislative enactment, the entire sequence of all statutes relating to the same subject matter should be considered. State ex rel. Washington Mutual Savings Bank v. City of Bellingham, 1935, 183 Wash. 415, 48 P.2d 609. A review of the firemen's pension acts from 1909 through 1957 discloses that the 1929 legislature rejected a provision which clearly granted a fluctuating pension, and enacted in lieu thereof a statute which definitely established fixed retirement benefits.

Since legislative policy changes as economic and sociological conditions change, the relevant legislative acts which are nearer in time to the enactment in question are more indicative of legislative intent than those which are more remote. Although the act passed by the 1957 legislature can be construed as providing for a fluctuating pension, considering the change in economic conditions from those which existed in 1919, we conclude that the legislative history indicates that the 1919 legislature intended to establish for firemen a fixed, rather than a fluctuating, pension system.

In the instant proceeding, the appellant has entirely severed his employment in public service. His pension payments, being deferred compensation for services previously rendered, must be based upon the contract existing prior to the termination of his employment.

Appellant's contention would deny a pensioner deferred compensation based upon services he performed, and could conceivably reduce or terminate his earned pension benefits. We are convinced that such an interpretation of the statute is not in keeping with the legislative intent.

The judgment is affirmed.

HILL, C. J., and MALLERY and WEAVER, JJ., concur.

FINLEY, Justice (concurring in the result).

This court...